|
Monthly archives: January 2004
“Hall’s of Relief”—Final Analysis
2004-01-30 00:11
Previous entries:The 1870s, ‘80s, and ‘90s The 1900s and ‘10s The 1920s, ‘30s, and ‘40s The 1950s The 1960s The 1970s The 1980s The 1990s and 2000s 2003 Notes: Part I & II To Come: Final Analysis: I, II, III, and IV. Notes on 2003:It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair, we had everything before us, we had nothing before us, we were all going direct to Heaven, we were all going direct the other way—in short, the period was so far like the present period, that some of its noisiest authorities insisted on its being received, for good or evil, in the superlative degree of comparison only. —Charles "Don't Call Me Jason" Dickens This past season was an extreme year for closers. There were very positive signs balanced against very negative ones. On one hand, many established closers lost their jobs: Mike Williams, Jose Mesa, Scott Williamson, Armando Benitez, and Billy Koch. Still other closers were being converted to starters more and more often (in 2003, Danny Graves and Byung-Hyun Kim, at least for some time) since Derek Lowe found success in the starting rotation two years ago. The Red Sox’s attempt at “bullpen by committee” ended disastrously. Five “closers” had ERAs greater than their league average in 2003. On the other hand, Dennis Eckersley became the third reliever in the Hall of. A slew of closers had sub-2.00 ERAs in 2003. Eric Gagne had arguably the greatest season ever for a reliever and won the NL Cy Young, the first such award given to a reliever in eleven seasons. Two of the top relievers in the game (Gagne and John Smoltz) were converted starters. Here’s what I said about his season when he was awarded the NL Cy Young: We shall nobly save, or meanly lose, the last best, hope of earth. —Abraham "Nunez" Lincoln Think not so much of what thou hast not as of what thou hast: but of the things which thou hast select the best... At the same time, however, take care that thou dost not through being so pleased with them accustom thyself to overvalue them, so as to be disturbed if ever thou shouldst not have them. —Marcus "Giles" Aurelius Antoninus from his Meditations He pitched magnificently. In 77 games and 80+ innings he had recorded well over 50 saves and had an ERA well under 2.00. Who cared if his winning percentage was just .400? The Cy Young voters look at his stats and gave the Cy Young to…Bob Welch. Oh, sorry. I wasn't speaking of Eric Gagne, who won the NL Cy Young the other day. It was Bobby Thigpen's great 1990 season that landed him in fourth place in both Win Shares (behind Clemens, Finley and Stewart and fractions ahead of Dennis Eckersley) and the Cy Young vote (behind Welch, Clemens, and Stewart but again ahead of Eckersley). Thigpen and his one great season were the precursor to Gagne. Thigpen never had Gagne's stuff but he was used in a similar fashion and produced similar results. Leading up to Bobby Thigpen's record save year in 1990, baseball was pushing the closer limits as much as possible. In 1988, the major-league average closer recorded 25 saves for the first time. Every non-strike year since then, the average major-league closer has exceeded the 25-save threshold. As the Eighties ended teams used their closers in more and more a similar fashion. The standard deviation for team closers' save totals (6.96) dropped to its lowest since 1976 (not counting the strike year of 1982) and the standard deviation as a percentage of the average saves (27.38) was at an all-time low (just 25.41%). This complacency was broken wide open in 1990 when, even though save totals fell (the average closer had 26.81), the ways that closers were used changed dramatically. The standard deviation of saves per closer nearly doubled and was an all-time high (11.11, which has been exceeded three times since, twice in the last two years). I have already offered my theory on this in my relievers study in the Nineties section. To summarize, the brief offensive onslaught of 1985-87 had subsided and the strategy of using one of your best pitchers as a closer who you hold off on using until late in the game to prevent a late-inning comeback by your opponent fell out of favor. Tony LaRussa started using Dennis Eckersley in what I have termed the post-modern closer mold, i.e., fewer innings, shorter outings, and more saves. Oakland also had a great supporting cast in the bullpen so limiting Eckersley's innings didn't hurt them. This culminated with his 1992 MVP- and Cy Young-winning season, the second 50-save year for a closer. Meanwhile, Thigpen's career feel apart: after his record 57-save season he only recorded 53 total saves for his career. Even though by 1992 Eckersley was used less in the post-modern role than he had been in the previous few (80 innings in 69 appearances), the post-modern closer took root. This was accelerated as most of the next decade was spent in an expansion-induced offensive explosion. Closers were held back until the ninth for fear that a lead would be lost in a final walk-off at-bat. However, as the offensive onslaught slackened, the battle for the preferred usage of the closer role heated up like a debate between Heat Miser and Cold Miser. Since 2000, the varied use of relievers has gone through the roof. The standard deviation of saves among all closers hit 11% of the average for the second time since 1990. It's been over 11.25% each of the last two years. Meanwhile, the average number of saves climbed to an all-time high of 32.93 in 2002 only to fall by over four saves (to 28.00) this year. Eric Gagne led all closers with 55 saves, but this year also witnessed a team save leader—dare I say closer—who recorded only 5 saves (Franklyn German and/or Chris Mears of Detroit) and four other AL teams that didn't have a reliever record more than 16 saves (Boston, Seattle, Toronto, and the White Sox). Five saves for a team leader is the least that has been recorded since 1975 in a non-strike year. By the way, here's a quicky comparison of Gagne's 2003 season with Thigpen and Eckersley's 1990 seasons: Name W-L G SV IP H BB K ERA Adj WHIP K:BB K/9IP Win Shares They all had great years, but only Gagne won the Cy Young. OK, so where does that leave us? Oh, yeah, I don't think Gagne deserved the award this year (I would have tabbed Mark Prior or Jason Schmidt myself) and I'll explain why. First, let me explain from an historical point of view. Just as Bill James said in 1991 of Bobby Thigpen's save record, "Obviously, Thigpen's record was brought about in part because of a change in the way that relief pitchers are used-a generalized change, operating th[r]oughout baseball," so too is Gagne's stats brought about by a recent return to that strategy. Baseball took a slight evolutionary detour after the great success of Dennis Eckersley. This Neanderthaloid evolutionary dead end took a decade during perhaps the game's greatest offensive era, the Mets-ozoic Era, which also encompassed two rounds of expansion. Perhaps with all the expansion, bullpens got too watered down. It became very difficult to build a bullpen as effective as the Eck-era A's pen. There have been very good pens of late, but they seem to be more capturing lightning in a jar than crafting a pen by design. Perhaps the trend played itself out. I mean, how long can you employ one of your best pitchers for just 50 innings a year? Byung-Hyun Kim moved back to the rotation and then back. Former closer Danny Graves went 4-15 in 2003, his first year as a full-time starter. And of course Derek Lowe successfully moved back to starting last year. Also, teams started to realize that reliance on a player just because he has recorded 30 or so saves in the past is ludicrous. Big name closers like Mike Williams, Jose Mesa, Scott Williamson, Armando Benitez, and Billy Koch lost closer jobs on their teams or were traded to other teams and no longer closed. Journeymen like Rocky Biddle, Joe Borowski, Tom Gordon, Tim Worrell, Lance Carter, and Rod Beck inherited closer jobs and for the most part performed well. Needless to say, the job of closer has gone through a reevaluation period the last couple of seasons. In Gagne, the Dodgers appointed a hard-throwing yet highly unsuccessful young starter as their closer in 2002. It revitalized his career to say the least. However, I see Gagne as a throwback to the Thigpen line. It's not that he hasn't pitched well, very well. I just think that his performance looks all the better for the shambles that closer role has become on many clubs, as well as his calling Dodgers Stadium home (though his 2003 home-road splits show no bias to Dodgers Stadium). He happens to be in the right role at the right time. To illustrate, there have been 87 closers all time with at least 20 saves and an ERA under 2.00, starting with Ellis Kinder in 1953. 53 of them have done it while pitching at least 80 innings. Well, one can argue that 20 saves is not 55. However, I think that the number of saves a closer records to a very large degree depends on his era and his usage. The Reds' Ted Abernathy recorded a 1.27 ERA in 1967 with 28 saves and a 6-3 record in 106.1 innings pitched. I know it was a pitcher's era, but his league-adjusted ERA is about the same as Gagne's (295 to 335) and he did it in so many more innings. In 1967, 28 saves were enough to lead the majors. So of course Abernathy got a ton of Cy Young votes, right? Uh, no. He didn't receive a one. Mike McCormick, Jim Bunning, and Fergie Jenkins were the only men to receive any votes that year. Abernathy's season was worthy of 24 Win Shares, one fewer than Gagne this year and fractions behind league leader Bunning. You say you want someone more recent. How about John Wetteland's 1993 season with the Expos? He was 9-3 with 43 saves in 85.1 innings over 70 appearances. He struck out 113 and walked just 28. His ERA was 1.37 and his adjusted ERA was 304. That's a pretty close match to Gagne. He was awarded 21 Win Shares, but was fourth behind league-leading Greg Maddux and Jose Rijo. I should also point out that the Dodger bullpen this year featured two other pitchers with ERAs under 2.00, Paul Quantrill (1.75 ERA in 77.1 innings) and Guillermo Mota (1.97 in 105 innings). I have said that the Dodgers are the anti-Rockies. Pitchers go to the Dodgers and resurrect their careers (e.g. Hideo Nomo's second stint, Wilson Alvarez, Kevin Gross, and Odalis Perez , at least in 2002). Then when they leave they fall flat on their faces (e.g., Hideo Nomo after his first stint, Kevin Gross, Chan Ho Park, Ismael Valdes, Ramon Martinez, and Tim Belcher ). Not that pitching for the Dodgers bars a player from winning a Cy Young, but it should make us a bit leery just like we were of Vinny Castilla's and Dante Bichette's stats in Colorado. Well, what about Gagne's historic 14.98 strikeouts per nine innings figure? Bill Wagner was the man he beat out (14.95 K/9 IP in 1999), and Wagner finished fourth in the Cy Young vote that year. The last stat that people will throw out is Win Shares. Gagne led NL pitchers with 25 Win Shares, three more than Mark Prior, Jason Schmidt, and Livan Hernandez. Did anyone notice that Rheal Cormier finished 19th in the NL in pitching Win Shares, ahead of every other Phillie? Cormier had a very good season (1.70 ERA, 8-0 record, 54 hits and 25 walks in 84.2 innings/65 appearances). However, given that the Phils had four men win 14 games and three pitch over 200 innings, few would pick Cormier as their best pitching asset. The reason is that Win Shares for relief pitchers is inherently problematic. I don't want to take anything away from James: Win Shares is probably the crowning moment of the career of baseball's greatest analyst since Henry Chadwick. However, trying to assign Win Shares to relievers is like trying to hit a moving target. The landscape of relief pitching has changed dramatically since James published Win Shares just two years ago. How can a standard formula be applied to all relievers throughout baseball history, especially when it takes a half dozen just to figure fielding Win Shares for third basemen throughout baseball history? Given that relief pitching Win Shares were derived basically via a compromise in James' formulae, who's to say they are accurate for the 2003 season? Individual pitching Win Shares are derived from assigning claim points to a team's staff via a set of criteria and then meting out Win Shares appropriately. The criteria are runs allowed (the largest factor); wins, losses, and saves; save-equivalent innings; and batting. The claim point formula for wins/losses is ((W*3)-L+Sv) / 3 (p. 35). That seems pretty straightforward. Of course, one could argue that this formula really doesn’t measure anything, but at least it's straightforward enough. My problem is with Save Equivalent or Crucial innings. That formula is to multiply saves by three, cap the result at 90% of actual innings pitched, and finally add one for each hold (Hello, Rheal Cormier). The save-equivalent innings are then multiplied by the pitcher's component ERA added to a constant (.56) minus the team cutoff to get the claim points. OK, why not? But why 90%? Why not 80%? Or perhaps why not an era-specific percentage? Why multiple by three? Why not 2 or 4? Why not 2 in 2003 and 4 in 1967? To say that a save is a save no matter the era is problematic at best. Win Shares is a valuable tool, but it's just that, a tool. Sometimes it proves useful; sometimes not. And given that the formulae for starting pitchers' and relief pitchers' Win Shares differ a great deal, it becomes dangerous to use Win Shares as the be all and end all for ranking all pitchers. I think Win Shares is the shakiest ground from which to build one's argument for Gagne's Cy Young legitimacy. Gagne had a fine season, but I cannot accept an argument that his 82.1 innings were superior to Prior's 211.1 or Schmidt's 207.2 even if they came in save opportunities. And what of save opportunities? James showed in his New Historical Baseball Abstract that a closer is best used in games in which his team leads by one, the score is tied, or possibly if his team trails by one. Only one of those three would even be considered a save opportunity. Using a closer to hold a three-run lead in the ninth is mere overkill. So, next we will take a look at Gagne's game log to determine if his appearances were indeed that crucial to his team's success to merit winning the award. Here is a table of Gagne's appearances and the situation when he entered the game. A Dodger lead is represented by the number of runs they led by at the time. If the Dodgers trailed, then the number of runs they trailed by is represented by a negative number: Situation -3+ -2 -1 Tied 1 2 3+ Gagne seemed to be used in almost all of the Dodgers extra inning games (16). All of his five decisions came after he entered a tie ballgame. He gave up four runs in a tied game on May 12, one on June 23, and one on July 2, all for losses. He gave a run in a tie game on August 20, but the Dodgers came back to win the game. His second win he garnered when the Dodgers broke a tie ballgame in extra innings that when he was pitching. His other three appearances in which he relinquished a run were a) he gave up two runs when the Dodgers already trailed by more than 3, b) he gave up a run when he was provided a two-run lead, and c) he gave a run with a 3-run lead. Basically, Gagne made 37 or 38 significant appearances out of 77. His 37 appearances when staked to two or more runs (26 with 3 or more) are the 19-yard field goal for closers. A competent one should be able to hold that lead. Yes, he did not blow any and yes, he only gave up two runs in those 37 games. However, if he were an average reliever, how many of those could he have blown? The Dodgers' team ERA was 3.16. An average Dodger pitcher would not have blown more than a handful of those games. So it comes down to 13 tie ballgames, 24 with a one-run Dodger lead, and the one the Dodgers trailed by one run, i.e., the close games in which Gagne pitched. He "blew" four of those 13 tie ballgames, but none of the one-run leads. So basically Gagne was given the award for 33 or 34 ballgames in which he pitched mostly one inning. Prior started 30 games and Schmidt 29 and each went significantly longer than one or two innings in those ballgames. Finally, the Dodgers were 26-23 in one-run ballgames, so how significant was Gagne's performance anyway? Gagne had a stellar year, but the role of the closer is still too marginalized to merit winning a Cy Young award. Since writing that, I have heard various arguments in support of Gagne's Cy Young crown. The best I have heard was by my friend Chris who said that if you have to give the award to a closer once in a while, then this was the year. There was no one dominant starter in the NL. Prior and Schmidt were great but neither started more than 30 games (Prior did not have a start between July 11 and August 5, after colliding with Marcus Giles; Schmidt missed a few turns at around the same time). Had they each had three or four extra starts as a typical Cy Young-level starter usually would, I bet that the Cy Young would have been a dogfight between the two probable twenty-win starters. Without those few extra starts, they become a 17- and an 18-game winner with great stats: Rick Reuschel for a new generation. How many Cy Youngs did Big Daddy win anyway? Gagne's 2003 season was arguably among the best ever for a reliever. Even so, as I showed above, he probably only had thirty meaningful innings all year. Compare that to thirty meaningful starts of five or more innings for the best starters. If you can accept that thirty innings for a closer are more valuable than thirty starts for a starter, then Gagne's your man. I don’t share that opinion, but I admit that Gagne’s is one of the greatest seasons ever for a reliever. To prove the point, here’s a table of all the relievers who have posted an ERA of 1.50 or lower while appearing in at least 30 games (sorry, I had to split it in two):
OK, so there were 52 such pitchers, three of whom, including Gagne, pitched this year. Actually Gagne’s record is only slightly better than Smoltz’s, and that was due mainly to the time Smoltz lost and to Gagne’s ungodly strikeouts per nine innings. However, note Smoltz’s strikeout-to-walk ratio superiority over Gagne. If there’s one knock you can make on Gagne’s 2003 season, it’s the walks. He didn’t walk a lot of men (20), but it was enough to affect his K-to-BB ratio a bit, even though it’s double the average for what amounts to 52 of the greatest seasons ever in relief pitching. For the record, Gagne has the best strikeouts per nine innings, 14.98. Second is Rob Nen in 2000 at 12.55. The lowest ERA on the list is Dennis Eckersley in 1990 at 0.61 (Gagne’s 1.20 was 14th). He also recorded the best walks plus hits divided by innings pitched (WHIP) that year also at 0.61 (Gagne was second with 0.66). Eckersley in 1990 also recorded the best strikeout-to-walk ratio on the list, an ungodly 18.25, almost twice as much as second-place total, 9.13, recorded by John Smoltz in 2003 (Gagne’s 6.85 is third). Three men recorded a zero home run per nine innings ratio (Rob Murphy in 1986, So, clearly Gagne’s 2003 campaign is among the greatest ever for a reliever. I prefer Eckesley’s 1990 season for the post-modern closers, Bruce Sutter’s for the modern closers, and John Hiller’s 1973 for ye olde tyme closers. But Gagne was better than a number of closers who won either a Cy Young or an MVP or both. Dee Average (Or What's Happenin' Now?)But extreme positions are not succeeded by moderate ones but rather by equally extreme, but inverted, positions. —Friedrich "Fat Freddie" Nietzsche This season there were seven closers with sub-2.00 ERAs: Gagne, Smoltz, Mariano Rivera, Bill Wagner, Shigetoshi Hasegawa, Danny Kolb, and Rod Beck. Now, I consider the team save leader to be the closer for these analyses. However, many may say that the first four on the list were the only true closers. The last three recorded 19 saves on average, not a lot in this era. Yet these seven sub-2.00 "closers" were the most in the majors in fourteen seasons. In 1989, Roger McDowell, Jeff Montgomery, Dennis Eckersley, Jay Howell, Bill Landrum, Gregg Olson, Mark Davis, Tom Henke, and Jeff Russell all had ERAs under 2.00. That also happens to be the last year before 2003 that a reliever (Davis) won the NL Cy Young. These nine men represent the all-time high for sub-2.00 closers in a season. (1908 matched it when sub-2.00 starting pitchers like Cy Young, Christy Mathewson, Addie Joss, Ed Walsh, Three-Finger Brown, and Rube Waddell also acted as closers for their teams.) The seven this year matches the strike-shortened 1981 season for second (1981 sub-2.00 closers: Rich Gossage, Rollie Fingers, Kevin Saucier, Dan Quisenberry, Rick Camp, Joe Sambito, and Woodie Fryman). By the way, there were only three last year (Gagne, Percival, and Julio) and one in 2000 (Nen). But at the opposite end of the spectrum, there were five closers with ERAs greater than the league average (Rocky Biddle in Montreal, Jose Mesa in Philly, Mike Williams in Pittsburgh, Jose Jimenez in Colorado, and both Franklyn German and Chris Mears in Detroit). The last time there were that many was 1999 at the height of offensive surge from which baseball has just gotten itself disentangled in the last couple of years. And in 1999, one closer (Dave Veres in Colorado) actually had a park-adjusted ERA 12% better than the league average and another (Boston's Tim Wakefield) was actually the team co-leader in saves. There was just one team save leader with an ERA worse than average in 2002 (Hideki Irabu in Texas). The all-time was 10 in 1992, right at the cusp of the offensive gluttony of the last decade. I have to list those ten because they read like a list of similar pitchers to Roberto Hernandez: Alejandro Pena, Jeff Reardon, Bobby Thigpen, Mike Henneman, Roger McDowell, Doug Henry, Anthony Young, Mitch Williams, Randy Myers, and Mike Schooler. Thigpen's 4.74 ERA was the highest on the list (as compared to Mesa's 6.52, Williams' 6.27, and German's 6.04 in 2003). Henneman's 3.96 seems paltry in comparison. (Then again, the only other time 10 team save leaders eclipsed the league average ERA was 1969 with Frank Lizzy's 3.63 ERA, Phil Regan's 3.70, Rollie Fingers' 3.70, and four other sub-4.00 ERAs on the list. The highest was John Boozer's 4.28.)
Permalink |
No comments.
Jeff Kent-Walt Weiss Memorial Baseball Darwin Awards, V
2004-01-28 00:33
Aaron Boone and the Yankees signed a one-year deal for 2004 worth $5.75 M. The deal "contained language saying it would become nonguaranteed if he played basketball." So guess what Boone was doing while he injured himself possibly tearing his ACL and throwing his season in doubt? Couldn't be basketball. Could it? The man could play squash, arena football, or parcheesi, but he has to play the one game that his contract stipulates he can't. This may force the Yankees to play Enrique Wilson or Miguel Cairo at third or, worse yet, actually give the job to erstwhile footballer Drew Henson. Aside from one very big home run, acquiring the free-swinging Boone has been anything but a boon for the Yanks. Oh, and apparently he is a moron on top of it. Like father, like son, I always say.
Permalink |
No comments.
Like School on Saturday (A Quinn Martin Production), Epilogue
2004-01-21 01:26
"…And I would have gotten away with it, too, if it weren't for those meddling kids and their dog." First, for those of you with such a short attention span that you could not sift through a few dozen (for shame!), here is a quick and dirty summary table by election:
A couple things that I didn’t do before but that I’d like to do now are to compare each election against the current Hall of Fame average Win Share total (337.23) and to look at the active players each year and compare them against this total. First, checking for career Win Shares over 337:
Now, the totals per year:
OK, so the Hall was selecting these players gradually and whittling them down into the single digits. That is, until recently. The numbers have gone up over the last dozen years. There are more eligible candidates with at least as many career Win Shares as the Hall average today then there were in 1980 or 1990. Let’s see who’s being singled out. Here is the number of active players per year who would achieve 337 Win Shares over their careers with a breakdown by who is and who is not in the Hall:
It seems that the expansion-era players have been singled out as well as us, the fans of expansion-era baseball, to be roundly ignored by the Hall (that is, unless you can remember the War Betwixt the States or at least WWI pretty clearly). Doesn’t this seem evident in what the writers and veteran players have been saying lately: they don’t like the wimpy DH. They don’t like wimpy starters who can’t finish games. They don’t like watered down staffs. They don’t like closers picking up cheap saves with a three-run lead in the ninth. They don’t like inflated power numbers. They don’t like Astroturf, steroids, domes, multi-purpose stadiums, divisions, extra rounds of playoffs. They don’t like Mondays: they want to shoot the whole thing down. They basically don’t like the game that’s been played over the last 40 years, and they devalue the stars from this era. Well, maybe not the Barry Bondses and Roger Clemenses. But certainly the Lou Whitakers and Darrell Evanses. So what is to be done? Many say nothing must be done. The Hall has finally adopted a reasonable standard they say and it's about time. These are the same people who told you when you were eight that there was no Santa Claus and who wouldn't flip baseball cards for fear of damaging them. If they want two Hall of Fames, one for ye olde tyme players represented by the likes of Tommy McCarthy and Travis Jackson and one for post-expansion players in which Ron Santo and Ryne Sandberg have to buy a ticket, then that's fine. It's not fair, but if you're OK with that, then have at it. Oh, but it's problematic: what happens in fifty years or a hundred? Is this a line drawn in the sand or a momentary blip on the radar? What if Tommy McCarthy's great-great-great-great-great-grandson follows in his forebear's footsteps and is among the worst players in the Hall of Fame while Darrell Evans III is still on the outside? So the heroes or of my youth are supposed to wait on the outside. Why me? It's all a plot against me personally. And I don't like that. Some will say that the Hall is no longer relevant, that if you know enough to pick out the poor Hall choices, then you have your own ideas about who's Hall-worthy. Well, aren't you special? If you don't care, then you don't get a say. I do care and a great deal of other people do, too. We want a real Hall of Fame, a fair and balanced Hall of Fame. Again I take this as a personal attack on me or rather my values. Remember, just because you're paranoid, it doesn't mean people are not against you. My megalomania aside, neither of these two responses takes care of the Hall's problems. Even if you accept the double standard now being employed, what do you say to Babe Dahlgren and Tony Mullane? (Remember they're dead, so you'll need a medium or maybe an extra-large.) Here are the things I would change: First, eliminate the 5% rule. There have been twenty Hall of Famers voted in by the baseball writers who at one time in their candidacy received less than five percent of the writer vote (including Warren Spahn, who received one vote while active). All but 15 of the veterans’ choices would fail that test. Besides there are now a good number of strong candidates who were removed from the writers’ ballot due to this rule. Four of the five top candidates (by Win Shares) who should be eligible to the writers’ ballot have been removed. The only one who was on the ballot in 2004 has now been voted into the Hall (Paul Molitor). So the top four will not be on the ballot next year (though they would then behind freshman candidate Wade Boggs). Yes, history tells us that the field must be narrowed or no one candidate will reach the prescribed number of votes, but there are better ways to do this, which I'll go into later. History also tells us that the more voters involved, the fewer the number players selected. The most efficient body had always been the old (pre-2003) veterans committees, who are usually very small in number especially when compared with the baseball writers' voting body. That's why my next suggestion may seem a bit odd. I think the vote should be broadened beyond the baseball writers. One advantage opening the vote to more informed individuals is that the eccentricities of a certain body or of the leader of that body, the cause of most of the poor choices in the Hall, can be minimized. (Remember Ted Williams support of Dom DiMaggio? How about Joe Morgan's current devotion to Dave Concepcion?) Besides, the fact that the custodians of the Hall are the writers on a fluke. Why? Because the baseball writers were the entire media in the mid-Thirties. There were a scant few radio broadcasts and no TV broadcasts as yet—not even on ESPN. Baseball scholarship was based on the Reach and Spalding baseball guides, that were soon to become the Sporting News guide. Henry Chadwick had passed on and Bill James was not yet born. The Society of American Baseball Research (SABR) was not yet a twinkle in the eye of founder L. Robert Davids. Al Gore had yet to invent the Internet. Now, beat writers who cover baseball have devolved to lookerroom hangers-on who act as a conduit for Carl Everett's latest tantrum as well as a lightning rod for the locals collective angst. Even at the outset, the writers acknowledged that they had no affinity for the old time players. In 1939, their head approached commissioner Landis to cede the sovereignty over the nineteenth-century players to the Hall's Permanent Committee (as the Old Timers Committee). The writers were promised authority over all twentieth-century players, a promise that lasted only seven years (and was thoroughly blurred even during those seven years). In 1946, the writers' authority was limited to all players who were active in the previous 25 years, and that number has varied ever since (now 20 years). The abdicated control over 60 years ago. Now's the time for a better system to step in. So what's my proposal? Enfranchise the TV and radio broadcasters, the Internet writers, the SABR scholars, player (active and retired), and even the fans. Add everyone willy-nilly? Well, willy, but definitely nilly. I propose that the same standard (10 years experience) be employed throughout. TV and radio broadcasters need ten years experience to get a vote. All SABR members with 10 years of membership get a vote. Internet writers are required to have been covering the game for at least two seasons (10 wouldn't work). The fans are problematic, but I think if you split the groups into separate bodies. But how could anyone ever garner the support of so many diverse people? That brings me to my next suggestion: Lower the threshold for election from 75% to 50%. "Shock and horrors!" you say? Well, we have already seen that the only player to pass through the writers ballot without being elected while amassing more than half the votes was Gil Hodges. And Hodges will be the first player selected by the vets once they straighten out their system. There are actively eligible players who have received more than 50% of the writers' vote (Sandberg, Rice, Sutter, and Dawson), but they all have a very good chance of being elected. You may also say that some individuals will be granted multiple votes due to their membership in multiple groups. Joe Morgan, that Renaissance man he, would have a vote as an ex-player, as a TV broadcaster, as an Internet writer, and presumably as a fan ( I doubt he's in SABR, but I'll check). I would have three votes myself: as a SABR member, as an internet scribe, and as a fan. I say that's OK, not only because I like the power, but because the separation of the groups will minimize the effects stemming from this multiple personality disorder. My next suggestion is to eliminate the Veterans Committee. The voters will be rolled into one of the bodies above and their candidates will be thrown back in with the rest of the ballplayers. I think that the average fan is aware of Ron Santo and Gil Hodges. However, opening the vote to all past players while broadening the voting community seems like a recipe for the logjam disasters of the past that brought about the veterans committee in the first place. Well, my next suggestion is to limit the players eligible to around 25-30 via a nominating phase. Have fans vote on the All-Star ballot. Coordinate the other groups' votes to coincide with the All-Star game as well. Take the top 5 from each ballot. If there is overlap, pick the next candidate by averaging the percentages across all groups. If you don't like that, have the SABR scholars pick the 25 best candidates. At the All-Star game, announce the Hall of Fame candidates. Let the writers and broadcasters voice their opinions during the season when more people are listening. Then have the final vote at the end of the season or during the offseason. Average the percentages across all groups or require that the candidate meet the voting requirements in four of the (By the way, a number of these suggestions were made by Bill James in his Hall of Fame book as well. I agree with the spirit of his proposals, but tweaked the details.) OK, that's what we do going forward, and I expect the Clark family, that runs the Hall of Fame as well as the city of Cooperstown, to come knocking any minute to implement it. However, I have a suggestion for the past blunders. I think all of the Veterans Committee selection from the past should be thrown open for review. The baseball writers have made their fair share of questionable calls (Catfish Hunter and Rollie Fingers come to mind), but their choices have been far better and have been free of the rank scent of cronyism. Here's a table of all the Grade-D Hall of Famers voted in by the Veterans:
Notice that most were selected during the crony-laden Seventies and mid-Forties. Of those listed, Maz, who is arguably the best defensive second baseman ever, is probably the best candidate. By means of comparison, here are the Grade-D baseball writers-inducted Hall of Famers:
Of those, Koufax is considered by many to be among the greatest left-handers of all time and Campanella is probably among the top five catchers. Dean, Fingers, and Hunter are iffy, at best, choices but I think the Hall can sustain them. Meanwhile, Joss doesn't even qualify for election to the Hall (only nine years of service). And the rest of the veterans' list are usually the ones pointed to as the worst selections of all time. Now, I'm not saying Win Shares (alone) should be the deciding factor. They do tend to point one to the poorest choices though. Have the SABR scholars review them and remove the poor choices. (That includes non-Hall-worthy executives, of which Morgan Bulkeley is the worst. He has no more business being in the Hall than anyone ever affiliated with the game. His claim to fame was being the first NL president for a year until William Hulbert, the real power in the early NL, decided that he wanted the until-then figurehead position.) It should be a one-time readjustment, and I would prefer that only deceased players be expunged. We don't want people thinking their childhood star that cruised into the Hall will one-day be un-enshrined. By removing these players, the Hall will regain its air of credibility. It would also undercut the arguments for many candidates who are similarly unworthy of enshrinement. Decommission their plaques and sell'em on Ebay. Well, there it is. It took long enough to get here, but I hope it was worth the ride. You don't have to agree with it. I'm sure there are other plans that work better. But I hope that you agree that something has to change. Let's start the conversation rolling so we can fix this mess.
Permalink |
No comments.
Like School on Saturday, Part XIV
2004-01-19 01:51
1995 BBWAA
Number selected: 1 1995 Veterans
Number selected: 2 (By the way, Joe Jackson, 294 WS, was no longer eligible due to the rule change to bar players on the permanently ineligible list, i.e., Pete Rose.) 1996 BBWAA
Number selected: 0 1996 Veterans
Number selected: 1 (By the way, Joe Jackson, 294 WS, was no longer eligible due to the rule change to bar players on the permanently ineligible list, i.e., Pete Rose.) 1997 BBWAA
Number selected: 1 1997 Veterans
Number selected: 1 1998 BBWAA
Number selected: 1 1998 Veterans
Number selected: 2 (By the way, Joe Jackson, 294 WS, was no longer eligible due to the rule change to bar players on the permanently ineligible list, i.e., Pete Rose.) 1999 BBWAA
Number selected: 3 1999 Veterans
Number selected: 1 |