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Monthly archives: February 2005
Lee Even Stevens, Part II—The Sexy Version
2005-02-25 12:40
Other entries in the Trade Series: Mike: I’ll Take Manhattan: Baseball’s Most Lopsided Trades I'll Take Manhattan: Baseball's Most Lopsided Trades, Revised Edition I'll Take Manhattan: Baseball's Most Lopsided Trades, Revised Edition (Cont.) Studes: The Best and Worst Teams of the Trade OK, I wasn't satisfied with the first go-round. Let's go with something more straightforward. How about we just rank the trades by how well the players performed after the trade (i.e., Total Post WSAB): #1:Date: May 2, 1975 Trade: The Cubs sent Burt Hooton to Los Angeles for Geoff Zahn and Eddie Solomon. Pre Career WS Diff: 31 (favoring LA) Post Career WS Diff: 13 (Chi) Pre Year WS Diff: 0 Post Year WS Diff: 15 (LA) WSAB Pre Career Diff: 21 (LA) WSAB Post Career Diff: 1 (LA) WSAB Pre Yr Diff: 1 (LA) WSAB Post Yr Diff: 10 (LA) Overall Avg Diff: 11.5 Post Avg Diff: 9.8 Total Post WSAB: 125 WSDiff: 14 Now that's what I'm talking about. Hooton and Zahn were pretty productive pitchers swapped for each other before they turned 30. However, Hooton was the more productive of the two. Solomon had a few decent years later on. Hooton went from 0-2, 8.18 in Chicago to 18-7, 2.82. Zahn and Solomon were a bust in Chicago, but they both turned their careers around, Zahn in Minnesota and Solomon in Pittsburgh.
#2:Date: April 7, 1979 Trade: The Dodgers sent Rick Rhoden to Pittsburgh for Jerry Reuss. Pre Career WS Diff: 45 (favoring LA) Post Career WS Diff: 6 (Pit) Pre Year WS Diff: 0 Post Year WS Diff: 7 (LA) WSAB Pre Career Diff: 21 (LA) WSAB Post Career Diff: 0 WSAB Pre Yr Diff: 0 WSAB Post Yr Diff: 1 (LA) Overall Avg Diff: 10.0 Post Avg Diff: 3.5 Total Post WSAB: 112 WSDiff: 6 This one's even better. Both of these pitchers were productive for their new teams for years, who were traded before turning 30. Rhoden was four years younger but was about as productive over the rest of his career.
#3:Date: May 26, 1959 Trade: The Yankees sent Jerry Lumpe, Johnny Kucks, and Tom Sturdivant to the Kansas City A's for Ralph Terry and Hector Lopez. Pre Career WS Diff: 9 (favoring NYY) Post Career WS Diff: 2 (NYY) Pre Year WS Diff: 6 (NYY) Post Year WS Diff: 2 (NYY) WSAB Pre Career Diff: 4 (NYY) WSAB Post Career Diff: 9 (NYY) WSAB Pre Yr Diff: 2 (NYY) WSAB Post Yr Diff: 7 (NYY) Overall Avg Diff: 5.1 Post Avg Diff: 5.0 Total Post WSAB: 105 WSDiff: 11 This is odd: one of the Yankee-KC A's deals from the era in which the latter was basically the former's Quad-A team. Lumpe was the reason the trade "worked". He had been a poor defensive player from the left side of the infield. The A's moved him to second and he had relatively productive career. Terry was the most productive player on the Yankee side of the equation after being exiled for seasoning to KC.
#4:Date: December 11, 1935 Trade: The Yankees sent Johnny Allen to Cleveland for Monte Pearson and Steve Sundra. Pre Career WS Diff: 3 (favoring Clev) Post Career WS Diff: 9 (NYY) Pre Year WS Diff: 0 Post Year WS Diff: 5 (Clev) WSAB Pre Career Diff: 3 (NYY) WSAB Post Career Diff: 4 (Clev) WSAB Pre Yr Diff: 0 WSAB Post Yr Diff: 5 (Clev) Overall Avg Diff: 3.6 Post Avg Diff: 5.8 Total Post WSAB: 102 WSDiff: 13 Allen won 20 games and Pearson won 19 the year after the trade.
#5:Date: December 6, 1989 Trade: The Mets sent Randy Myers and Kip Gross to Cincinnati for John Franco and Don Brown. Pre Career WS Diff: 52 (favoring NYM) Post Career WS Diff: 1 (Cin) Pre Year WS Diff: 0 Post Year WS Diff: 6 (Cin) WSAB Pre Career Diff: 37 (NYM) WSAB Post Career Diff: 7 (Cin) WSAB Pre Yr Diff: 0 WSAB Post Yr Diff: 6 (Cin) Overall Avg Diff: 13.6 Post Avg Diff: 5.0 Total Post WSAB: 83 WSDiff: 8
#6:Date: June 5, 1932 Trade: The Red Sox sent Danny MacFayden to the New York Yankees for Ivy Andrews, Hank Johnson, and $50K. Pre Career WS Diff: 35 (favoring NYY) Post Career WS Diff: 8 (Bos) Pre Year WS Diff: 2 (Bos) Post Year WS Diff: 4 (Bos) WSAB Pre Career Diff: 28 (NYY) WSAB Post Career Diff: 3 (Bos) WSAB Pre Yr Diff: 0 WSAB Post Yr Diff: 5 (Bos) Overall Avg Diff: 10.6 Post Avg Diff: 5.0 Total Post WSAB: 81 WSDiff: 11
#7:Date: November 18, 1963 Trade: Kansas City sent Jerry Lumpe, Ed Rakow and Dave Wickersham to Detroit for Rocky Colavito, Bob Anderson, and $50K. Pre Career WS Diff: 87 (favoring KC) Post Career WS Diff: 1 (Det) Pre Year WS Diff: 0 Post Year WS Diff: 15 (Det) WSAB Pre Career Diff: 70 (KC) WSAB Post Career Diff: 11 (KC) WSAB Pre Yr Diff: 0 WSAB Post Yr Diff: 4 (Det) Overall Avg Diff: 23.5 Post Avg Diff: 7.8 Total Post WSAB: 65 WSDiff: 12 What's the deal with Jerry Lumpe? Colavito was the big player here, but he stayed in KC for only one year.
#8:Date: December 20, 1933 Trade: Washington sent Goose Goslin to Detroit for John Stone. Pre Career WS Diff: 216 (favoring Det) Post Career WS Diff: 10 (Was) Pre Year WS Diff: 0 Post Year WS Diff: 8 (Det) WSAB Pre Career Diff: 142 (Det) WSAB Post Career Diff: 0 WSAB Pre Yr Diff: 0 WSAB Post Yr Diff: 8 (Det) Overall Avg Diff: 48.0 Post Avg Diff: 6.5 Total Post WSAB: 64 WSDiff: 10 Gooslin was 32 but had just three full seasons left in his tank. Stone was five years younger but had just four seasons, productive ones, in Washington.
#9:Date: December 8, 1948 Trade: Pittsburgh sent Frankie Gustine and Cal McLish to the Cubs for Clyde McCullough and Cliff Chambers. Pre Career WS Diff: 50 (favoring Chi) Post Career WS Diff: 2 (Chi) Pre Year WS Diff: 0 Post Year WS Diff: 19 (Pit) WSAB Pre Career Diff: 13 (Chi) WSAB Post Career Diff: 13 (Chi) WSAB Pre Yr Diff: 0 WSAB Post Yr Diff: 8 (Pit) Overall Avg Diff: 13.1 Post Avg Diff: 10.5 Total Post WSAB: 55 WSDiff: 15
#10:Date: August 28, 1916 Trade: The Cubs sent Mickey Doolan and Heinie Zimmerman to the Giants for Larry Doyle, Herb Hunter, and Merwin Jacobson. Pre Career WS Diff: 89 (favoring NYG) Post Career WS Diff: 8 (Chi) Pre Year WS Diff: 4 (Chi) Post Year WS Diff: 4 (NYG) WSAB Pre Career Diff: 5 (Chi) WSAB Post Career Diff: 0 WSAB Pre Yr Diff: 4 (Chi) WSAB Post Yr Diff: 1 (NYG) Overall Avg Diff: 14.4 Post Avg Diff: 3.3 Total Post WSAB: 54 WSDiff: 8
#11:Date: December 10, 1952 Trade: The White Sox sent Chuck Stobbs to Washington for Mike Fornieles. Pre Career WS Diff: 34 (favoring WAS) Post Career WS Diff: 9 (Chi) Pre Year WS Diff: 0 Post Year WS Diff: 1 (WAS) WSAB Pre Career Diff: 14 (WAS) WSAB Post Career Diff: 4 (Chi) WSAB Pre Yr Diff: 0 WSAB Post Yr Diff: 0 Overall Avg Diff: 7.8 Post Avg Diff: 3.5 Total Post WSAB: 54 WSDiff: 13 Stobbs for Fornieles? Now, that's sexy.
#12:Date: July 19, 2000 Trade: Texas sent Esteban Loaiza to Toronto for Darwin Cubillan and Michael Young. Pre Career WS Diff: 37 (favoring Tor) Post Career WS Diff: 2 (Tor) Pre Year WS Diff: 5 (Tor) Post Year WS Diff: 7 (Tor) WSAB Pre Career Diff: 8 (Tor) WSAB Post Career Diff: 2 (Tex) WSAB Pre Yr Diff: 1 (Tor) WSAB Post Yr Diff: 5 (Tor) Overall Avg Diff: 8.4 Post Avg Diff: 4.0 Total Post WSAB: 50 WSDiff: 4
#13:Date: December 19, 1985 Trade: Cincinnati sent Dann Bilardello, Andy McGaffigan, John Stuper, and Jay Tibbs to Montreal for Bill Gullickson and Sal Butera. Pre Career WS Diff: 5 (Favoring Cin) Post Career WS Diff: 1 (Cin) Pre Year WS Diff: 0 Post Year WS Diff: 2 (Mon) WSAB Pre Career Diff: 15 (Cin) WSAB Post Career Diff: 1 (Cin) WSAB Pre Yr Diff: 0 WSAB Post Yr Diff: 1 (Cin) Overall Avg Diff: 3.1 Post Avg Diff: 1.3 Total Post WSAB: 49 WSDiff: 2 Catchers Butera and Bilardello was a wash. As for the pitchers, Stuper was done. McGaffigan and Tibbs together were about the same as Gullickson.
#14:Date: October 24, 1973 Trade: Kansas City sent Dick Drago to the Red Sox for Marty Pattin. Pre Career WS Diff: 0 Post Career WS Diff: 7 (Bos) Pre Year WS Diff: 0 Post Year WS Diff: 8 (Bos) WSAB Pre Career Diff: 1 (KC) WSAB Post Career Diff: 6 (Bos) WSAB Pre Yr Diff: 0 WSAB Post Yr Diff: 7 (Bos) Overall Avg Diff: 3.6 Post Avg Diff: 7.0 Total Post WSAB: 44 WSDiff: 13
#15:Date: August 29, 1990 Trade: Oakland sent Felix Jose, Daryl Green, and Stan Royer to St. Louis for Willie McGee. Pre Career WS Diff: 136 (favoring Oak) Post Career WS Diff: 8 (Oak) Pre Year WS Diff: 6 (Oak) Post Year WS Diff: 0 WSAB Pre Career Diff: 62 (Oak) WSAB Post Career Diff: 4 (StL) WSAB Pre Yr Diff: 5 (Oak) WSAB Post Yr Diff: 1 (Oak) Overall Avg Diff: 27.8 Post Avg Diff: 3.3 Total Post WSAB: 40 WSDiff: 12
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Lee Even Stevens
2005-02-24 12:07
Other entries in the Trade Series: Mike: I’ll Take Manhattan: Baseball’s Most Lopsided Trades I'll Take Manhattan: Baseball's Most Lopsided Trades, Revised Edition I'll Take Manhattan: Baseball's Most Lopsided Trades, Revised Edition (Cont.) Studes: The Best and Worst Teams of the Trade Russell Ziskey: "Can I have your last beer?" [I was going to call it "Tit For Tat" but "The Man" wouldn't let me. Ever since that Janet Jackson thing…] After looking at the most lopsided trades of all time, I thought it would be interesting to take a look at the most even. At the moment of consummation trades are often evaluated as a "win" for both sides, but how many actually have been? In looking at the data, there are thousands (2452 actually) of trades in which the balance sheet evens out for both teams (i.e., that the Win Shares Above Baseline differential is zero). However, in the vast majority of these trades both teams received players who had very little value over the rest of their careers. They are even trades, but they are not exactly "wins" for any of the teams involved. We need to filter the data based on the total WSAB after the trade for all of players involved. Also, given that the WSAB varies according to role, what we really need is a way to combine the WSAB differential with straight Win Shares amassed after the trade. Summing the two won't work since sometimes the two will cancel each other out if one is negative and the other positive. We need to measure the total differential (i.e., via absolute values). In that way, every post-trade Win Share is worth one point, but those in the WSAB stat count for two. Let's call this WSDiff. I set the thresholds for the two derived stats at a minimum of 10 WSAB in total after the trade and a maximum WSDiff at 15. I got 188 records back, which would translate into 94 two-way trades. But how to rank them after that? I next created a new derived stat, Post WS Avg, that takes the average of all the post-trade Win Share differentials (actually, of their absolute values). That is, the ones for career Win Shares, single-season Win Shares, career WSAB, and single-season WSAB. Anyway, the trades in which the teams experienced as close to the same performance level during the remainder of the given season and over the rest of the players' careers would be considered even trades. Without further ado, here they are (ranked by Post Avg Diff): #1:Date: May 19, 1970 Trade: San Francisco sent Frank Linzy to St. Louis for Jerry Johnson. Pre Career WS Diff: 51 (favoring STL) Post Career WS Diff: 0 Pre Year WS Diff: 2 (SF) Post Year WS Diff: 1 (STL) WSAB Pre Career Diff: 37 (STL) WSAB Post Career Diff: 3 (SF) WSAB Pre Yr Diff: 0 WSAB Post Yr Diff: 0 Overall Avg Diff: 11.8 Post Avg Diff: 1 Total Post WSAB: 11 WSDiff: 3 One middle of the road reliever for another. Johnson had a very good year in 1971 as the Giants won the division. Linzy best years were later on.
#2:Date: December 19, 1985 Trade: Cincinnati sent Dann Bilardello, Andy McGaffigan, John Stuper, and Jay Tibbs to Montreal for Bill Gullickson and Sal Butera. Pre Career WS Diff: 5 (Favoring Cin) Post Career WS Diff: 1 (Cin) Pre Year WS Diff: 0 Post Year WS Diff: 2 (Mon) WSAB Pre Career Diff: 15 (Cin) WSAB Post Career Diff: 1 (Cin) WSAB Pre Yr Diff: 0 WSAB Post Yr Diff: 1 (Cin) Overall Avg Diff: 3.1 Post Avg Diff: 1.3 Total Post WSAB: 49 WSDiff: 2 Catchers Butera and Bilardello was a wash. As for the pitchers, Stuper was done. McGaffigan and Tibbs together were about the same as Gullickson.
#3:Date: April 4, 2001 Trade: Milwaukee sent Juan Acevedo, Kane Davis, and Jose Flores to Colorado for Mark Leiter, Mike DeJean, and Elvis Pena. Pre Career WS Diff: 48 (favoring Milw) Post Career WS Diff: 3 (Milw) Pre Year WS Diff: 0 Post Year WS Diff: 2 (Milw) WSAB Pre Career Diff: 13 (Milw) WSAB Post Career Diff: 0 WSAB Pre Yr Diff: 0 WSAB Post Yr Diff: 3 (Milw) Overall Avg Diff: 8.6 Post Avg Diff: 2.0 Total Post WSAB: 14 WSDiff: 3 This one's still to early to call. However, DeJean is about the only one that was very active in the majors last season.
#4:Date: July 23, 1990 Trade: Atlanta sent Joe "Leave it to" Boever to the Philadelphia for "Starvin'" Marvin Freeman. Pre Career WS Diff: 12 (favoring Phil) Post Career WS Diff: 2 (Phil) Pre Year WS Diff: 2 (Phil) Post Year WS Diff: 5 (Phil) WSAB Pre Career Diff: 5 (Phil) WSAB Post Career Diff: 0 WSAB Pre Yr Diff: 2 (Phil) WSAB Post Yr Diff: 2 (Phil) Overall Avg Diff: 3.8 Post Avg Diff: 2.3 Total Post WSAB: 16 WSDiff: 2 Here's another reliever swap. Boever was veteran middle reliever and Freeman was a failed young starter, who become one of the Braves first middle relief reclamation projects.
#5 (tie):Date: July 11, 2002 Trade: Montreal sent Carl Pavano, Graeme Lloyd, Mike Mordecai, Justin Wayne, and a player to be named later (Donald Levinski) to Florida for Cliff Floyd, Wilton Guerrero, Claudio Vargas, and cash. Pre Career WS Diff: 64 (favoring Mon) Post Career WS Diff: 2 (Mon) Pre Year WS Diff: 17 (Mon) Post Year WS Diff: 1 (Fla) WSAB Pre Career Diff: 34 (Mon) WSAB Post Career Diff: 3 (Fla) WSAB Pre Yr Diff: 7 (Mon) WSAB Post Yr Diff: 5 (Mon) Overall Avg Diff: 16.6 Post Avg Diff: 2.8 Total Post WSAB: 31 WSDiff: 5 Again, still too early. However, given that Montreal cashed in Floyd in 19 days for two pitchers that haven't yet done much for them, this one will not be remembered as a win for the Expos/Nationals.
#5 (tie):Date: August 26, 1987 Trade: Cincinnati sent Bill Gullickson to the Yankees for Dennis Rasmussen. Pre Career WS Diff: 53 (favoring NYY) Post Career WS Diff: 4 (NYY) Pre Year WS Diff: 2 (Cin) Post Year WS Diff: 1 (Cin) WSAB Pre Career Diff: 27 (NYY) WSAB Post Career Diff: 5 (NYY) WSAB Pre Yr Diff: 2 (Cin) WSAB Post Yr Diff: 1 (Cin) Overall Avg Diff: 11.9 Post Avg Diff: 2.8 Total Post WSAB: 21 WSDiff: 9 What's the deal with Bill Gullickson and these deals anyway? I guess mediocrity breeds mediocrity.
#5 (tie):Date: December 6, 1959 Trade: The Cubs sent Lee Walls, Bill Henry, and Lou Jackson to Cincinnati for Frank Thomas. Pre Career WS Diff: 22 (favoring Chi) Post Career WS Diff: 1 (Cin) Pre Year WS Diff: 0 Post Year WS Diff: 3 (Cin) WSAB Pre Career Diff: 17 (Chi) WSAB Post Career Diff: 4 (Cin) WSAB Pre Yr Diff: 0 WSAB Post Yr Diff: 3 (Cin) Overall Avg Diff: 6.3 Post Avg Diff: 2.8 Total Post WSAB: 20 WSDiff: 5 Here's a three-for-one swap that "worked".
#5 (tie):Date: December 17, 1995 Trade: Baltimore sent Joe Borowski and Rachaad Stewart to Atlanta for Kent Mercker. Pre Career WS Diff: 41 (favoring Balt) Post Career WS Diff: 4 (Balt) Pre Year WS Diff: 0 Post Year WS Diff: 0 WSAB Pre Career Diff: 10 (Balt) WSAB Post Career Diff: 7 (Atl) WSAB Pre Yr Diff: 0 WSAB Post Yr Diff: 0 Overall Avg Diff: 7.8 Post Avg Diff: 2.8 Total Post WSAB: 17 WSDiff: 11 Borowski did OK for the Braves, but his career year came much later.
#5 (tie):Date: February 13, 1986 Trade: The White Sox sent Ron Hassey, Chris Alvarez, Eric Schmidt, and Matt Winters to the Yankees for Neil Allen, Scott Bradley, Glen Braxton, and cash. Pre Career WS Diff: 24 (favoring NYY) Post Career WS Diff: 7 (Sox) Pre Year WS Diff: 0 Post Year WS Diff: 0 WSAB Pre Career Diff: 1 (Sox) WSAB Post Career Diff: 2 (NYY) WSAB Pre Yr Diff: 0 WSAB Post Yr Diff: 2 (NYY) Overall Avg Diff: 4.5 Post Avg Diff: 2.8 Total Post WSAB: 10 WSDiff: 9
#10 (tie):Date: June 10, 1907 Trade: Phillies sent Johnny Lush to the Cardinals for Buster Brown (and his shoes). Pre Career WS Diff: 15 (favoring StL) Post Career WS Diff: 8 (Phil) Pre Year WS Diff: 2 (StL) Post Year WS Diff: 1 (StL) WSAB Pre Career Diff: 5 (StL) WSAB Post Career Diff: 2 (Phil) WSAB Pre Yr Diff: 2 (StL) WSAB Post Yr Diff: 1 (StL) Overall Avg Diff: 4.5 Post Avg Diff: 3.0 Total Post WSAB: 34 WSDiff: 10
#10 (tie):Date: July 31, 2001 Trade: Boston sent Tomo Ohka and Rich Rundles to Montreal for Ugueth Urbina. Pre Career WS Diff: 51 (favoring Bos) Post Career WS Diff: 3 (Bos) Pre Year WS Diff: 6 (Bos) Post Year WS Diff: 3 (Bos) WSAB Pre Career Diff: 32 (Bos) WSAB Post Career Diff: 4 (Bos) WSAB Pre Yr Diff: 4 (Bos) WSAB Post Yr Diff: 2 (Bos) Overall Avg Diff: 13.1 Post Avg Diff: 3.0 Total Post WSAB: 32 WSDiff: 7
#10 (tie):Date: July 11, 1992 Trade: Pittsburgh sent Steve Buechele to the Cubs for Danny Jackson. Pre Career WS Diff: 11 (favoring Chi) Post Career WS Diff: 2 (Pit) Pre Year WS Diff: 8 (Chi) Post Year WS Diff: 1 (Chi) WSAB Pre Career Diff: 18 (Pit) WSAB Post Career Diff: 7 (Pit) WSAB Pre Yr Diff: 3 (Chi) WSAB Post Yr Diff: 2 (Chi) Overall Avg Diff: 6.5 Post Avg Diff: 3.0 Total Post WSAB: 19 WSDiff: 9
#10 (tie):Date: July 22, 1960 Trade: Washington sent Bill Fischer to Detroit for Tom Morgan. Pre Career WS Diff: 36 (favoring Was) Post Career WS Diff: 2 (Det) Pre Year WS Diff: 1 (Det) Post Year WS Diff: 4 (Det) WSAB Pre Career Diff: 6 (Was) WSAB Post Career Diff: 5 (Was) WSAB Pre Yr Diff: 1 (Det) WSAB Post Yr Diff: 1 (Det) Overall Avg Diff: 7.0 Post Avg Diff: 3.0 Total Post WSAB: 17 WSDiff: 7
#10 (tie):Date: June 1, 1910 Trade: Pittsburgh sent Sam Frock to the Boston Doves for Kirby White. Pre Career WS Diff: 6 (favoring Pit) Post Career WS Diff: 4 (Bos) Pre Year WS Diff: 3 (Pit) Post Year WS Diff: 4 (Bos) WSAB Pre Career Diff: 1 (Pit) WSAB Post Career Diff: 2 (Bos) WSAB Pre Yr Diff: 1 (Pit) WSAB Post Yr Diff: 2 (Bos) Overall Avg Diff: 2.9 Post Avg Diff: 3.0 Total Post WSAB: 14 WSDiff: 6
#10 (tie):Date: April 1, 1982 Trade: Cincinnati sent Jeff Lahti and Jose Brito to St. Louis for Bob Shirley. Pre Career WS Diff: 35 (favoring Cin) Post Career WS Diff: 5 (Cin) Pre Year WS Diff: 0 Post Year WS Diff: 4 (Cin) WSAB Pre Career Diff: 10 (Cin) WSAB Post Career Diff: 1 (Cin) WSAB Pre Yr Diff: 0 WSAB Post Yr Diff: 2 (Cin) Overall Avg Diff: 7.1 Post Avg Diff: 3.0 Total Post WSAB: 13 WSDiff: 6
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I'll Take Manhattan: Baseball's Most Lopsided Trades, Revised Edition (Cont.)
2005-02-22 01:22
Other entries in the Trade Series: Mike: I’ll Take Manhattan: Baseball’s Most Lopsided Trades I'll Take Manhattan: Baseball's Most Lopsided Trades, Revised Edition Studes: The Best and Worst Teams of the Trade Here are the rest of the top fifty most lopsided trades. Meanwhile, Studes has an in-depth look at the Smoltz-for-Alexander trade, which clocks in at number thirty-seven. Finally, prior to continuing with the list I just want to clarify what the hex it is I'm trying to research here—from an email I sent to Studes: As far as the meaning of the slew d'stats, my thinking was that a trade is a snapshot in time. You have the players' past statistics to go on for the year (if midseason) and for their careers. Then the other side of the balance sheet is what the GMs don't know at the time, how well the players perform after the trade in the given season and over their careers. So there are four time periods to consider: the players' entire career before and after the trade and the players' stats for the season in which the trade was made (before and after). Then I looked at these time periods based on straight win shares and on win shares above baseline. I ranked them by career win share above baseline differential after the trade. All the stats listed per trade are based on the differentials in each category between what the team got and what they gave up. #11:Date: December 6, 1959 Trade: Cleveland gets Johnny Romano, Bubba Phillips, and Norm Cash from the White Sox for Don Ferrarese, Dick Brown, Minnie Minoso, and Jake Striker. Pre Career WS: -215 Post Career WS: 371 Pre Year WS: 0 PostYearWS: 8 WSAB Pre Career: -140 WSAB Post Career: 198 WSAB Pre Yr: 0 WSAB Post Yr: -3
#12:Date: December 14, 1948 Trade: Cleveland gets Mickey Vernon and Early Wynn from Washington for Ed Klieman, Joe Haynes, and Eddie Robinson. Pre Career WS: 46 Post Career WS: 307 Pre Year WS: 0 PostYearWS: 7 WSAB Pre Career: 38 WSAB Post Career: 197 WSAB Pre Yr: 0 WSAB Post Yr: 5
#13:Date: January 27, 1982 Trade: The Cubs get Larry Bowa and Ryne Sandberg from the Phils for Ivan DeJesus. Pre Career WS: 80 Post Career WS: 339 Pre Year WS: 0 PostYearWS: 8 WSAB Pre Career: 14 WSAB Post Career: 196 WSAB Pre Yr: 0 WSAB Post Yr: 3
#14:Date: May 22, 1913 Trade: Cincinnati gets Heinie Groh, Red Ames, Josh Devore, and $20,000 from the Giants for Art Fromme and Eddie Grant. Pre Career WS: 46 Post Career WS: 332 Pre Year WS: 2 PostYearWS: 24 WSAB Pre Career: 35 WSAB Post Career: 190 WSAB Pre Yr: 2 WSAB Post Yr: 10
#15:Date: July 29, 1989 Trade: The White Sox get Scott Fletcher, Sammy Sosa, and Wilson Alvarez from Texas for Fred Manrique and Harold Baines. Pre Career WS: 46 Post Career WS: 332 Pre Year WS: 2 PostYearWS: 24 WSAB Pre Career: 35 WSAB Post Career: 190 WSAB Pre Yr: 2 WSAB Post Yr: 10
#16 (tied):Date: December 4, 1974 Trade: Baltimore gets Ken Singleton and Mike Torrez from Montreal for Dave McNally, Rich Coggins, and Bill Kirkpatrick. Pre Career WS: -63 Post Career WS: 327 Pre Year WS: 0 PostYearWS: 49 WSAB Pre Career: -55 WSAB Post Career: 186 WSAB Pre Yr: 0 WSAB Post Yr: 36
#16 (tied):Date: August 28, 1983 Trade: Cleveland gets three players to be named later (Rick Behenna, Brett Butler, and Brook Jacoby) and $150,000 from Atlanta for Len Barker. Pre Career WS: -33 Post Career WS: 385 Pre Year WS: -3 PostYearWS: 27 WSAB Pre Career: -15 WSAB Post Career: 186 WSAB Pre Yr: 0 WSAB Post Yr: 9
#18 (tied):Date: January 9, 1918 Trade: Brooklyn gets Al Mamaux, Burleigh Grimes, and Chuck Ward from Pittsburgh for Casey Stengel and George Cutshaw. Pre Career WS: -112 Post Career WS: 194 Pre Year WS: 0 PostYearWS: 4 WSAB Pre Career: -31 WSAB Post Career: 179 WSAB Pre Yr: 0 WSAB Post Yr: 12
#18 (tied):Date: July 25, 1910 Trade: Cleveland gets Joe Jackson from the Athletics for Bris Lord. Pre Career WS: -25 Post Career WS: 248 Pre Year WS: -4 PostYearWS: -6 WSAB Pre Career: -3 WSAB Post Career: 179 WSAB Pre Yr: -3 WSAB Post Yr: -3
#20:Date: May 6, 1930 Trade: The Yankees get Red Ruffing from the Red Sox for Cedric Durst and $50,000. Pre Career WS: 47 Post Career WS: 262 Pre Year WS: 0 PostYearWS: 13 WSAB Pre Career: 28 WSAB Post Career: 174 WSAB Pre Yr: 1 WSAB Post Yr: 9
#21 (tied):Date: June 15, 1964 Trade: St. Louis gets Lou Brock, Jack Spring, and Paul Toth from the Cubs for Bobby Shantz, Ernie Broglio and Doug Clemens. Pre Career WS: -187 Post Career WS: 298 Pre Year WS: -1 PostYearWS: 9 WSAB Pre Career: -114 WSAB Post Career: 166 WSAB Pre Yr: 4 WSAB Post Yr: 9
#21 (tied):Date: April 12, 1960 Trade: Detroit gets Norm Cash from Cleveland for Steve Demeter. Pre Career WS: 4 Post Career WS: 311 Pre Year WS: 0 PostYearWS: 16 WSAB Pre Career: 0 WSAB Post Career: 166 WSAB Pre Yr: 0 WSAB Post Yr: 6
#23:Date: December 11, 1917 Trade: The Cubs get Grover Cleveland Alexander and Bill Killefer from the Phillies for Mike Prendergast, Pickles Dillhoefer, and $55,000. Pre Career WS: 253 Post Career WS: 245 Pre Year WS: 0 PostYearWS: -3 WSAB Pre Career: 185 WSAB Post Career: 164 WSAB Pre Yr: 0 WSAB Post Yr: -9
#24:Date: December 14, 1917 Trade: Red Sox get Amos Strunk, Joe Bush, and Wally Schang from the A's for Vean Gregg, Merlin Kopp, Pinch Thomas, and $60,000. Pre Career WS: 118 Post Career WS: 345 Pre Year WS: 0 PostYearWS: 26 WSAB Pre Career: 35 WSAB Post Career: 163 WSAB Pre Yr: 0 WSAB Post Yr: 16
Man, that was one bad week in Philly. #25:Date: March 30, 1992 Trade: White Sox sent Sammy Sosa and Ken Patterson to the Cubs for George Bell. Pre Career WS: -124 Post Career WS: 266 Pre Year WS: 0 PostYearWS: -5 WSAB Pre Career: -70 WSAB Post Career: 160 WSAB Pre Yr: 0 WSAB Post Yr: -3
#27:Date: December 11, 1975 Trade: Yankees sent Doc Medich to Pittsburgh for Willie Randolph, Ken Brett, and Dock Ellis. Pre Career WS: 80 Post Career WS: 317 Pre Year WS: 0 PostYearWS: 36 WSAB Pre Career: 26 WSAB Post Career: 155 WSAB Pre Yr: 0 WSAB Post Yr: 20
#28:Date: December 12, 1903 Trade: Cardinals sent Mordecai Brown and Jack O'Neill to the Cubs for Jack Taylor and Larry McLean. Pre Career WS: -93 Post Career WS: 134 Pre Year WS: 0 PostYearWS: -4 WSAB Pre Career: -71 WSAB Post Career: 153 WSAB Pre Yr: 0 WSAB Post Yr: -7
#29 (tie):Date: October 30, 1922 Trade: Detroit sent Babe Herman, Danny Clark, Howard Ehmke, Carl Holling, and $25000 cash to the Red Sox for Del Pratt and Rip Collins. Pre Career WS: -177 Post Career WS: 254 Pre Year WS: 0 PostYearWS: 14 WSAB Pre Career: -93 WSAB Post Career: 152 WSAB Pre Yr: 0 WSAB Post Yr: 19
#29 (tie):Date: October 19, 1949 Trade: The Philadelphia Athletics sent Nellie Fox to the White Sox for Joe Tipton. Pre Career WS: 0 Post Career WS: 269 Pre Year WS: 0 PostYearWS: 0 WSAB Pre Career: 0 WSAB Post Career: 152 WSAB Pre Yr: 0 WSAB Post Yr: 0
#31:Date: May 25, 1989 Trade: Montreal sent Randy Johnson, Gene Harris, and Brian Holman to Seattle for Mark Langston and a player to be named later (Mike Campbell). Pre Career WS: -73 Post Career WS: 194 Pre Year WS: -5 PostYearWS: 0 WSAB Pre Career: -49 WSAB Post Career: 149 WSAB Pre Yr: -3 WSAB Post Yr: -7
#32:Date: December 4, 1964 Trade: The Los Angeles Dodgers sent Frank Howard, Ken McMullen, Phil Ortega, Pete Richert and a player to be named later (Dick Nen) to Washington for Claude Osteen, John Kennedy, and $100 K. Pre Career WS: 53 Post Career WS: 308 Pre Year WS: 0 PostYearWS: 54 WSAB Pre Career: 14 WSAB Post Career: 147 WSAB Pre Yr: 0 WSAB Post Yr: 24
#33 (tie):Date: November 29, 1971 Trade: Cleveland sent Sam McDowell to San Francisco for Gaylord Perry and Frank Duffy. Pre Career WS: 0 Post Career WS: 257 Pre Year WS: 0 PostYearWS: 44 WSAB Pre Career: 1 WSAB Post Career: 146 WSAB Pre Yr: 0 WSAB Post Yr: 33
#33 (tie):Date: November 10, 1948 Trade: The White Sox sent Aaron Robinson to Detroit for Billy Pierce and $10 K. Pre Career WS: -45 Post Career WS: 214 Pre Year WS: 0 PostYearWS: -6 WSAB Pre Career: -11 WSAB Post Career: 146 WSAB Pre Yr: 0 WSAB Post Yr: -2
#35:Date: July 20, 1916 Trade: The Giants sent Christy Mathewson, Bill McKechnie and Edd Roush to the Cincinnati Reds for Buck Herzog and Red Killefer. Pre Career WS: 342 Post Career WS: 259 Pre Year WS: -5 PostYearWS: 2 WSAB Pre Career: 303 WSAB Post Career: 142 WSAB Pre Yr: -5 WSAB Post Yr: -4
#36:Date: February 25, 1972 Trade: St. Louis sent Steve Carlton to Philadelphia for Rick Wise. Pre Career WS: 12 Post Career WS: 176 Pre Year WS: 0 PostYearWS: 20 WSAB Pre Career: 10 WSAB Post Career: 141 WSAB Pre Yr: 0 WSAB Post Yr: 20
#37:Date: August 12, 1987 Trade: Detroit sent John Smoltz to Atlanta for Doyle Alexander. Pre Career WS: -163 Post Career WS: 193 Pre Year WS: -6 PostYearWS: -12 WSAB Pre Career: -83 WSAB Post Career: 138 WSAB Pre Yr: -7 WSAB Post Yr: -5
#38:Date: March 26, 1992 Trade: Milwaukee sent Gary Sheffield and Geoff Kellogg to San Diego for Ricky Bones, Jose Valentin, and Matt Mieske.. Pre Career WS: 28 Post Career WS: 70 Pre Year WS: 0 PostYearWS: 28 WSAB Pre Career: 10 WSAB Post Career: 136 WSAB Pre Yr: 0 WSAB Post Yr: 22
#39:Date: December 2, 1927 Trade: Detroit sent Heinie Manush and Lu Blue to the St. Louis Browns for Chick Galloway, Elam Vangilder, and Harry Rice. Pre Career WS: -26 Post Career WS: 224 Pre Year WS: 0 PostYearWS: 29 WSAB Pre Career: -14 WSAB Post Career: 135 WSAB Pre Yr: 0 WSAB Post Yr: 27
#40 (tie):Date: April 2, 1992 Trade: Houston sent Curt Schilling to Philadelphia for Jason Grimsley. Pre Career WS: 6 Post Career WS: 155 Pre Year WS: 0 PostYearWS: 17 WSAB Pre Career: 0 WSAB Post Career: 134 WSAB Pre Yr: 0 WSAB Post Yr: 11
#40 (tie):Date: July 29, 1996 Trade: The Mets sent Jeff Kent and Jose Vizcaino to Cleveland for Carlos Baerga and Alvaro Espinoza.. Pre Career WS: -52 Post Career WS: 205 Pre Year WS: 11 PostYearWS: 4 WSAB Pre Career: -36 WSAB Post Career: 134 WSAB Pre Yr: 4 WSAB Post Yr: 1
#42:Date: April 3, 1974 Trade: Cleveland sent Pedro Guerrero to Los Angeles for Bruce Ellingsen Pre Career WS: 0 Post Career WS: 244 Pre Year WS: 0 PostYearWS: -2 WSAB Pre Career: 0 WSAB Post Career: 133 WSAB Pre Yr: 0 WSAB Post Yr: 0
#43:Date: December 3, 1936 Trade: Brooklyn sent Frenchy Bordagaray, Jimmy Jordan, and Dutch Leonard to the St. Louis Cardinals for Tom Winsett. Pre Career WS: 56 Post Career WS: 247 Pre Year WS: 0 PostYearWS: 1 WSAB Pre Career: 10 WSAB Post Career: 128 WSAB Pre Yr: 0 WSAB Post Yr: 0
#44:Date: April 5, 1972 Trade: The Mets sent Ken Singleton, Tim Foli, and Mike Jorgensen to Montreal for Rusty Staub. Pre Career WS: -169 Post Career WS: 316 Pre Year WS: 0 PostYearWS: 25 WSAB Pre Career: -107 WSAB Post Career: 127 WSAB Pre Yr: 0 WSAB Post Yr: 6
#45 (tie):Date: November 18, 1997 Trade: Tampa Bay sent Bobby Abreu to Philadelphia for Kevin Stocker. Pre Career WS: -46 Post Career WS: 141 Pre Year WS: 0 PostYearWS: 21 WSAB Pre Career: -4 WSAB Post Career: 126 WSAB Pre Yr: 0 WSAB Post Yr: 16
#45 (tie):Date: May 29, 1971 Trade: San Francisco sent George Foster to Cincinnati for Frank Duffy and Vern Geishert. Pre Career WS: 2 Post Career WS: 212 Pre Year WS: 2 PostYearWS: 10 WSAB Pre Career: 1 WSAB Post Career: 126 WSAB Pre Yr: 1 WSAB Post Yr: 1
#45 (tie):Date: June 13, 1938 Trade: Philadelphia sent Bucky Walters to Cincinnati for Spud Davis, Al Hollingsworth, and $50 K. Pre Career WS: -92 Post Career WS: 129 Pre Year WS: 3 PostYearWS: -1 WSAB Pre Career: -25 WSAB Post Career: 126 WSAB Pre Yr: 1 WSAB Post Yr: 3
#48 (tie):Date: December 15, 1920 Trade: The Red Sox sent Waite Hoyt, Harry Harper, Mike McNally, and Wally Schang to the Yankees for Muddy Ruel, Del Pratt, Sammy Vick, and Hank Thormahlen. Pre Career WS: -29 Post Career WS: 180 Pre Year WS: 0 PostYearWS: 18 WSAB Pre Career: -31 WSAB Post Career: 124 WSAB Pre Yr: 0 WSAB Post Yr: 17
#48 (tie):Date: December 2, 1937 Trade: The White Sox sent Dixie Walker, Vern Kennedy, and Tony Piet to Detroit for Marv Owen, Mike Tresh, and Gee Walker. Pre Career WS: -11 Post Career WS: 123 Pre Year WS: 0 PostYearWS: 3 WSAB Pre Career: 5 WSAB Post Career: 124 WSAB Pre Yr: 0 WSAB Post Yr: 7
#50:Date: February 26, 1957 Trade: The Giants sent Hoyt Wilhelm to St. Louis for Whitey Lockman. Pre Career WS: -86 Post Career WS: 186 Pre Year WS: 0 PostYearWS: -2 WSAB Pre Career: -20 WSAB Post Career: 123 WSAB Pre Yr: 0 WSAB Post Yr: 0
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I'll Take Manhattan: Baseball's Most Lopsided Trades, Revised Edition
2005-02-21 01:49
Other entries in the Trade Series: Mike: I’ll Take Manhattan: Baseball’s Most Lopsided Trades Studes: The Best and Worst Teams of the Trade This article has been revised and expanded after Studes and I revised our methodology and resolved all outstanding data issues. I've added a slew of stats: career win shares before and after the trade, the single-season win shares before and after the trade, and the career and single-season win shares above baseline (WSAB) before and after the trade. The trades are ranked by career WSAB after the trade. I also made sure to incorporate all of the trades mentioned in the first go-round. So here goes: #1:Date: December 15, 1900 Trade: New York Giants sent Amos Rusie to Cincinnati for Christy Mathewson Pre Career WS: -293 Post Career WS: 426 Pre Year WS: 0 PostYearWS: 21 WSAB Pre Career: -239 WSAB Post Career: 333 WSAB Pre Yr: 0 WSAB Post Yr: 15 This wasn't so much a trade as a gimmick to sell the team, but I have to go by the official record. Then-Cincinnati owner John T. Brush started with the old Indianapolis NL club, but this club folded and his investment was transferred to the Giants as the NL tried to consolidate its base during the Players League wars. He was rewarded with ownership of the Reds in the resulting twelve-team NL. It's unclear if he ever relinquished his Giant ownership. However, had he kept it while owning the Reds, he wouldn't have been the only owner at that time to do so. Apparently, in the negotiating process Brush demanded Mathewson from Giant controlling owner Andrew Freedman. In exchange, the Reds got Rusie, a future Hall of Famer who had missed two straight seasons at the time. Rusie had torn his shoulder muscles in a throw to first and never was able to recuperate. He was actually retired at the time of the trade. Oddly, Rusie had followed Brush from Indianapolis to New York back in 1889-1890. Rusie would go on to pitch just three games, very poorly (including a 14-3 debut), for the Reds and then called it a career. That was more than one could have expected when he was traded. Mathewson did pretty well for the Giants. Rusie would return more than two decades later as the superintendent of the Polo Grounds. Mathewson would be traded back to Cincinnati in 1916 and he would pitch his last game with the Reds, the only game he pitched for them.
#2:Date: January 10, 1991 Trade: Houston sent Glenn Davis to Baltimore for Steve Finley, Curt Schilling, and Pete Harnisch Pre Career WS: -92 Post Career WS: 525 Pre Year WS: 0 PostYearWS: 35 WSAB Pre Career: -58 WSAB Post Career: 310 WSAB Pre Yr: 0 WSAB Post Yr: 18 This is the ultimate cautionary tale for GMs who want to nab a star by giving up the farm, or at least all the farmhands. The Orioles had grown tired of Randy Milligan's inconsistency at the plate and salivated at the idea of injecting power into their lineup via Davis. Being a seven-year veteran in the cavernous Astrodome, Davis was still able to collect thirty home runs in three seasons. The Orioles expected that to translate into 40 or 50 in Memorial Stadium, and they wanted to generate fan interest as they prepared to move into Camden Yards in 1992. They were coming off a disappointing 1990 season (76-85) after making great strides the previous season (from a catastrophic 54-107 record in 1988 to 87-75, in second place, just two games behind the Blue Jays in 1989). One more star could right their course. Meanwhile, the Astros had fallen into fifth place in 1990 (75-87) and were looking to rebuild. They had a young Craig Biggio behind the plate and just about to bloom into an All-Star. In August they stripped the Red Sox of a minor-league Jeff Bagwell for 15 games from Larry Andersen. With then-third baseman Bagwell in tow, the Astros felt that Davis, a free agent at year's end, was expendable. Harnisch would be an All-Star in 1991 and would be a reliable starter for the 'Stros over the next three years. Finley would be inserted in center field and even though he hit just three home runs in 464 at-bats in 1990, he would eventually become the power hitter he's known to be today. Unfortunately for the Astros he would never hit more than 11 for them in his four seasons in Houston. He would then be traded to the Padres on December 28, 1994 in their monster 11-man deal. Schilling would spent one year in the Astro pen and then after a trade to the Phils for Jason Grimsley at the end of spring training in 1992, he would finally become a starter. The Astros collected the most lopsided bounty in trade history and they failed to unearth the best of it. Meanwhile, Davis would hit just 24 home runs and play 185 games over the next three seasons in Baltimore. After playing at least 150 games a season from 1986 to 1989, Davis at age 29 would never play more than 106 in a season. Here’s a comparison between the two sides in the deal:
#3:Date: December 5, 1988 Trade: Texas sent Curtis Wilkerson, Paul Kilgus, Mitch Williams, Steve Wilson and two minor leaguers (Luis Benitez and Pablo Delgado) to the Cubs for Rafael Palmeiro, Jamie Moyer, and Drew Hall. Pre Career WS: -17 Post Career WS: 413 Pre Year WS: 0 PostYearWS: 1 WSAB Pre Career: 0 WSAB Post Career: 251 WSAB Pre Yr: 0 WSAB Post Yr: 0 What do you need Rafael Palmeiro when you have Mark Grace? Palmeiro was a singles-hitting left fielder. Pete O'Brien had been the Rangers first baseman in 1988, but signed after the season with Seattle as a free agent. The Rangers desperate for first baseman traded a boatload of young players including 12-game winner Kilgus and young would-be closer Williams. Wilkerson was a weak-hitting middle infielder that the Cubs mistakenly tried to convert to third. Moyer is now a two-time twenty-game winner but he was coming off a 9-15 year in Chicago and would go just 6-15 in two seasons with the Rangers.
#4:Date: August 30, 1990 Trade: Boston sent Jeff Bagwell to Houston for Larry Andersen. Pre Career WS: -63 Post Career WS: 338 Pre Year WS: -10 PostYearWS: -3 WSAB Pre Career: -22 WSAB Post Career: 237 WSAB Pre Yr: -6 WSAB Post Yr: -2 What do you need Jeff Bagwell for if you have Wade Boggs and you need a middle reliever? Bagwell was a single-hitting third baseman in Double-A at the time. The Sox won the AL East by two games and Andersen pitched very well before leaving as a free agent. Bagwell became the 'Stros starting first baseman the next season, developed a bit of power, and may join Boggs in the Hall of Fame when all is said and done. I was living in Boston at the time of the trade and knew, as many did, that this was a mistake. By the way, the starting Boston first baseman was Carlos "The Q" Quintana.
#5:Date: December 9, 1982 Trade: New York Yankees traded Fred McGriff, Dave Collins, Mike Morgan, and cash to Toronto for Dale Murray and Tom Dodd. Pre Career WS: -63 Post Career WS: 338 Pre Year WS: -10 PostYearWS: -3 WSAB Pre Career: -22 WSAB Post Career: 237 WSAB Pre Yr: -6 WSAB Post Yr: -2 "You want some kid who's a year out of high school as a throw-in? Sure" Yeah, Murray wasn't very effective as a long reliever in New York, but this was just a bad trade for five years. In 1987, Fred McGriff became the Blue Jays starting first baseman, and though he may always be seven dingers away from a Cooperstown plaque, he makes this one memorial. Even without McGriff, Collins remained a steady starting outfielder and Morgan was then a young starter. Murray had just pitched 111 innings in relief the year before, but even so, you can't trade this much for a middle reliever. McGriff had just parts of two seasons in the Gulf Coast League under his belt. In his first partial season after being drafting by the Yankees, he batted .148. The same day the Yankees signed Steve Kemp to a five-year contract. Really.
#6:Date: November 29, 1971 Trade: Cincinnati sent Lee May, Tommy Helms, and Jimmy Stewart to the Astros for Jack Billingham, Ed Armbrister, Cesar Geronimo, Denis Menke, and Joe Morgan. Pre Career WS: 152 Post Career WS: 389 Pre Year WS: 0 PostYearWS: 33 WSAB Pre Career: 111 WSAB Post Career: 233 WSAB Pre Yr: 0 WSAB Post Yr: 19 The Reds traded Lee May for who? Are they crazy? In a deal panned by the Cincinnati press, the Reds picked up three big pieces of the Big Red Machine in Morgan, Geronimo, and Billingham. After falling from 102 wins in 1970 to just 79 in 1971, the Reds were ready to run off ten straight winning seasons with two world championships, three league championships, and five division titles. The Reds gave up two established starting position players. May had just hit 39 home runs for the Reds. He would remain productive, but would never be a superstar. Helms had been a starting second baseman in Cincy for six years, was a rookie of the year, and had just won two straight Gold Gloves. This was a trade that would have made Billy Beane proud.
#7:Date: January 20, 1965 Trade: Three-team deal--The White Sox get Tommy John, Tommy Agee and Johnny Romano from Cleveland and send Cam Carreon to Cleveland and a player to be named later (Fred Talbot), Jim Landis, and Mike Hershberger to the Kansas City. Also,Kansas City sent Rocky Colavito to Cleveland. Pre Career WS: -96 (White Sox transactions only) Post Career WS: 371 Pre Year WS: 0 PostYearWS: 8 WSAB Pre Career: -22 WSAB Post Career: 231 WSAB Pre Yr: 0 WSAB Post Yr: 15 Again Beane would be proud: Horn your way into a deal and get the players you want in the process. The Sox pick up two young Tommies as Colavito returns to Cleveland. The Sox give up quantity, a number of players that they no longer need or want, and get youthful quality.
#8:Date: April 21, 1966 Trade: The Cubs sent Larry Jackson and Bob Buhl to the Phillies for Ferguson, John Herrnstein and Adolfo Phillips. Pre Career WS: -312 Post Career WS: 338 Pre Year WS: 0 PostYearWS: 5 WSAB Pre Career: -185 WSAB Post Career: 215 WSAB Pre Yr: -1 WSAB Post Yr: -1 Well, there it is. The Phils trade a future Hall of Famer for two starters that were 35 and 37 years old. Jackson would be decent for three years in Philly rotation but Buhl would last just 137.1 innings and win 6 games in slightly over one year with the Phils. After Leo Durocher converted Fergie to a starter, he would win twenty games in six straight seasons starting in 1967.
#9:Date: July 29, 1988 Trade: Baltimore gets Brady Anderson and Curt Schilling from Boston for Mike Boddicker. Pre Career WS: -79 Post Career WS: 363 Pre Year WS: -5 PostYearWS: -7 WSAB Pre Career: -47 WSAB Post Career: 207 WSAB Pre Yr: -5 WSAB Post Yr: -4 I had just settled in at Boston when this trade went down. Mike BODdicker became Mike Bod-DECK-er in the deal, and my ears nascently introduced to a Bah-stan accent were highly offended. Anderson had faltered earlier in the season and was back in Triple-A. Boddicker was an established starter. Boddicker would have two and one-half reliable to very good seasons in Boston. Anderson would have a pretty good career in Baltimore. Schilling again becomes a thrown-in awaiting to bloom. The Red Sox did win a division that year and again two years later with Boddicker in the rotation.
#10:Date: December 10, 1971 Trade: California gets Nolan Ryan, Frank Estrada, Don Rose, and Leroy Stanton from the Mets for Jim Fregosi. Pre Career WS: -199 Post Career WS: 340 Pre Year WS: 0 PostYearWS: 26 WSAB Pre Career: -124 WSAB Post Career: 202 WSAB Pre Yr: 0 WSAB Post Yr: 20 And here's the trade, any mention of which every Met fan dreads. It should put to rest the "Quantity for Quality" argument. Fregosi was a very good player with the Angels but a) faltered with the Mets and b) would still not have been fair compensation for Ryan. Never trade a young pitcher with Ryan's natural skills even if he can't find the plate.
To be continued…
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A Quick One (Happy Mike)
2005-02-17 13:02
Other entries in the Trade Series: Mike: I’ll Take Manhattan: Baseball’s Most Lopsided Trades Studes: The Best and Worst Teams of the Trade The Best and Worst Teams of the Trade: Revisted Here is a quickie aperitif while we finalize the transaction data for future multi-course meals. We have been adding in-season and interstitial Win Share metrics to add more depth, hopefully, to the analysis (and because I love trying to make update queries work in Access). Anyway, here's a taste, and don't worry: it's wafer thin. First, here are the players who traded midseason after accumulating the greatest Win Shares totals for their original teams. And the Cliff Floyd double entry is not a typo. It is the aftereffect of his being laundered in MLB's washing machine, the then-Expos, and then presented as a gift to John Henry's Red Sox:
Here are the midseason pickups that contributed the most to their new clubs:
If you say April isn't really mid-season, here are the biggest contributors based on July to September transactions:
As for players acquired in the offseason who had the biggest impact on their new teams in the first season, guess who's number one?:
Finally, here are the players who had the most left in the tank when they left one team for another. That is, they would accumulate the highest Win Share totals after the transaction (and the leader is another big surprise):
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Cul-de-Sad Sack
2005-02-15 12:25
Missed me by that much  In September 1996 a skinny, 23-year-old shortstop with the boxscore unfriendly name of Nomar Garciaparra came to the Red Sox as and displaced veteran John Valentin, a man who hit 27 home runs with 102 RBIs, 20 stolen bases, and a .298 batting average just a year earlier, to third base. Third baseman Tim Naehring, the Sox previous young savior, who would hit 17 HRs in 1996, was chase very quickly to the bench and then after 70 games in 1997 into the baseball ether. Garciaparra would go on to have a monster rookie year in 1997. He had 30 home runs, 209 hits, 44 doubles, 11 triples, 98 RBI, 22 steals (in 31 attempts), a .306 batting average, and an .875 OPS (23 percent better than the park-adjusted league average) all as a leadoff hitter. He also had a thirty-game hitting streak, breaking a fifty-four-year-old AL rookie record. He established a record for RBI by a leadoff hitter. He topped off the season by being named AL Rookie of Year by a unanimous vote (matching fellow shortstop Derek Jeter's feat from a year before). However, the Red sox under new manager Jimy Williams fell to 78-84 after winning the division two years before. The Sox rebounded to score two straight wild card berths in the next two seasons. But the Sox could do no better than second place with "Nomah" and didn't return to the playoffs until 2003, again as a wild card. And it seems no matter how well Garciaparra played, the second-place finishes turned him from the franchise savior to an albatross around the team's neck. He was too fragile the fans said. This grew from his one injury-plagued season in 2001 (only 21 games) after he bulked up in the offseason and his buff physique appeared on the from of SI. However, Garciaparra played at least 135 in six of his first seven full seasons in the majors and followed 2001 with two straight 156-game years. In the 2003-04 offseason the Sox were ready to retool their lineup by acquiring then-Ranger shortstop Alex Rodriguez for Manny Ramirez and then in turn trade Garciaparra reportedly to the White Sox for outfielder Magglio Ordonez. But, of course, the A-Rod deal fell through. In 2004, with a contract about to expire and after missing the first two months of the season, Garciaparra's days in Boston seemed numbered. On July 24 he went 3-for-5 in a 11-10 Red Sox win over the Yankees, but reportedly stayed on the bench during a benches-clearing brawl. Earlier in the month, Derek Jeter dove into the stands and bloodied his goyisha punim to catch a foul ball against the Sox in a game the Yankees won 5-4 in 13 with Garciaparra conspicuously on the bench. In the two previous games, Nomar committed three errors. All of this seemed to seal his fate with the fans and the Red Sox organization. On July 24, Garciaparra was traded in a four-tam deal to the other then-cursed team, the Cubs (The White Sox have yet to earn a curse apparently because of the Black Sox scandal). So once the team's one-time franchise player is gone, what to the Red Sox go and do? They win the World Series for the first time in one bazillion year (Boston time) earning the apotheosis of GM Theo Epstein and every member of the club. It was nice to hear that the Sox voted Garciaparra, who played all of 38 games in a Sox uni in 2004, a three-quarter share of the World Series booty. I think he would have preferred the ring, however. This got me to wondering about similar "sad sack" players, guys who were on a "team of destiny" (i.e., a World Series champ) but got shipped off to another club just in time to miss the parade. I did a bit of research. To qualify the player would never end up winning the lord of the rings, the World Series champion one, just like "Nomah No More". There have been 129 such players, dating back to Charlie Sweeney, Cyclone Miller, and John Cattanach who were jettisoned midseason by the 1884 NL-AA Champion Providence Grays. Former Red Sock Curt Leskanic, who finished 2004 with KC, can join Garciaparra's pity party. Anyway, I wanted to know if there were any other "sad sacks" who were of Garciaparra's quality as a player. Here they are arranged by career at-bats along with other salient career stats:
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I'll Take Manhattan: Baseball's Most Lopsided Trades
2005-02-10 01:48
Studes: The Best and Worst Teams of the Trade [N]o man can weigh this world, without throwing in something, somehow like Original Sin, to strike the uneven balance. A few hundred years ago the Yankees traded some beads to the Indians for the isle of Manhattan. They even made the Indians eat the bulk of Manhattan's remaining contract in the deal. And yet that does not even compare to Nolan Ryan for Jim Fregosi. Now that was a lopsided deal if there ever was one. We have all heard of some doozies. Each team has its legendary trades that haunt or vaunt the fanbase. In Philly, there's Von "5-for-1" Hayes, the man on whom the Phils placed all their hopes at the start of the Eighties by sending five players to the Indians, all of whom made it to the majors. Then there's throwing in future Hall of Famer Ryne Sandberg on a deal with the Cubs to swap aging shortstops. Both deals helped the Phils fall from one of the better franchises in baseball at that start of the Eighties to one of the worst over the last two decades (though Hayes would have some success with the Phils). Then there's the classic, a young Ferguson Jenkins wrapped up and shipped to the Cubs for two aging starters. So every team has its fair share of lopsided trades. How do we determine which one was the worst (or best)? Can it be quantified? Should it be? Should we dabble in god's domain? We must, we must. One thing that Bill James suggested in Win Shares was that trades could, in theory, be evaluated by comparing the Win Shares given up and received by the teams involved, like credits and debits in a spreadsheet. Thanks to some research from Win Shares master Studes and Retrosheet trade data I did James one better, comparing by WSAR (Win Shares Above Studes and I started discussing how to quantify trade efficacy this offseason, which led to our research collaboration on the topic. This article and Studes' are the first in a series of articles on the history of baseball transactions. We're lousy with ideas. Anyway, here were the twenty most lopsided trades of all time: #1:Date: January 10, 1991 Trade: Houston sent Glenn Davis to Baltimore for Steve Finley, Curt Schilling, and Pete Harnisch Win Share Difference: 529 WSAR Diff: 280 This is the ultimate cautionary tale for GMs who want to nab a star by giving up the farm, or at least all the farmhands. The Orioles had grown tired of Randy Milligan's inconsistency at the plate and salivated at the idea of injecting power into their lineup via Davis. Being a seven-year veteran in the cavernous Astrodome, Davis was still able to collect thirty home runs in three seasons. The Orioles expected that to translate into 40 or 50 in Memorial Stadium, and they wanted to generate fan interest as they prepared to move into Camden Yards in 1992. They were coming off a disappointing 1990 season (76-85) after making great strides the previous season (from a catastrophic 54-107 record in 1988 to 87-75, in second place, just two games behind the Blue Jays in 1989). One more star could right their course. Meanwhile, the Astros had fallen into fifth place in 1990 (75-87) and were looking to rebuild. They had a young Craig Biggio behind the plate and just about to bloom into an All-Star. In August they stripped the Red Sox of a minor-league Jeff Bagwell for 15 games from Larry Andersen. With then-third baseman Bagwell in tow, the Astros felt that Davis, a free agent at year's end, was expendable. The Astros plucked Steve Finley, who was a regular for the O's in 1990 (though he played no more than 73 games in any of the three outfield positions), eleven-game winner Pete Harnisch, and a young reliever and would-be closer, Curt Schilling, from the Oriole roster. All would be between 24 and 26 years old in 1991, and all had at least one major-league season under his belt. Harnisch would be an All-Star in 1991 and would be a reliable starter for the 'Stros over the next three years. Finley would be inserted in center field and even though he hit just three home runs in 464 at-bats in 1990, he would eventually become the power hitter he's known to be today. Unfortunately for the Astros he would never hit more than 11 for them in his four seasons in Houston. He would then be traded to the Padres on December 28, 1994 in their monster 11-man deal. Schilling would spent one year in the Astro pen and then after a trade to the Phils for Jason Grimsley at the end of spring training in 1992, he would finally become a starter. The Astros collected the most lopsided bounty in trade history and they failed to unearth the best of it. Meanwhile, Davis would hit just 24 home runs and play 185 games over the next three seasons in Baltimore. After playing at least 150 games a season from 1986 to 1989, Davis at age 29 would never play more than 106 in a season. Here’s a comparison between the two sides in the deal:
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Rocket Envy—Schilling's Preemptive, Premature Un-Retirement
2005-02-09 13:37
TSN's Ken Rosenthal reports that "Red Sox RHP Curt Schilling, 38, plans to retire when his contract expires at the end of the 2007 season." Not only have we had to live with Roger Clemens retiring and un-retiring over the last two seasons whenever his wife asks him to take out the garbage, now we have guys setting themselves up for preemptive retirements/un-retirements in the future. And of course, Schilling, the great team player he, is doing it for completely altruistic reasons: Schilling…says he will not play past age 40 in an attempt to strengthen his Hall of Fame credentials. By playing only three more seasons, he likely would fall short of the 66 victories he needs to reach 250. Schilling, however, says his family will come first. He and his wife, Shonda, have four children, ages 3 to 9. What's the deal with the magic number of 250? Bert Blyleven won 287 and he's languishing in BBWAA ballot purgatory. Besides what Hall of Fame credentials does Schilling have? Of all active pitchers, where does Schilling stand in the line for Hall plaques in baseball's soup kitchen? Tenth? Twlefth? Definitely, behind Roger Clemens, Greg Maddux, Randy Johnson, Tom Glavine, Pedro Martinez, and Mariano Rivera. I'd put him in the Kevin Brown, Mike Mussina, and David Wells group. OK, so maybe Schilling is seventh or eighth. Then there are the Blylevens, Johns, Kaats, Morrisi, Guidrys, etc. I won't even go into Tony Mullane and Bobby Matthews (two nineteenth century players, whose election I don't necessarily support). Keep in mind that there's no pitcher in the Hall with 184 or fewer wins and an ERA of 3.32 or worse. Schilling has 184 wins, a 3.32 career ERA, and a .599 winning percentage. He is far from the lock the media would lead you to believe, bloody sock or no. What if he's hit by a bus tomorrow? Let's assume that Schilling does pitch enough to reach 250 wins, no matter how many unretirements are needed to do so. Would his stats be Hall-worthy?
Eckersley, of course, was a closer for half his career. A few of the others are usually mentioned as among the worst pitchers in the Hall. And yeah, ERA is era- and park-specific, but 3.32 still isn't going to impress. As my friend Chris points out, Peter Gammons and his ilk have already labeled Schilling the greatest postseason ever. Does that claim hold water and should it help him gain admission to the Hall? Here are all the guys with 5 or more postseason victories:
How does he perform in Bill James' Hall of Fame tests? (From Baseball-Reference.com): Black Ink: Pitching - 40 (35) (Average HOFer ~ 40) That's better than I expected. Perhaps Schilling's best argument will be his strikeouts, not his wins totals. He should pass 3000 Ks sometime in 2006. That is still a magic number in a lot of voters' eyes. Depending on how many men have reach that number by the time he is eligible for the Hall determine whether and how quickly Schilling goes into the Hall. Maybe he would be wise to step down as quickly as possible after reaching 3000. It's better to be Rollie Fingers than Rich Gossage where the voters are concerned. My final assessment is that Schilling is not a Hall of Famer as yet. He may well be one once he reaches 3000 strikeouts, only time will tell. If 3000 loses its luster, than Schilling will need to reach, say, the top ten (3500 K) or have two more twenty-win seasons. Given that his Hall argument is based on three years (2000-01 and 2004) out of 17 in his career, there's no reason to believe that he can remain healthy and effective in order to get those two more monster seasons. I personally would not rush to enshrine the guy, but it appears that he'll Don Sutton his way into the Hall. Given his rapport with the media and his desire to remain in the public eye, he'll have his advocates when his day comes. He's no lock, but his odds are improving even with the stringent standards that are now imposed on expansion-era candidates. Now let's hope that his head does not get too big to fit on one plaque. [Thanks to my friend Mike for the TSN article link.]
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Tom Petty Was Right
2005-02-08 00:47
The waiting is the hardest part. That is if you a Philadelphia sports fan. As has been widely publicized, Philly hasn't had a sports champion since 1983 when the "Fo', Fo', and Fo'" Moses and Dr. J. Sixers swept the Magic and Kareem Lakers. (Actually, the Stars won the then-NFL rival USFL championship in 1984, but the media ignores them.) That got me to wonder what is the current longest wait for a sports city. And by sports city, I mean only those with a team in each of the four major-league team sports. Forget LA. It may be the second-largest metro area in the country and the Angels might be bending their name over backwards to fit it in their title, but they can't keep a football team and no one really seems to care. There are fourteen qualifying four-sport metro areas, and guess who has been waiting the longest for a ring?
Philly also has the most teams by a long shot to reach a final and lose in the intervening years:
Philly also leads the pack in team-seasons since their last championship:
And the Eagles looked like the best shot in a while. With the Phils embracing mediocrity, the Flyers on hiatus indefinitely, and the Sixers, along with the rest of the new Atlantic Division, scraping the Mendoza Line, it looks like it'll be at least another year of waiting. And Ray Davies thought he was tired of waiting.
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The Centre of Attention
2005-02-08 00:19
Say good bye to SkyDome, and say howdy to the Rogers Centre after owner Ted Rogers. That's what happens when you let Mr. Rogers be your neighbor. It's a time-honored tradition to name teams after the guy who signs the checks, at least until that guy decided to forego his ego for a little thing called corporate sponsorship. At least Rogers is not money-hungry or at least it doesn't eclipse his devotion to himself. However, Rogers for some unknown reason went with "Centre"—yeah, not even "Center"—in an attempt to construct the most pretentious ballpark name of all time. Maybe he'll rename them "Les Bleu Jays". No major-league baseball stadium has even been designated a "Centre" or even a "Center". Here are the totals per designation:
There are, or at least were, only three outliers:
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Phinale
2005-02-06 01:03
Here's just a quick note on the eve of the Eagles' second appearance in the Super Bowl. The following is every Philadelphia team to win a championship or appear in a championship game/series in the four major sports in chronological order:
Notes: NABBP=National Association of Base Ball Players, the precursor to the first professional league, the National Association. You'll notice that the Phils now have gone the longest of any Philly club to reach the finals. You'll also notice that the USFL Stars, not the 76ers as is widely reported, are the last Philly team to win a championship. Philadelphia teams overall are 15-19 in championship series/games. That's a .441 winning percentage. In total championship games, they are 69-83 (.454). Also consider that the Eagles have gone the third longest in the NFL without winning a championship (since 1960). The longest wait is since 1947 by the Cardinals, during which the franchise moved twice (from Chicago to St. Louis, then to Arizona). The second longest wait is owned by the Lions (1957). A good sign is that only one Philly team with a better record lost in the championship round (1983 USFL Stars):
Then again, as a Philadelphia fan, I am of course grasping at straws. Why do you think I wore my Reggie White jersey today if not to pay tribute to the mighty football gods?
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Four-Players
2005-02-04 00:31
A question is circulating on SABR-L, the email list for SABR members, regarding Dave Kingman's improbable 1977 season, in which he played for four separate teams, one per division, including both New York teams. The question was whether anyone else had matched or bettered Kingman in in-season migratory patterns. There were a bunch of emails mentioning other quad-teamers, but no one had a complete list. Well, it seems that I am fast becoming the Shell Answer Man for odd SABR questions. I ran a nice little nine-table query and voila, got an answer. First, Kingman was eclipsed by five-teamer Frank Huelsman. In 1904, Huelsman played for the White Sox, the Tigers, the Sox again, the Browns, and the Senators. Technically, that's four teams, but he did have two separate stints with Chicago. I couldn't find any information on why Huelson became such a hot potato. Baseball-Reference only had one transaction from Chicago. One thing to consider is that teams frequently loaned players to other teams in the olden days before farm systems. This was especially true when leagues failed to act in concert regarding player ownership and leagues tried to retain players for themselves. Not that this was the case in 1904—The NL and AL had already come to an agreement in 1903—but it's something to keep in mind. In total there have been 19 players who had four separate stints with different teams in a season. Many of them, like Huelson, spent more than one stint with the same team. As for Dave Kingman, he is the only man to have played for all four divisions, but that might be attributable to the era in which he played more than anything else. There were four divisions in the majors from 1969 to 1993, inclusive. Kingman was one of just three men to play for four teams in that era. He just turned out to be the lucky one. Dan Micelli played for four teams in four different divisions in 2003, but by then the majors had expanded to six divisions, a number that even Dave Kingman would be hard pressed to match. In the days before divisional play, one player, George Strief, managed to play in all three major leagues. Here's the complete list of four-team players with first their batting and then pitching (if any) stats:
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Interview with the Umpire Information System Operator
2005-02-02 12:27
Since 2001 MLB has been using QuesTec's UIS (Umpire Information System) to evaluate to its umpires' performance in calling balls and strikes, and on occasion it has been a source of controversy for both umpires and players. While still a Diamondback, dyed-in-the-wool(-sock) Red Sox pitcher Curt Schilling beat one QuesTec camera into submission for what he perceived as miscalls by the home plate umpire, who was supposedly intimidated by the Big Brotherian contraption. The system has been rolled out to just ten of the thirty major-league stadia. However, a recent agreement between MLB and the umpires union gives baseball the green light to roll the system out universally. I have come to an equilibrium of sorts with the UIS system. I initially dismissed the system as "inherently flawed" but started to come around as I have learned more about it (and have written extensively on the topic—a listing of articles is available in the article above). And I have been, hopefully, trying to keep an open mind on the matter. After the agreement between the owners and the umps was inked, the opportunity came up to interview a major-league QuesTec/UIS operator, and I jumped at the chance. Here's our exchange: Q: First, can you give us an overview of what your job entails? That is, prior to, during, and after the game as well as from game to game. A: As an Umpire Information System (UIS) operator, I arrive at the stadium about an hour before the game to do set-up. The system is made up of two different computers and a TV monitor. One of the computers is the “tracking computer” and has the tracking software installed on it. I’ll track some batting practice pitches to make sure that the system is working properly and that the cameras are aimed properly. Then I’ll make sure that our video/audio feed is coming in properly. After I’ve verified that, I’ll head off to the pressbox to get the lineups for the day. On my way, I usually check out the protective lenses on the dugout cameras to make sure that they aren’t obstructed or dirty. Very rarely, we’ll have to re-aim a camera because it’s been bumped out of position (this happened once last year). When I return to the system, I’ll enter the game information: lineups, umpires, teams, weather conditions, etc. This information goes into the second (“scoring”) computer. Once all of this is complete and batting practice is over, it’s time to calibrate the tracking system—something that is done for every game. The calibration files set baseline points from the back of home plate so that the tracking system knows what points it’s looking at. About 5-10 minutes before the game, I’ll start the video recorder, which will record the entire game in three (or more) digital video files—one file for every three innings. During the game, my primary responsibility is to score the result of every pitch—foul, hit, swinging strike, called strike, called ball, etc. This information is recorded on a paper scoresheet and then entered into the scoring computer (using an Access DB entry form). I also have to make sure that the tracking system is operating properly and isn’t missing pitches, acting weird, etc. It’s important to note that no “calls” are made by the system during the game. There is a generic strike zone that makes estimates for each pitch, but during the game, that’s not adapted to each batter. The system can display location in real time, but cannot make judgements of ball/strike until after the game. When the game is over, the database (scoring computer) has information about each pitch, and the tracking system (tracking computer) has tracking information for each pitch. Corresponding pitch numbers allow this data to be correlated. Obviously, it’s important to make sure that these numbers match up during the course of the game. In addition to a track for each pitch, the system takes still photos (“snapshots”) of the batter as the pitch crosses the plate. Taken as a whole, then, the system gathers four elements of information about each pitch: the track, the still photo, the scoring information, and the digital video. After the game is when the magic happens. First comes the most important step. The scoring computer outputs a list of all “called” pitches—balls and strikes—that excludes all other pitches: fouls, hits, and swinging strikes. That list is then correlated to the still photos producing a sequence of still photos, one for each called pitch. It is then my responsibility to set the strike zone (top and bottom) for each called pitch during the game. If a given batter takes four balls, I set the strike zone four times for that batter. Thus, it is possible for a given batter to have up to 6 still photos (and six different strike zones) per at bat. An average number of called pitches for a 9 inning game is about 150 out of a total of about 450 (including the warmup throws before each inning). I set the top and bottom of the strike zone at the hollow of the knee and the top of the belt on the photos. The system then adds in 2.5 ball widths to the mark I set at the top of the belt to move the top of the strike zone up to the regulation strike zone. Once this process is complete, the system generates a series of reports that determine whether the umpire’s call was correct (C), incorrect (N), or close, but acceptable (A). The system has a built in margin of error (the .5 inch) to give umpires the benefit of the doubt. After the top/bot has been set for each pitch and the reports have been generated I then clip the game video. This produces a 10 second video clip for each called pitch so the umpire can see what happened on any given pitch. This video is taken from the centerfield camera. All of this information is then compiled into what is called the “Pitch table” which lists the pitch, the pitcher, the batter, the count, the speed of the pitch, the umpire’s call, and the system’s assessment. Also available for each pitch is the 10 second video clip, a diagram showing the location of the pitch, and the still photo that shows the strike zone as I set it. This information is used to throw out pitches that humans determine were incorrectly or unfairly assessed by the system or the operator. I don’t know exactly what standards are used to make those determinations; that work is done by a series of umpire supervisors in the employ of MLB. Finally, it’s time for quality control. I go through each pitch on the pitch table and watch the video to make sure that I’ve scored it correctly. If I have made an error (say I scored a swinging strike as a called strike) I’ll make the necessary corrections and re-run the reports. I also make sure that the video clips have been produced correctly. Overall, there’s quite a bit of redundancy built in to eliminate operator error. If I discover, for example, that I’ve set a strike zone incorrectly on a particular pitch, that pitch is thrown out and will not count against that umpire. The complete pitch table, along with graphics that show accuracy and consistency (color coded) are then burnt to a CD that I or another operator will give to the umpire the next day. Umpires have been provided with laptops by MLB so that they can look over the data. A copy of the CD goes to MLB, and a copy stays with QuesTec to serve as a backup in case something happens to the other CDs. The post-game process usually takes about an hour, but that depends on how long the game was and how many called pitches there were. Needless to say, I’ve grown to appreciate quick workers who either generate a lot of swinging strikes and don’t walk many people or induce a lot of balls in play early in the count. This reduces the time of the game as well as the final number of called pitches. Q: What kind of training and retraining were you provided and what kind of job requirements did they have? Who is your employer: the team, the stadium, or MLB? A: I was trained by three different people who came into town to oversee my training process. I began by observing the system in operation, graduated to scoring on paper, and finally was placed in control of the system with an experienced operator there to answer questions and help me solve any problems that I might run into. In terms of setting the strike zone on the still photos, we used old data to practice. I’d set the strike zones, and the trainer would comment on my accuracy until both he and I felt confident that I was setting it properly. The whole system is surprisingly easy to learn, so long as one is comfortable using PCs. It’s a bit intense at first, but as you become more comfortable with what to look for, running it becomes relatively easy as well. The listed job requirements were relatively simple, and by now infamous: live within 50 miles of an MLB stadium, be familiar with computers, and possess strong baseball knowledge. In addition, I had some background in audio and video production. I am employed as an independent contractor by QuesTec, Inc., who owns and produces the Umpire Information System under contract to Major League Baseball. As to retraining, I’m assuming that we’ll have a visit or two from the manager of the UIS project, also an employee of QuesTec. Those details are still being worked out. We’ll do a few preseason games to get back in the swing of things and depending on schedules, we may do a few spring training games. Q: How receptive have the umpires, players, managers, and other on-field personnel been of QuesTec and of the individuals involved with it? How much interaction do you have with them? A: My interaction with personnel is relatively small. Umpires seem mostly to be ambivalent, though I have noticed a few rolled eyes when I deliver the CDs. Some umpires seem extremely interested in what we do; others seem to be uninterested. I run into players and radio/television announcers often enough, but they don’t know who I am, and I haven’t made it a point to tell them. There’s a clear pecking order to the pressbox area. The columnists and personalities are known by everyone, and the people with behind-the-scenes jobs (say, the scoreboard operator, the grounds crew, etc) are not known as well. I’ve talked the most with security people, who I see every day as I enter the stadium or use the staff elevator. I haven’t had occasion to talk with a player yet. I have had a few umpire supervisors stop by to see how the system is functioning, and to a man they have all been friendly, courteous and interested. Q: Are you involved in the installation of the QuesTec system software? What about QuesTec upgrades or system hardware/software upgrades? What sort of equipment (PC, etc.) do you use? A: I have not performed any installation. The system was in place when I was hired. QuesTec management comes around to each stadium to install upgrades, etc in the offseason so that all systems are running the same versions, etc. This offseason should see more action on that level since it appears that the green light has been given for expansion to new parks. I’m not sure yet what my involvement will be in that process, but I’m certainly interested in at least watching an installation. I think I covered the equipment we use above. Q: How many cameras and where exactly on the field level are they mounted? Does it vary per field? I have heard many different configurations described. The one that I have heard most is that there are cameras mounted on the field level and the mezzanine, two per level. Is that correct? A: There are four cameras that operate in sets of two. The Field level (mounted at first and third base dugouts) cameras take the still photos of the batter. The upper level (first and third base side) cameras do the tracking. Q: If so, one concern I have is that the batter himself may block up to two of those camera angles (i.e, a field-level and a mezzanine level on the side from which he is batting). Is that the case? Doesn't that limit the system's accuracy? A: To the best of my understanding, the batter blocking the tracking camera is not an issue since it is tracked from both sides. In addition, for the field level cameras, the important one is across from the batter, so he can’t block it. The biggest problem we have is when the field level cameras are blocked from the dugout, thus rendering the still photo useless. In that situation, I can’t set a strike zone, and thus the pitch is thrown out. This tends to happen in later innings when the game is on the line and players are standing on the top step of the dugout. If the third base camera is blocked, I can’t set the strike zone on a left-handed batter, and vice versa. This doesn’t happen very often, but is an obstacle to total accuracy. Q: I still think that blocking the back camera(s) may interfere with the system's ability to triangulate a pitch given that its depth perception might be off. Have you seen anything like this in the games you've worked? Has it ever been the case that both sets of cameras have been obscured—say by the batter and an on-deck batter or fans—or have malfunctioned—say by inclement weather—at the same time on a given pitch? What would the system do and what would you do as an operator in that case? A: The dugout level cameras are not involved in tracking. Hence, blocking it has no effect on the accuracy of the track. The only thing that can be hurt by blocking dugout level cameras is the operator’s ability to set the strike zone. On occasion, it is impossible. Those pitches are thrown out. The mezzanine cameras have an angle down to the plate that renders concerns about blocking mostly moot. Fans cannot obscure the upper set of cameras since in every park I’ve seen, they are hung out from the front of an upper deck, almost looking back at the batter, and down at the plate over the batter, if you can follow me. I have heard of cases where shadows have caused an issue with tracking either degrading the quality of a track or making the ball impossible to track altogether. Pitches that are not tracked obviously cannot be graded. This reduces the sample size in any game, but does not count against the umpire. There are adjustments that an operator can make to overcome some of these difficulties; clearly it depends on the magnitude of the problem. I have not yet had any equipment malfunction as regards the cameras. Regardless of the problem, it is my job as an operator to a) log what happened, b) pass that information on, and c) remedy the situation as soon as possible. It is possible that some problems could not be remedied until after the conclusion of a game. (if, say, Curt Schilling attacked another camera during the course of an actual game.) One other point to understand in this is that not being able to see the ball for a portion of the time isn’t terribly important. The ball is tracked at a given number of points; between those points, there’s only so much that the ball can possibly do, especially given the minuscule amount of time it takes a ball traveling even as slow as 75 MPH to travel the less than 60 feet from the pitcher’s hand to the plate. Physically, only certain paths are possible, and those can be determined mathematically. The software that does all of this is outside my expertise, and is really, at its heart, what the UIS is all about. It is what QuesTec has to sell. Q: Here's a long question with a lot of setup: A strike is defined as "a legal pitch when so called by the umpire, which (b) Is not struck at, if any part of the ball passes through any part of the strike zone" while the strike zone is defined as "that area over home plate". Robert K. Adair demonstrated in "The Physics of Baseball" that a 65-mile-per-hour curveball can drop out of the strike zone as it passes over home plate and by the same token a high, 95-mile-per-hour fastball can drop into the strike zone while traveling over home plate. Does QuesTec track balls over the entire plate to take this into account? I have read otherwise, i.e., that the call is made just at the back of the plate. Harold Reynolds of "Baseball Tonight" claimed that the system loses the ball "3 feet from the plate", meaning at the dirt in front of home. Using one point to measure the location of the ball is inherently inaccurate. A: The system produces graphical representations of the track that provide at least 4 points of data over the plate. These often show a pitch diving into the top or out of the bottom of the strike zone. While this may not be enough to provide a constant track, 4 different data points is clearly more than the umpire has while watching a 95 MPH fastball. I cannot verify if those are actual track points or extrapolations of the flight of the ball based on a smaller number of actual track points. Is it infallible? No. But there is information available to umpire supervisors to allow them to make those calls when they review the data. Q: Here's another one with a bit of setup: The strike zone definition further states that "the upper limit of [the strike zone] is a horizontal line at the midpoint between the top of the shoulders and the top of the uniform pants, and the lower level is a line at the hallow beneath the knee cap. The Strike Zone shall be determined from the batter’s stance as the batter is prepared to swing at a pitched ball." How can the system possibly measure these things while the batter is possibly moving (think Joe Morgan) while in his stance? The QuesTec system would have to be able to determine where the batter’s knee caps, belt, and shoulder are and to calculate the position of the horizontal line that defines the upper and lower bounds of the strike zone from these body parts. Not only that, the system must be able to determine when the batter is prepared to swing, even one who has a lot of motion while he is in the box, to make the measurements of the zone. A: There are occasions where this is very difficult--for example a called pitch on a bunt—that arise in situations when there are extreme variations in a batter’s stance. From the time a pitch is released to the time the ball crosses the plate there is usually very little alteration in the strike zone for a given batter. Sit in good seats behind the dugout some time and watch the batter (not the pitcher). You’ll see what I mean. As I mentioned, I make those determinations based on the still photos. There are possibly limitations to this system, but they are far less than have been described. I’d like to stress that a different strike zone is set for each and every called pitch during the course of a game. Q: Specifically, regarding the "2.5 ball widths" above the belt that the system uses to demarcate the top of the strike zone, I see this as potentially problematic given the definition of a strike. This standard might fit the average batter, but what above extremely tall players like Richie Sexson or extremely short players and those who squat in their stance, like Pete Rose did? Is there an adjustment made in this instance? A: I think you’re right. There are situations in which this probably would result in a somewhat large or small Questec set strike zone. This is why all of the information I described is contained in the Pitch Table that is given to the Ump and MLB. First of all, not every call is right or wrong based on the top or bottom of the strike zone. For example, if the pitch is a foot outside, it doesn’t matter about the top or the bottom of the zone. Secondly, the inclusion of the still photo from which the strike zone and the video clip of the pitch allows the operator AND MLB/the Ump to look over the data and form their own interpretations of a given call. Let’s say that an ump calls a given pitch a “ball.” The UIS calls it a strike. It is possible to double check that decision and account for any error or extenuating circumstances that may explain the discrepancy. If the system gives the Ump an “N” score based on what is clearly a faulty strike zone setting, I can throw it out, and MLB can throw it out in assessing umpire accuracy. Overall, I’d say that the top of the strike zone is probably the most error-free of the four areas. Inside and outside calls are wrong far more often. Q: The umps state that a technician sets the coordinates of the system on the first pitch to the first batter. Given the size of that batter or the calibration method used, the strike zone may or may not be accurate. According to the New York Times, a computer technician sets the strike zone from a snapshot taken as the first pitch to a batter was on the way to the plate. Is either one of these scenarios true? Is the actual method more accurate and if so, how can we be sure of that? A: Neither of these descriptions is accurate. The system is calibrated to home plate before each game; these (inside and outside edges of the plate) coordinates are fixed. The operator sets the strike zone from a still photo for EACH called pitch; as I mentioned before, this can result in up to six different strike zones in a given at bat for each player (2 called strikes, 4 balls; 3 called strikes, 3 balls). The strike zone is set for every called pitch to every batter. This method is clearly more accurate than what has been described. Again, there may be flaws in the method, but they are much different than what has been described and will result in a much lower degree of error. Given that there is a margin of error built into the system to give umpires the benefit of the doubt on their calls, I’d suggest that the amount of error is actually quite low. Q: The umpires said in a 2003 statement that the computer is "heavily dependent upon decisions and actions by the QuesTec ballpark operators, almost none of whom have any experience in professional baseball" and that it "often incorrectly interprets the strike zone," producing "unacceptable inconsistencies between strike zones from ballpark to ballpark and from day-to-day in the same ballpark." Incidentally this contradicts their complaint in the previous question. Are the zone settings recalibrated throughout the game and do they remain accurate? If so, how can we be assured of their accuracy? A: Aside from setting the top and bottom of the strike zone, there is nothing left to my judgment. I am simply recording what happened. There may be slight inconsistencies from operator to operator with regards to setting the strike zone. I don’t have any way to verify or refute those sorts of claims, as I’ve only seen my strike zones and those of the other operators I’ve worked with. We all worked together and I’d say that we were consistent with each other. Further, while I respect the point about lacking experience in professional baseball, I don’t think that it’s particularly important to operating the system properly. Even someone who has never watched a baseball game can locate the hollow of the knee and the top of the belt buckle on a still photo. Other than that, there is almost no judgment exercised by the operators. The only other case of judgment is in deciding to throw out pitches where the track or the still photo is bad. Again, these judgments do not depend on baseball experience, but can be trained with relative ease. Q: Tony Massarotti of "The Boston Herald" said that UIS may be causing more walks to be issued and also may not be achieving one of its proposed goals-to speed up games. What do you have to say about this? A: The data on this score is inconclusive, and any differences between QuesTec and non-QuesTec parks seem to be so minimal as to be statistically insignificant. The obvious solution is to put it in all parks. It’s hard for me to say if the system has caused more walks, since watching a game in the stands and scoring a game on the system are very different experiences. There are so many variables involved: quality of pitcher, quality of opponent, etc, etc. My gut instinct is that there may be a few more outside pitches being called balls, but I have absolutely no way of proving or verifying that instinct. On the other hand, more high pitches are being called strikes. It’s important to remember that any of us watches only a small slice of the total number of games that are played; I only worked about 40 games last year in my park and attended about 15 others, mostly in other parks. That’s a very small percentage of the total number of games played, so observations that I make are limited by that small sample size and the fact that almost all of the games that I watched involved one particular team. Q: Umpire crew chief Randy Marsh once made these comments regarding QuesTec: "In the past, there have been pitches that are a little off the plate that are hittable pitches that we’d call strikes. If we call them strikes now, we’re wrong. You have QuesTec looking over your shoulder every single pitch." Any comments? A: If the rule book says those are balls, what difference does it make if they are hittable? Who defines “hittable”? What is hittable to Vlad Guerrero is not hittable to a lot of other players. These pitches (the outside ones especially) are ones that I’ve noticed produce the majority of mistakes as judged by the system. If they were called strikes before, then those calls were wrong. The point of the system is to help umpires call the strike zone as the rule book defines it. We should only judge it on how well it accomplishes that goal. Q: Author of "The Diamond Appraised", Craig Wright said in a study on ESPN.com that "With the supposed pressure of their calls being tracked by QuesTec, the umpires are calling a slightly higher — not lower — percentage of strikes in 2003 than they did in 2002…[T]he emphasis on calling higher strikes has resulted in a higher percentage of strike calls." Do you think that having QuesTec monitoring games has affected the way umpires call games or at least how they call certain pitches? A: First off, the UIS has been in operation since 2002, with some operation in 2001. So differences between 2002 and 2003 are somewhat inconclusive in showing the impact of the system on umpire calls. I would hope the monitoring has affected the way in which umpires call games. That’s the point of the system. There was a time when ball/strike calls were truly outrageous. Consistency is always more important than accuracy, and the system measures both. What I am most disheartened by are reports that the strike zones of various umpires vary from park to park (as in the Schilling quotation below). That’s not a flaw with the system, but with that umpire. Q: Can you explain more fully how the system measures both consistency and accuracy? A: What the consistency algorithm measures is if pitches in the same location are called the same thing throughout the game. Basically, the definition of the strike zone creates a universe of possible coordinates for the result “strike” on each pitch. Since each pitch has certain coordinates assigned to it, pitches can be compared, and the calls made on those pitches can be compared. I assume that the math takes into account distance from the strike zone, since that of course varies from pitch to pitch. What the system generates is a “consistency score” from 0-100, and a color keyed graphic that shows where the ump was accurate and where he was inaccurate. On average, low and outside are the least accurate and often the least consistent calls. Consistency scores tend to be higher than accuracy scores, but the accuracy scores are raw, unadjusted totals. Of course, there are variations from umpire to umpire. The final accuracy scores assigned to umpires (as I understand it) include all “C” and “A” grades, and also factor in any pitches that are removed due to problems with the data or extenuating circumstances. Q: Are those consistency scores per pitcher or across all pitchers? I ask that since if a guy who those a 95-mile-per-hour fastball is followed by a junkballer, consistency may not necessarily be a good thing or even a possibility. If Umpire A officiates in a Randy Johnson (LHP)-Curt Schilling (RHP) matchup in which both last deep (eight innings?) in the game and are replaced by RHP Mariano Rivera and LHP Alan Embree for one inning. Umpire B calls a game between the Phils' Corey Lidle and the former Phil Eric Milton. Both are yanked by the third inning and both teams use five or six relievers, a few right-handers and a few lefties, with different types of pitches thrown at different speeds. Could it be unfair to the ump B given that finding consistency under those circumstances is more difficult? A: The consistency scores are for the game as a whole. Consistency as judged by UIS is strictly about location; I’d think that that’s a good thing even across different pitcher types. However, I would think that as an umpire it would be particularly difficult to maintain that consistency given different pitcher types. The pitch table lists who the pitchers were, so there is an ability to adjust the raw data to reflect the situations you refer to. I would assume (though I do not know for sure) that MLB would take these sorts of things into account in interpreting and adjusting the raw scores. What this situation highlights is the reality of this (or any) system: it’s a tool to help humans, not a final answer. Q: Curt Schilling made these statements after his infamous run-in with a QuesTec camera: "I said something to one of the umpires about it and he said 'Do us a favor and break the other one'… The QuesTec system in this ballpark is a joke. The umpires have admitted it. They hate it. In the last three starts I’ve made here, multiple times umpires have said to the catcher, 'It’s a pitch I want to call a strike but the machine won’t let me.'" As an IT professional myself, I know that hearing this sort of feedback always warms my heart. What do you have to say about it? A: Again, I think this is the point of the system—to enforce the strike zone as defined in the rule book. While I respect the experience of the umpires, I don’t think they have the right to “want” to call something a strike. They have a job to do, and most do it very well. Taken in the proper context, this system can only help them do that job better. Clearly Schilling hasn’t been hurt too much by the system; he had a pretty good season this year in a QuesTec park. Q: After the Schilling incident, then-Diamondback manager Bob Brenly said, "They call balls and strikes differently in the ballparks where [QuesTec]’s set up. If the system is so good and the ball tracks so well, why do you need a ball-strike umpire? You could have a green light go on out on the scoreboard if it’s a ball and a red light if it’s a strike." I know that it's a backhanded compliment but do you think the players and on-field personnel would welcome ball-strike calls done in this manner? A: I doubt if they would welcome it. Honestly, I’m not sure what I think of the idea. I like the idea of umpires making the calls. As an aside, the system as currently constructed can’t make real-time ball/strike calls. Determinations of accuracy are not made until after the game. It also has no way of recording swings or fouls, so we’d still need an umpire to do that. I’d hazard a guess, however, that we will someday see a system that can overcome those difficulties, but it’s a long way off. Q: Brenly, as is his wont, went on to say, "The strike zone has always been very subjective, and the players know that going in. You put it [i.e., QuesTec] up in a ballpark, and the umpires are calling what they think they’re supposed to call. If you want a consistent strike zone, you’ve got to put QuesTec in all 30 ballparks." In a variant, do you think the players, etc. would be more welcoming of the system if it were used universally? A: Aren’t umpires supposed to call “what they think they’re supposed to call?” I think expanding to all 30 parks would improve things dramatically. While I don’t know the details of umpire scheduling, it has occurred to me that some umpires could have more games in QuesTec-enabled parks than others. If true, that would mean that some umpires are being graded/assessed on a smaller sample size which is more likely to be influenced by an off-game or the like. Put it in every park, and some of the claims about unfairness simply disappear. On the other hand, it is disingenuous of umpire representatives to make this claim since it was their union that filed the grievance that held up installation in all 30 parks. I agree with Brenly on the universality comment 100%. When consistency is the goal, everyone must play on the same playing field. Q. QuesTec claims that the system is accurate to one-half inch. Do you know under what conditions that benchmark was made? Do you see that sort of accuracy consistently when operating the system? A: I do not know the details of that claim. I have read that the tracking technology was improved by a collaboration with Titan, a company that makes missile tracking devices. It’s difficult for me to say if I see that kind of accuracy. I don’t know what 1 inch vs. ½ inch accuracy would look like. In addition, almost everything I look at is either a graphical representation or televised, so nothing is its actual size. As a result, it’s hard for me to say that it’s accurate to this or that standard. What I can say is that watching the system has shown me the distorting effects of the off-center centerfield camera that is used to show almost every pitch on TV. It’s also gotten me to ignore the catcher’s mitt, which is the center of attention from the centerfield camera. My sense of what is and isn’t a strike has changed as a result—almost exclusively to the benefit of the umpires. Q: Do you feel that any of the camera views one sees on TV is accurate? How about the view from the blimp? My favorite has to be the groundhog cam that Fox dubbed, I believe, Diamond View. A: Sadly, I think the most accurate was the ESPN High Center camera. It really wasn’t any fun to watch, but it did give you a straight on view of the plate, which is good for inside-outside calls. Relatively useless, however, for top/bot judgements. I really liked the camera in the dirt that Fox used. I thought it really added something to the telecast, which is more than you can say for most gadgets. The best cameras would be (for top/bot) the ones we used, combined with one suspended just over the top of the plate, from above. The combination of those would probably work best for visuals. But since I’ve never seen the strictly overhead view zoomed in on the plate, I don’t know how well it would work. It seems like a good idea. Q: Regarding calibration, are all these systems calibrated against some absolute to minimize variation across parks? A: There is no universal standard that I am aware of; the system is calibrated to the specific park before each game. Those files are saved so they can be checked if the results seem suspicious for some reason. Given that the shape of the diamond and home plate are consistent across parks, I’d guess that there is almost no variation in this area, since those are the benchmarks that are used to calibrate the tracking cameras. What’s interesting is that I’ve found that after the system taught me about the distorting effect of the centerfield camera, I could generally predict what it would call pitches as I saw them. This predictability gives me confidence in the system at least as it operates in one park. It doesn’t say anything about differences from park to park. But it tells me that from day-to-day, umpires are being graded by a system that a) can teach even a relative amateur observer like me and b) is consistent across games. Q: Peter Gammons stated on ESPN.com that he believes that "21-year-old [QuesTec] operators must be replaced by ex-umpires." What is your reaction to this statement? To Gammons election to the broadcasters' branch of the Hall of Fame? I withdraw the last question. A: I don’t know any 21 year old QuesTec operators. For the most part, UIS operators, myself included, are at least in their mid-20s. Another operator I met was in his 30’s. As I explained above, I don’t think that bringing in ex-umpires would really change anything about how the system operates. It couldn’t hurt, so long as ex-umpires with the requisite computer skills could be found, but it’s really more of a computer job than a baseball job. What’s important is dedication to doing the job properly even when the work devolves into drudgery. (for example, setting the strike zone for 450 pitches in a 16 inning game). Every operator I’ve met has that dedication. Additionally, I’d be willing to bet that most former umpires aren’t willing to work for what they pay us. Gammons’ comment is typical talking head kind of stuff: it sounds like a strong stand, but it dissolves under any sort of examination. It’s like saying that all grocery store cashiers should have advanced degrees in mathematics. Sure, that’d be great, but do we really need PhDs running cash registers? And what would be the benefit? The place for those with experience is interpreting, not producing, the data. Q: In a study on ESPN.com in 2003, Baseball Prospectus found that QuesTec does not bring consistency. Hitters' umps (i.e., ones that call more balls) are not reined in but rather overcompensate and call more strikes: "Our numbers reveal that QuesTec has made a difference for individual umpires, each of whom has adapted to the system differently, and unpredictably." Do you feel that QuesTec is an effective tool in training home plate umpires, especially after MLB redefined the strike zone in recent years? A: I think it can be an effective tool, depending on how it’s used. I am not privy to the way in which MLB or umpire supervisors meet with individual umpires to discuss their performances. Like any other method of assessment, it’s only as effective as the people who are employing it. In any business, if employees know that they can ignore their reviews, there’s less of a tendency to work towards achieving the goals set out in their performance plan. The same applies here. The tool will work as well as the people using it let it work. The system, after all, is only a tool to aid the human eye. People using UIS effectively would find out which umpires were failing to improve their performance and sanction them in some mutually agreeable way. This, however, is subject to the collective bargaining process. I was pleased to see the recent agreement because it seems to strike the proper balance and understands that the UIS is a tool, and nothing more. The Prospectus study was not some of their best work. There’s no attempt to control for different quality of teams involved in these games. The discussion of individual umpires does point out some trends, but the biggest effects that they can find are on the order of 2-3%. This means approximately 3 pitches a game. Without data on locations that are called differently, it is impossible to conclude what the effect on these umps is. If we took a random sample of games an arbitrarily labeled them group 1 and group 2, there is the possibility that the same discrepancies would show up. What I’m saying is that the science of umpire assessment is something new to the baseball community and the methods that have been publicly discussed seem a bit weak methodologically. I’d love to see the development of some more descriptive metrics using actual QuesTec data. One last point: The UIS is a training tool. A study done in 2003 is only going to show the early stages of this change; it’s also done in the middle of a pitched fight between the WUA and MLB over the used of the system. Will results really be consistent in that context? I don’t want to sound like an apologist here, but that seems like jumping the gun to me. Q: Robert K. Adair, author of "The Physics of Baseball" and a consultant hired by the umpires union to investigate QuesTec, found that "The umpire’s strike zone and the QuesTec strike zone are consistent, but in different ways… the QuesTec strike zone does closely mirror the strike zone defined in the rulebook." Do you feel that is a validation of the system? A: It sounds like it. I suppose it depends on what he means by “different ways.” Umpires by and large have been consistent over the years to their own strike zones; if what Adair means is that the UIS more closely approximates the rulebook strike zone, then yes, I think that is a validation of the system, especially if viewed as a training tool. On the other hand, it could be suggesting that individual umpire consistency is more important than adherence to the rule book. In that case, I’d disagree. We’re all here to make sure that the rules are followed consistently. Q: He went on to say that while a certain number of pitches do give incorrect readings, "Operators are given leave to kick those out, and typically they tend to throw out six or seven pitches per game." Is that the case? A: We are given leave to remove pitches that are measured incorrectly for whatever reason. Some games none are removed; some games 8 are. I don’t know what an accurate average would be since I have experience in only one park. Each park generates its own unique circumstances (shadows, dugout design, lighting, open/dome configuration, etc) that might contribute to a pitch being thrown out. We also keep a log of each pitch that is thrown out and the information (but not the grade) is passed on to QT and MLB. The total number of pitches thus removed is kept somewhere (I don’t know what the number is or where it’s kept, but someone has that information to keep track of what’s happening with the system). Q: My old friend Joe Morgan also wrote about QuesTec on ESPN.com: "Umpiring officials showed me the QuesTec system and explained why they felt it wasn't accurate. And after seeing their demonstration, I could see what they were talking about (from ballpark to ballpark, similar pitches to the same batter were called differently by the computer)…K-Zone, ESPN’s strike-zone innovation…is accurate to within four-tenths of an inch. I don’t use it to grade the umpires but to demonstrate how the pitcher uses different parts of the zone or misses just off the plate. I trust K-Zone because I know how it works and I know it’s accurate." Can you discuss K-Zone and compare it to QuesTec UIS? Morgan claims that it is the more accurate tool. What is your reaction to this? A: I’ve read criticism of Morgan’s comments elsewhere that has not been charitable. I’d like to take a slightly different tack. Taken literally, what Morgan is saying is that the same batter received two similar pitches from two different pitchers in two different ballparks, and the results were called differently by the system. Why is that result surprising? The reason why a system like this was designed in the first place was precisely because of this situation: what appears to be true isn’t always. I don’t know precisely what examples Morgan looked at, but I’d submit that it’s at least possible that the reason the pitches were called differently is because they WERE different. What we see watching the game on TV is much different than what the system or the umpires see. If Morgan’s observations about K-Zone were accompanied by some specific examples, perhaps it’d be a more discussable point. For now, all we have is his word on it. As much as I love Joe as a player (I’m a Reds fan) I have no reason to believe that his observations about a computer system are particularly compelling. I find the assertion that he “trusts” the K-Zone system more because he “knows” that it’s accurate to be troubling. Is he doubting UIS simply because he doesn’t know how it works? I don’t know anything about how the K-Zone system works or what its specifications are. If it is truly 1/10 of an inch more accurate than the UIS, then perhaps MLB should be using it instead. In addition, I don’t know what process is used to overlay a strike zone with the location data. That’s the real key to accuracy in judging ball/strike calls. I’d love to see an explanation of how that system operates. In any case, the argument shouldn’t be about this system or that system. That should be subject to independent verification since it is a question that can be answered by testing. As near as I can tell, the main argument between MLB and the umpires has been about the use of any system whatsoever. Hopefully, that argument is over. Q: Regarding the deal signed by MLB and the umpires, it seems that MLB is now free to install QuesTec in all major-league parks while the umps got a concession in how QuesTec will be used to evaluate their rank: "[U]mpires whose ball-and-strike calls are rated below standard by QuesTec will be evaluated by umpire supervisors based on videotape and in-game inspection." Do you see this as a victory for the QuesTec system and will it remain effective as an umpire evaluation tool in this more, shall we say, watered-down scenario? A: UIS shouldn’t be about victory. What this agreement was really about was MLB getting umpires to agree that MLB had the right to use some sort of system to assess and improve their performance. This tool can be used in many ways. This sounds like it will be used to identify umpires who are less effective and turn them over to someone for remedial work. That sounds perfectly reasonable to me, and doesn’t seem to make UIS any less effective. The point is to identify umpires who aren’t doing their job correctly. One part of that job is calling balls and strikes as defined in the rule book. The system generates data that is subject to interpretation. If there is a place for former umpires, it’s in the interpretation of that data and the implementation of plans to improve umpire performance. I can run this system. I have no idea how to work with an umpire on improving his results since I’ve never stood behind the catcher while a 95 mph pitch comes rolling in. Q: In your opinion, will the system eventually replace the umps in calling balls and strikes? A: This system will not replace the umps, for technological reasons outlined above. It simply is not designed to take the place of human beings. A different system might. Something involving GPS locators in the balls and laser beams worn by the players, etc, etc. I’ve tried to imagine ways to replace the umpires and that’s the best I’ve come up with. The issue is not accuracy, but about timing. The results of this system are produced after the game is over. Setting a strike zone for this system in real time will involve a different level of invasiveness, I think. Something like creating an “electric eye” beamed upwards from the plate and out from players. We’re just not there yet. Even our “smart bombs” aim for areas larger than the typical strike zone, and they only have to aim in two dimensions. Q: What are QuesTec's plans, at least the ones for public consumption, regarding MLB and the UIS system? A: I’m not aware of any public announcements on the subject. My guess is that they will be forthcoming as MLB and QuesTec assess what parks can easily be fitted with the system within the limited time left before the season begins. No action could be taken until the umpires’ grievance was settled. Q: Are there plans to scorecard calls at first, fair/foul calls, catches against the wall, tag calls, balks, knowledge of the rules, or any of the other responsibilities of the umps that you are aware of? A: I am not aware of any such plans. They would involve a completely different kind of system than the UIS. Q: What about using QuesTec as replay tool in playoff games or the like? A: The system as currently designed wouldn’t allow it. Even if I wanted to, I can’t go back and process an individual pitch after it happened. The system is designed only to handle the data in one batch; one pitch can’t be pulled out. I’m not a big fan of replay in general. I think its use in football (along with other factors) made televised football almost mind-numbingly dull to watch. Can you imagine watching Game 7 of the Red Sox-Yankees series after Torre throws a red flag on the field to challenge a ball-strike call? Tim McCarver and Joe Buck would remind us about the need for indisputable visual evidence and argue with each other about what the Ques-play would show. And they’d have at least a minute and a half to do it. No thanks. That same Red Sox-Yankees series showed us that dedicated, properly trained umpires working as a crew can get calls right. I salute the umpires for those calls. Q: In my opinion, QuesTec is caught in a power struggle over the strike zone that has been playing out since at least the mid-Eighties between the umps and the owners. I conducted a study that found in part that the power surge of the mid-Eighties led to the batter's box to be obliterated in an effort to get to outside pitches. As a result the umps widened and flattened the strike zone, leading to a rules redefinition by MLB to "restore" the zone. If the batter’s box were enforced in the first place, the umps wouldn't have had to give the pitchers an extra few inches on the outside of the plate. If they enforced the batter's box now, strike calling could go back to the old days. What's your opinion? A: I have been infuriated by the disregard for the batter’s box rule ever since I moved to a big league city and got a chance to watch at least 15-20 games a season in person. In my mind, that’s one of the top five problems in the game today. In any game you watch, the back of the box is covered up by the second inning and you have guys setting up 4, 5, sometimes 6 inches back of the line. I hope MLB encourages stricter enforcement of this rule. I think you’re right about outside pitches in general. The plate shifted several inches to the outside. I see this result in the UIS data; umpires consistently give some on the outside and call pitches balls that are on the inside corner. Enforce the batter’s box, and we’d see some differences. Unfortunately, that’s something that the UIS can have no impact on whatsoever. I think the system has been caught in the middle of a power struggle between MLB and the umps that began some time ago, perhaps even with the infamous “enforce the balk rule” directive. The fact that each league ran its own umps led to the growth of fiefdoms, where you had the employees telling the employers how they would go about their business. Recently, that balance of power has changed, and the adoption of the system is just one part of that shift. I hope the recent agreement heralds a new era of cooperation between MLB and the umpires. After all, don’t we all just want to see the best baseball possible? I love doing this job. It’s forced me to refine the way in which I watch and think about the game. I watch pitch-to-pitch now instead of at-bat to at-bat, and I think I understand more about how the game is played as a result. I don’t have a strong opinion about this particular system one way or the other, but I do firmly believe that the game can be improved by objective assessment of umpire performance. Thinking about that issue has given me a great deal of respect for the skill that umpires display on a regular basis, and gotten me more interested in the realities of what umpires do in every game. The best umps are invisible to fans, but they deserve our gratitude. They’re professionals who work hard to be the best at what they do. Hopefully, the UIS can help them achieve that goal. Mike's Epilogue (A Quinn Martin Production): I still have some issues with UIS—how well the ball is tracked above the plate, using 2.5 ball widths above the belt uniformly to define the upper limit of the strike zone. However, I feel that the established procedures along with the dedication and professionalism of the operators (if this one is any indication), help overcome the limitations of the system itself. The ump is given the benefit of the doubt on extremely close calls (i.e., within one-half inch). The calls are photographed and reviewed. The operator can throw out calls on which he feels the system did not function optimally. All this says that the point is to get the call right if possible, to curb the poor calls but not to nitpick on borderline calls. There has been a lot of inaccurate criticism published about UIS. I have asked every reasonable question, and some not so reasonable, that I've read elsewhere or that I've thought up myself in my wee brain, and I feel that they have been answered sufficiently. I'm not saying that there cannot be improvements made to the system nor that we should not continue to raise questions about it. Also, QuesTec must continue not only to adhere to its established standards and procedures, but it should strive to improve them as the system is rolled out throughout the majors. What I am saying is that I am finally a believer. Like E.G. Marshall in "12 Angry Men" I have finally set aside every misgiving, and can give it the thumbs-up. I think UIS is a step in the right direction for the sport. Rolling it out to the remaining twenty stadiums, as long as it is in a controlled manner and the new operators that will be employed are well trained, should be a good thing for baseball in general and us as fans. Now let's just hope they don't screw it up.
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Myers and Telemaco and Await the Debacle
2005-02-02 00:18
Phils prospect Cole Hamels, one of their no-touch, can't miss, super-wizbangy type future stars (in the Pat Combs mold), fractured a bone in his pitching hand in a proverbial "altercation" in Clearwater. I guess Cole—Is that really his actual name or is he a character in Tom Hanks' "Bachelor Party"?—forgot Crash Davis's sage advice, " When you get in a fight with a drunk, you don't hit him with your pitching hand". Whatever the reason, Hamels will be out until May. So starts the untuning of the Phillie rotation What, am I insane? Hamels was invited to spring training, but had very little chance of making the rotation. How will that affect the rotation especially given that the Phils problem is quality not quantity. Well, that's true but Hamels was sure to be a mid-season replacement for one of the eventual ineffective or injured starters. I was hoping it would be Cory Lidle. With Gavin Floyd almost a lock to make the rotation, there's not a lot of help in the organization. The previous surefire prospect, Brett Myers, is still floating around, though even the Phils are not incompetent enough to put him back in the rotation. However, Myers and swingman supernumerary Amaury Telemaco will step in if anyone in the rotation falters. I am already on the record for predicting that if Telemaco is in the rotation come May, the Phils are in trouble. Well, the slippery slope just got waxed by Hamels.
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Lord, Nelson! 'Cause He's Once, Twice, Three Times A Mariner
2005-02-01 23:26
Jeff Nelson signed a minor-league contract with Seattle on Monday.
Now, that was a be-otch of query.
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We Are Devo, D-E-V-O
2005-02-01 22:31
If, after the last election, one still needs proof that we are the dumbest country on the planet, I found it. My favorite part is this: There is no credible scientific challenge to the idea that all living things evolved from common ancestors, that evolution on earth has been going on for billions of years and that evolution can be and has been tested and confirmed by the methods of science. But in a 2001 survey, the National Science Foundation found that only 53 percent of Americans agreed with the statement "human beings, as we know them, developed from earlier species of animals."
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Where's Jorge Posada When You Need Him?
2005-02-01 22:19
It seems that the groundhog cam that Fox used last year in the playoffs and World Series will now be infecting the Super Bowl, which, of course, is being broadcast on Fox. I just hope T.O. repeats his "star dance" from the Dallas game right on top of "Turf Cam" or maybe he can get Nicolette Sheridan to drop towels on the wee tiny devices. To quote Gaylord Focker to another annoying mini-cam, "Can you handle this?"
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Palmeiro and Sosa to Share More Than Viagra?
2005-02-01 00:45
There is one rather salient little factoid that I left out of my analysis of Sammy Sosa moving to the Orioles. Should both Sosa and Rafael Palmeiro are both on the active roster at the same time, it will mark the first time in baseball history that two players on the same team have had 500 career home runs. Sosa has 574, and Palmeiro 551. That's a total of 1125 career home runs. The previous high for two teammates was 1056, and it happened twice. Here are the top 25 teammates in career home runs (Remember, these numbers reflect the career homers as of the given year):
Note that Giants Barry Bonds (703) and Moises Alou (278, for a total of 981) should join this list this year. Also, both these tandems should add to their career totals throughout the year. Even though this will be the first time two teammates will be in the 500-homer club, there have only been nine teams with two men in the 400-home run club:
However, this will not be the first time that two future 500-home run players have been on the same team. It won’t even add to the list of such teammates since Palmeiro and Sosa were teammates in Texas back in 1989, when Sosa was a 20-year-old rookie. He played 25 games in Texas before being traded to the White Sox on July 29. Palmeiro was just 24 and had never hit more than 14 homers in his four-year career. Here is the complete list:
Finally, given that there have been so few 500-home run hitters, should we be surprised that no two teammates have ever before both reached the magic number. Consider that Babe Ruth was the first man to join the club in 1929. He was the sole active member until 1935. Then in 1940 Jimmie Foxx became the second man in the club. In Foxx's last season, 1945, Mel Ott became number three. Then Ott was the only active member until 1947. Ted Williams became the fourth member in his last season, 1960. Willie Mays joined them in 1965 and then both Mickey Mantle and Eddie Mathews in 1967, when there were three active 500-home run hitters for the first time. Their ranks grew to four when Hank Aaron joined the list in 1968, Mantle and Matthews' last season. Ernie Banks became the third active member in 1970. Harmon Killebrew and Frank Robinson made it five active members for the first time in 1971. That decreased to four when Banks retired after 1971, three when Mays retired after 1973, and two when Killebrew retired after 1975. By 1977, there were no active members. Then, just Willie McCovey, 1978-80 and just Reggie Jackson, 1985-86. Both Jackson and Schmidt were active members in 1987, the first time multiple members were active in over a decade. Then, it was just Schmidt for two seasons. Baseball went six seasons without any new recruits to the club. Then, Eddie Murray was the sole active member for two seasons. By 1998, there were again no active 500-homerians. Mark McGwire joined their ranks in 1999. By 2001, McGwire's last season, Barry Bonds joined him. 2003, Palmeiro and Sosa joined Bonds. Finally, Ken Griffey made it four last season. What this long dissertation of "begats" was supposed to demonstrate is how unlikely it is that two men in all of baseball let alone on one team were active members of the 500-homer run club at the same time. In all of baseball history, there have been just 44 seasons in which one member of the club was even active. As for multiple members, there have been just 17 seasons:
We just happen to be living in one of the more populous seasons for their membership. Also, the Cubs happened to sour on Sosa at the same time that the O's need a marquee name to deter fans from rooting for the newly relocated Nationals. That's the confluence of quite a number of events that was required to bring about the first two teammates who were members of the 500-HR club. And we still have spring training to get through before it actually comes to pass.
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Baseball Toaster was unplugged on February 4, 2009. Frozen Toast
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