Baseball Toaster was unplugged on February 4, 2009.
"Welcome to the Hall's of Relief", VII
Previous entries:
The 1870s, '80s, and '90s
The 1900s and '10s
The 1920s, '30s, and '40s
The 1950s
The 1960s
The 1970s
The 1980s
These growing feathers plucked from Caesar's wing
Will make him fly an ordinary pitch,
Who else would soar above the view of men,
And keep us all in servile fearfulness.- Flavius in Julius Caesar, act 1, sc. 1, l. 72-5 by William "Moose" Shakespeare
Since the turn of the century relief pitching had been a tool in the manager's bag of tricks, but rarely was a valuable member of the staff used exclusively for relief. An odd Firpo Marberry might appear here and there, but mainly a swingman, someone used as a starter and a reliever, either the star or the 10th man on the staff, would act as the reliever. Sometimes whole staffs were used as the support structure for a failing starter. And that's a key point: only when the starter began to fail did the manager turn to a reliever.
These trends changed extremely slowly. More pitchers were used per game and fewer pitchers completed games as time wore on, but the process took literally decades and it was far from a linear progression with retreats and lurches along the way. In the Fifties things began to accelerate as star relievers like Joe Page and Jim Konstanty took center stage. The better starters rarely if ever relieved and swingmen started to be eclipsed by the pure reliever.
In the 1960s the baseball cognoscenti started to experiment more with relief pitching. After the 1950s finally established the bullpen as a key element on the pitching staff, they started to push the envelope. Barriers like 30 saves and 90 relief appearances in a year were crossed. Career relievers like Hoyt Wilhelm, Roy Face, and Lindy McDaniel relieved in more games than anyone who came before them.
The role of the reliever was still being defined, especially that of the closer. The Seventies proved a mercurial time for relievers. Five-man rotations, the designated hitter rule, and expansion caused staff leaders to be worked harder than in the previous few decades. They started more games and completed more games as well. The reliever's role was also becoming one of endurance: 80 appearances and 130 innings pitched were common. Finally, in 1979, Bruce Sutter, who had broken down in the second half because of overuse in the three previous seasons, was used in limited situations. No longer was he asked to pitch almost daily. No longer was he asked to pitch 3 or more innings. He came in in save situations and pitched fewer innings. This came in a year in which two men were used as closers and still appeared in 90 games (Kent Tekulve and Mike Marshall).
Managers, who were looking for the correct way to use their closers and were afraid that the envelop-pushing approach was abusing them, were given a guide. Though it seemed they had been railing for a decade against using a closer in save situations exclusively, the results with Sutter was the tipping point. And the modern reliever that we boo the manager for not bringing in in the seventh inning with the game on the line was born.
Now that this rather lengthy preamble is complete, what exactly did happen in the Eighties, that era when Michael Jackson was still cool and not a pedophile (allegedly, of course, if any of Mr. Jackson's lawyers are reading-he was allegedly cool as well)? The view from 50,000 feet tells us that:
a) the first 40-save season was recorded (45 in 1983 by Dan Quisenberry)
b) Rollie Fingers became the first pitcher to surpass 300 saves in his career, the number that has since become the standard much like 300 wins for a starter, and c)
c) For the first time since the advent of unlimited substitution, relievers outnumbered swingmen by the end of the decade. That trend has continued and now there are almost twice as many pure relievers as swingmen.
d) Higher save totals: Since the beginning of the Eighties there has never been a full season in which someone has not save at least 30 games. Since 1983, when Quisenberry was the first to eclipse 40 saves, there has not been a full season in which someone has not saved 40 games.
e) The number of men who amassed 300 or more relief appearances increased from 31 in the Seventies to 54 in the Eighties. However, the number of men who made 500 or more relief appearances (7) stayed the same: the abuse was subsiding.
f) The number of men with 100 saves for the decade went from 12 in the Seventies to 23 in the Eighties.
g) The top relievers were now saving a larger percentage of their relief appearances. Compare the 100-save relievers of the Seventies and Eighties:
The Seventies:
First Last RA Sv %Sv Rollie Fingers 611 209 34.21% Sparky Lyle 600 190 31.67% Mike Marshall 618 177 28.64% Dave Giusti 467 140 29.98% Tug McGraw 533 132 24.77% Dave LaRoche 538 122 22.68% John Hiller 409 115 28.12% Gene Garber 436 110 25.23% Clay Carroll 436 106 24.31% Bruce Sutter 240 105 43.75% Rich Gossage 322 101 31.37% Terry Forster 321 100 31.15% Total 5531 1607 29.05%
The Eighties:
First Last RA Sv %Sv Jeff Reardon 629 264 41.97% Dan Quisenberry 637 239 37.52% Lee Smith 580 234 40.34% Rich Gossage 494 206 41.70% Bruce Sutter 421 195 46.32% Dave Righetti 393 188 47.84% Dave Smith 518 176 33.98% Steve Bedrosian 438 161 36.76% John Franco 393 148 37.66% Greg Minton 625 146 23.36% Willie Hernandez 564 140 24.82% Todd Worrell 281 126 44.84% Tom Henke 320 122 38.13% Ron Davis 433 121 27.94% Rollie Fingers 243 120 49.38% Jesse Orosco 476 119 25.00% Bob Stanley 465 118 25.38% Jay Howell 323 117 36.22% Gene Garber 485 108 22.27% Bill Caudill 404 106 26.24% Roger McDowell 322 103 31.99% Kent Tekulve 687 101 14.70% Dan Plesac 210 100 47.62% Total 10341 3458 33.44%
Note that only Sutter records a save in more than 40% of his appearances in the Seventies while nine relievers do so in the Eighties.
h) Further note the appearance among the relief appearance leaders more men who were setup men as opposed to closers. Kent Tekulve shows up in the list above even though he was a true closer for only a short period (around 1978-'80). So even though save totals are skyrocketing, men like Craig Lefferts, Larry Andersen, Frank DiPino, and Ed Vande Berg are among the leaders in relief appearances (all 396 or above). And as you go below 400 relief appearances, more and more setup men appear. Frank Williams and Dan Schatzeder both have over 300 relief appearances but have single-digit save totals. No one in the Seventies could claim to have done that. The closers are more dispersed in the relief appearance list as they are used in fewer games but save a higher percentage.
i) Of the ten men who made 80 or more relief appearances in a year in the Seventies, only one was not the team closer (it is somewhat problematic to designate some pitchers as closers in the Seventies since teams used their pens in a diverse way and save totals for the main reliever varied greatly). Of the 14 men who appeared in 80 games or more in a season in the Eighties only two were closers (Quisenberry in '85 and Guillermo Hernandez in '84).
j) Check out the all-time career saves leaders (with 100 or more) after the 1969, 1979, and 1989 seasons:
After 1969 | After 1979 | After 1989
Name Sv | Name Sv | Name Sv
Hoyt Wilhelm 210 | Hoyt Wilhelm 227 | Rollie Fingers 341
Roy Face 193 | Sparky Lyle 223 | Rich Gossage 307
Stu Miller 154 | Rollie Fingers 221 | Bruce Sutter 300
Ron Perranoski 138 | Roy Face 193 | Jeff Reardon 266
Lindy McDaniel 127 | Mike Marshall 187 | Dan Quisenberry 244
Dick Radatz 122 | Ron Perranoski 179 | Sparky Lyle 238
Don McMahon 119 | Lindy McDaniel 172 | Lee Smith 234
Al Worthington 110 | Stu Miller 154 | Hoyt Wilhelm 227
Ron Kline 107 | Don McMahon 153 | Gene Garber 218
Johnny Murphy 107 | Ted Abernathy 148 | Roy Face 193
Ted Abernathy 106 | Dave Giusti 145 | Dave Righetti 188
John Wyatt 103 | Tug McGraw 145 | Mike Marshall 188
Ellis Kinder 102 | Clay Carroll 143 | Kent Tekulve 184
Firpo Marberry 101 | Darold Knowles 143 | Tug McGraw 180
| Jim Brewer 132 | Ron Perranoski 179
| John Hiller 125 | Dave Smith 176
| Jack Aker 123 | Lindy McDaniel 172
| Dick Radatz 122 | Steve Bedrosian 161
| Dave LaRoche 122 | Stu Miller 154
| Frank Linzy 111 | Don McMahon 153
| Al Worthington 110 | Greg Minton 150
| Gene Garber 110 | John Franco 148
| Fred Gladding 109 | Ted Abernathy 148
| Ron Kline 108 | Willie Hernandez 147
| Wayne Granger 108 | Dave Giusti 145
| Johnny Murphy 107 | Darold Knowles 143
| Bruce Sutter 105 | Clay Carroll 143
| John Wyatt 103 | Gary Lavelle 136
| Ellis Kinder 102 | Bob Stanley 132
| Firpo Marberry 101 | Jim Brewer 132
| Rich Gossage 101 | Ron Davis 130
| Terry Forster 100 | Terry Forster 127
| Bill Campbell 126
| Todd Worrell 126
| Dave LaRoche 126
| John Hiller 125
| Jack Aker 123
| Tom Henke 122
| Dick Radatz 122
| Jesse Orosco 119
| Jay Howell 117
| Tippy Martinez 115
| Frank Linzy 111
| Al Worthington 110
| Fred Gladding 109
| Wayne Granger 108
| Ron Kline 108
| Johnny Murphy 107
| Bill Caudill 106
| John Wyatt 103
| Ron Reed 103
| Roger McDowell 103
| Tom Burgmeier 102
| Ellis Kinder 102
| Firpo Marberry 101
| Dan Plesac 100
Or to break it down by plateaus reached (with percent increase):
Saves 1969 1979 % Inc. 1989 % Inc. 300 0 0 0% 3 Inf 250 0 0 0% 4 Inf 200 1 3 300% 9 900% 150 3 8 800% 21 2100% 100 14 32 3200% 56 5600%
These numbers accelerated into the Eighties.
k) Closers were being used in fewer situations in which their teams trailed or were tied with these opponents. They also pitched fewer innings per appearance. How do I know this?
Below is a table of cumulative stats for all closers in the Eighties and Seventies (min. 20 saves per season in the Eighties and 15 in the Seventies-I tried to compensate for the job's changing). The total games, relief appearances, wins, losses, saves, and innings pitched are listed along with the percentage of games in which the pitcher was used in relief and the percentage of games won, lost, and saved and innings-per-game.
Decade G RA W L SV IP %RA %W %L %Sv IP/G 1980s 8892 8890 869 854 3980 12753.2 99.98% 9.77% 9.60% 44.76% 1.43 1970s 8422 8364 1025 885 2873 14101 99.31% 12.17% 10.51% 34.11% 1.67 %change 0.67% -19.70% -8.60% 31.21% -14.34%
So what changed? Closers wee used in relief slightly more often-no biggy. They had a drop of nearly twenty percent in wins-per-game, nine percent in losses-per-game, and fourteen percent in innings-per-game and an increase of about thirty-one percent in saves-per-game. The saves come as no surprise. But why the decrease in wins, losses, and innings-per-appearance?
The innings-per-game dropoff represents managers attempting not to overwork their closers to save them for key situations.
The decrease in wins represents the resistance on the manager to use the closer when the game is tied or the team is losing. These situations produce a win, but as the role changed the closer usually came in after the lead was established in his team's favor. Also, fewer innings pitched meant that the pitcher had less time in which his team could recapture a lead once he had given it up.
The decrease in losses represents managers not using the closer in tie ballgames. Also, fewer innings had an effect. The loss decrease is less because wins also were affected by the team-trailing scenario being removed from the closer's possible situations.
The closer was being used more often in save situations for shorter periods.
l) The number of pure starters reached 20% of all pitchers by the end of the decade. This was the first time since 1902 that they comprised such a large segment of the pitching corps.
m) Pure reliever relievers now averaged an ERA that was .15 points better than a pure starter. In the Seventies the relievers' average ERA was .11 point worse than starters. And swingmen lagged far behind.
Well, that's the view from on high. I also have three little studies that I think might shed some light on this seemingly homogeneous decade:
Rollie Fingers in 1981
Brewers Rolled Behind Rollie[From The Sporting News 1982 Baseball Guide]
It was fitting that Rollie Fingers was the winning pitcher when the Brewers clinched the East Division's second-half title on the next-to-last day of the season.
Without Fingers, the fourth relief pitcher ever to win the Cy Young Award, where would the Brewers have been? "Probably three games behind Toronto," said Manager Buck Rodgers.
The Brewer manager may have been stretching it a bit, but there isn't much doubt that they wouldn't have won their first title ever without the THE SPORTING NEWS' American League Fireman of the Year.
The Brewers had been a relief pitcher short of being a legitimate pennant contender for three seasons, and the addition of the tall man with the famous mustache proved to be even better than anybody had expected. Fingers led the major leagues with 28 saves and had a 6-3 record. He had an earned-run average of 1.04 in 78 innings.
He was phenomenal in the second half with a 5-1 record, 16 saves and a 0.72 ERA. The Brewers won 31 games to clinch the second-half title, and Fingers figured in 21 of the victories. In 1981 Rollie Fingers won the AL Most Valuable Player award.
Now compare that to what Bill James said of Fingers in his New Historical Baseball Abstract:
One player that I will be criticized for omitting [from his 100 best pitchers] is the Hall of Fame's second reliever, Rollie Fingers. But again, meaning no disrespect to Fingers, or anyone else who has a moustache you could weave into a carpet, I don't really see what is uniquely wonderful about Rollie Fingers' career. Yes, Fingers won an MVP Award in 1981, but...why? He faced 297 batters that year. Yes, he posted a 1.04 ERA, but Goose Gossage posted an ERA of 0.77 that same season, Rob Murphy posted an ERA of 0.77 in 1986, Dale Murray had a 1.03 ERA in 1974, Tim Burke had a 1.19 ERA in 1987, Frank Williams a 1.20 ERA in 1986. Jim Brewer and Ted Abernathy had ERAs of 1.27. Bob Veale in 1963 pitched the same number of innings (78) and allowed the same number of earned runs (9) as Fingers in 1981. It's just not a remarkable accomplishment.Veale, for pitching 78 innings and allowing 9 earned runs, was credited with 10 Win Shares. Fingers, for doing the same, was credited with 17 Win Shares. That is a reasonable recognition of the importance of Fingers' role on the team. The BBWAA, however, gave Fingers an MVP Award. This is excessive. In my opinion, the BBWAA did something dumb when they gave Fingers an MVP award, and compounded the dumbitude by using that as a reason to put him in the Hall of Fame.
Rollie Fingers' proponents used the argument that Fingers was remarkably consistent for a relief ace. But for a relief ace, an ERA a full run better than the league is a basic standard of competence. Fingers met that standard only six times in his career, and pitched all of his career in pitcher's parks. Gossage met that standard 11 seasons, seven straight seasons, and pitched as many innings per year in tougher parks while doing it. Quisenberry met that standard his first nine seasons in the league, ten overall, also pitching more innings in tougher parks.
Fingers' ERA, adjusted for the parks he played in, was 16% better than league (2.90 vs. 3.45) [Baseball-Reeference.com says 19%]. Quisenberry's ERA was 31% [46%] better than league, Gossage's was 20% [26%] better than league, Sutter's 26% [36%] better, Wilhelm's 31% [46%] better. Kent Tekulve and Lee Smith were 24% [both 32%]better than league, Sparky Lyle 21% [27%] better than league. Fingers is more in a class with Jeff Reardon (17% [21%] better than league), Ron Perranoski (18% [21%] better), Gene Garber 11% [17%] better), and Don McMahon (16% [19%] better).
What lifted Fingers out of that class, I believe, was simply that he had exceptionally good taste in teammates-and the same is true of Jesse Haines and Rube Marquard. Haines in his career was ten games better than his teams; Marquard was two better than his.
Those are two quite different takes on Fingers' 1981 season. I believe that there's a little truth in both excerpts and that this season is illustrative of relievers of this era as a whole.
First, neither makes direct mention of the fact that Fingers lost a large segment of the season (53 games) to the strike and yet appeared in 47 games, pitched 78 innings, and tallied more saves (28) than he had in three years. That said what would Fingers' prorated season totals look like?
Year Ag Tm Lg W L G GS CG SHO SV IP H ER HR BB SO ERA ERA+ WS 1981 34 MIL AL 6 3 47 0 0 0 28 78 55 9 3 13 61 1.04 331 17 1981 34 MIL AL 9 4 70 0 0 0 42 116 82 13 4 19 91 1.04 331 25
Well, that's a bit more impressive. 42 saves would have been the first time that a reliever reached 40 in a season, and therefore, a record. His 25 Win Shares are a little more respectable than the 17 James sites (and besides I am not completely sold that Win Shares measures relievers worth accurately, especially as the role has changed over time, but that's an argument for another day).
How many closer's have saved 42 games, won 9 others, and had an ERA in the 1.07 range? Just one comes close, John Wetteland in 1993. Wetteland had 9 wins, 43 saves, and a 1.37 ERA in 85.1 innings. So maybe Fingers deserved that MVP award after all?
Maybe. But I'm not willing to give it to him based on that argument. I cannot accept a player's projected totals as fact, especially a pitcher's. Why? Because a veteran pitcher like Fingers in 1981 (34 years old) benefits greatly from a 50-odd game break in the middle of the season. The most grueling part of the season is removed to provide a breather. Note that, as James points out, Gossage produced an even lower ERA in that season.
Second, pitcher's ERAs tend not to represent the pitcher's actual value-they appear more impressive or much less impressive-over short spans. This is especially true of relief pitchers, whose effectiveness may not show up as readily in ERA. This is due to ERA being zero-bound at the lower end (i.e., a pitcher cannot give up negative runs) and unbounded at the upper end (i.e., a pitcher in theory could give up infinite runs and infinite ERAs are possible if a pitcher allows a run without recording an out). Therefore, one bad outing does more damage to a pitcher's ERA than a few good outings do to help his ERA, especially if the pitcher throws very few innings at a time like a reliever. Look at John Smoltz last year for example. He gave up 8 earned runs in two-thirds an inning in his second outing in 2002, raising his ERA to 43.20. He gave up one run in his next 11 games (13 innings) and had a 5.52 ERA to show for it. At that point he had thrown 13 scoreless innings in 11 outings and had given up 9 runs in 1.2 innings in two outings. The two subpar outings had much more affect on his ERA than the many good ones. However, as the season wore on the good outings were able to overpower that one atrocious outing on April 6. It still had some effect though since his 3.25 ERA on the season would have only been 2.37 without that outing. Therefore, had Fingers pitched an entire season, they likelihood of a damaging outing would go up. One outing like Smoltz' would have almost double Fingers' ERA (to 1.94).
Third, Fingers' MVP candidacy benefited from the Brewers' pennant race in the second half of the split season. The Brewers may not have been in a pennant race had it not been for the strike. They "finished" the first half three games behind the Yankees, won the second half by 1.5 games over Detroit, and had the best record in the division. However, the Yankees were one game under .500 in their meaningless second half and finished two games back. A little incentive could have helped them bury the Brewers by the All-Star break.
Finally, I cannot reward Fingers for games he never pitched because he never pitched them. Lyman Bostock and Mark Fidrych may have been Hall-of-Famers had they been able to lead normal, uninterrupted careers. So might have Stan Bahnsen for that matter and probably a hundred-odd other players, but they didn't. So we'll never know. We cannot reward players for time not served. It's just too dangerous. Fingers was limited to 109 games in 1981 and that's perhaps too bad, but it's all we've got.
However, I think his prorated value had something to do with his winning the award, but I'll return to that later.
Now back to his effectiveness in the season: Apart from the impressive ERA, the most compelling argument promulgated by TSN was, "The Brewers won 31 games to clinch the second-half title, and Fingers figured in 21 of the victories." I wondered if the percentage of total wins and saves compared to team wins was that impressive. I found that Fingers' 54.84% was very good but was only 67th on the all-time list for relievers (with 30 relief appearances). There are 25 over 60% and here they are:
Name Year W SV GP Tm W+Sv W+Sv
W /GP /Tm W
Bryan Harvey 1993 1 45 59 64 77.97% 71.88%
Ugueth Urbina 1999 6 41 71 68 66.20% 69.12%
Mike Williams 2002 2 46 59 72 81.36% 66.67%
Randy Myers 1993 2 53 73 84 75.34% 65.48%
Roberto Hernandez 1999 2 43 72 69 62.50% 65.22%
Bobby Thigpen 1990 4 57 77 94 79.22% 64.89%
Antonio Alfonseca 2000 5 45 68 79 73.53% 63.29%
Dan Quisenberry 1983 5 45 69 79 72.46% 63.29%
Lee Smith 1991 6 47 67 84 79.10% 63.10%
Dick Radatz 1964 16 29 79 72 56.96% 62.50%
Doug Jones 1990 5 43 66 77 72.73% 62.34%
Rollie Fingers 1977 8 35 78 69 55.13% 62.32%
Jeff Montgomery 1993 7 45 69 84 75.36% 61.90%
Trevor Hoffman 2000 4 43 70 76 67.14% 61.84%
Ugueth Urbina 1998 6 34 64 65 62.50% 61.54%
Jose Mesa 2002 4 45 74 80 66.22% 61.25%
Neil Allen 1981 7 18 43 41 58.14% 60.98%
Eric Gagne 2002 4 52 77 92 72.73% 60.87%
Trevor Hoffman 2002 2 38 61 66 65.57% 60.61%
Jeff Shaw 1997 4 42 78 76 58.97% 60.53%
Dennis Eckersley 1992 7 51 69 96 84.06% 60.42%
Dave Righetti 1986 8 46 74 90 72.97% 60.00%
Rick Aguilera 1998 4 38 68 70 61.76% 60.00%
Rod Beck 1998 3 51 81 90 66.67% 60.00%
...
Rollie Fingers 1981 6 28 47 62 72.34% 54.84%
Note that, even though the list is predominately season from the last 20 years, Fingers' 1977 season shows up in the list along with Radatz in 1964 and Neil Allen in 1981. Also, of the 142 season at or above 50%, 22 were from 1981 or before, and of the 66 seasons that rank higher than Fingers in 1981, seven were from 1981 or before (the three above and Ken Sanders in 1971 (55.07%), Sparky Lyle in 1972 (55.70%), Mike Marshall in 1973 (56.96%), and John Hiller 1973 (56.47%)). So it's not as if his performance were unprecedented at the time.
We'll maybe it's just easier to do on bad teams, given the fewer games that they win, and we all know how MVP voters dislike players on losing teams. What if we limit it to teams with winning records?
Name Year W SV GP Tm W+Sv W+Sv
W /GP /Tm W
Randy Myers 1993 2 53 73 84 75.34% 65.48%
Bobby Thigpen 1990 4 57 77 94 79.22% 64.89%
Lee Smith 1991 6 47 67 84 79.10% 63.10%
Jeff Montgomery 1993 7 45 69 84 75.36% 61.90%
Eric Gagne 2002 4 52 77 92 72.73% 60.87%
Dennis Eckersley 1992 7 51 69 96 84.06% 60.42%
Dave Righetti 1986 8 46 74 90 72.97% 60.00%
Rod Beck 1998 3 51 81 90 66.67% 60.00%
Armando Benitez 2001 6 43 73 82 67.12% 59.76%
Bruce Sutter 1984 5 45 71 84 70.42% 59.52%
Dan Quisenberry 1984 6 44 72 84 69.44% 59.52%
Bryan Harvey 1991 2 46 67 81 71.64% 59.26%
Trevor Hoffman 1998 4 53 66 98 86.36% 58.16%
Doug Jones 1992 11 36 80 81 58.75% 58.02%
Tom Gordon 1998 7 46 73 92 72.60% 57.61%
John Smoltz 2002 3 55 75 101 77.33% 57.43%
Dennis Eckersley 1991 5 43 67 84 71.64% 57.14%
Mariano Rivera 2001 4 50 71 95 76.06% 56.84%
Lee Smith 1992 4 43 70 83 67.14% 56.63%
John Hiller 1973 10 38 65 85 73.85% 56.47%
Trevor Hoffman 1996 9 42 70 91 72.86% 56.04%
Sparky Lyle 1972 9 35 59 79 74.58% 55.70%
Jeff Brantley 1996 1 44 66 81 68.18% 55.56%
Keith Foulke 2001 4 42 72 83 63.89% 55.42%
John Wetteland 1993 9 43 70 94 74.29% 55.32%
Rollie Fingers 1981 6 28 47 62 72.34% 54.84%
Fingers rises to number 27 but is still behind Hiller and Lyle, who preceded him.
Let's give this argument one last try. Let's look exclusively at playoff teams:
Name Year W SV GP Tm W+Sv W+Sv
W /GP /Tm W
Dennis Eckersley 1992 7 51 69 96 84.06% 60.42%
Rod Beck 1998 3 51 81 90 66.67% 60.00%
Dan Quisenberry 1984 6 44 72 84 69.44% 59.52%
Trevor Hoffman 1998 4 53 66 98 86.36% 58.16%
Tom Gordon 1998 7 46 73 92 72.60% 57.61%
John Smoltz 2002 3 55 75 101 77.33% 57.43%
Mariano Rivera 2001 4 50 71 95 76.06% 56.84%
Trevor Hoffman 1996 9 42 70 91 72.86% 56.04%
Rollie Fingers 1981 6 28 47 62 72.34% 54.84%
Billy Koch 2002 11 44 84 103 65.48% 53.40%
Todd Worrell 1996 4 44 72 90 66.67% 53.33%
Robb Nen 2002 6 43 68 95 72.06% 51.58%
John Wetteland 1998 3 42 63 88 71.43% 51.14%
Mariano Rivera 1997 6 43 66 96 74.24% 51.04%
Dennis Eckersley 1990 4 48 63 103 82.54% 50.49%
Mariano Rivera 1999 4 45 66 98 74.24% 50.00%
Fingers rises to ninth and he was the first to exceed 50% for a playoff team. But I'm still not sure that constitutes much of an argument for his MVP award.
Now for James' argument against Fingers winning the award: "Yes, he posted a 1.04 ERA... It's just not a remarkable accomplishment." Is that true given Fingers' save total? For example, of the comparable pitchers James cites, Murphy was rookie pitcher who threw 50.1 innings and saved one game. Gossage saved 20 but pitched only 46.2 innings. Murray had 10 saves and 69.2 innings in his rookie season. Burke had 18 saves and 91 innings pitched. Williams had one save in 52.1 innings. Brewer, 17 saves and 78.1 innings, and Veale had 3 saves in 77.2 innings. Abernathy did save 28 games and pitch 106.1 innings in 1967, but that does make Fingers' accomplishment a bit more remarkable.
Here's the complete list of relief pitchers with ERAs of 1.50 or less in chronological order (note that a pitcher must have 30 relief appearances or 20 saves to qualify):
Name Year SV G RA IP SO BB W L ERA Junior Thompson 1946 4 39 38 62.7 31 40 4 6 1.29 Terry Fox 1961 12 39 39 57.3 32 16 5 2 1.41 Bill Henry 1964 6 37 37 52.0 28 12 2 2 0.87 Frank Linzy 1965 21 57 57 81.7 35 23 9 3 1.43 Steve Hamilton 1965 5 46 45 58.3 51 16 3 1 1.39 Frank Linzy 1967 17 57 57 95.7 38 34 7 7 1.51 Hoyt Wilhelm 1967 12 49 49 89.0 76 34 8 3 1.31 Ted Abernathy 1967 28 70 70 106.3 88 41 6 3 1.27 Joe Hoerner 1968 17 47 47 48.7 42 12 8 2 1.48 Ken Tatum 1969 22 45 45 86.3 65 39 7 2 1.36 Steve Mingori 1971 4 54 54 56.7 45 24 1 2 1.43 Darold Knowles 1972 11 54 54 65.7 36 37 5 1 1.37 Jim Brewer 1972 17 51 51 78.3 69 25 8 7 1.26 John Hiller 1973 38 65 65 125.3 124 39 10 5 1.44 Dale Murray 1974 10 32 32 69.7 31 23 1 1 1.03 Bob Apodaca 1975 13 46 46 84.7 45 28 3 4 1.49 Bruce Sutter 1977 31 62 62 107.3 129 23 7 3 1.34 Tug McGraw 1980 20 57 57 92.3 75 23 5 4 1.46 Rich Gossage 1981 20 32 32 46.7 48 14 3 2 0.77 Rollie Fingers 1981 28 47 47 78.0 61 13 6 3 1.04 Jesse Orosco 1983 17 62 62 110.0 84 38 13 7 1.47 Steve Howe 1983 18 46 46 68.7 52 12 4 7 1.44 Frank Williams 1986 1 36 36 52.3 33 21 3 1 1.20 Rob Murphy 1986 1 34 34 50.3 36 21 6 0 0.72 Jeff Calhoun 1987 1 42 42 42.7 31 26 3 1 1.48 Tim Burke 1987 18 55 55 91.0 58 17 7 0 1.19 Jeff Montgomery 1989 18 63 63 92.0 94 25 7 3 1.37 Les Lancaster 1989 8 42 42 72.7 56 15 4 2 1.36 Dennis Eckersley 1990 48 63 63 73.3 73 4 4 2 0.61 Doug Henry 1991 15 32 32 36.0 28 14 2 1 1.00 Jim Corsi 1992 0 32 32 44.0 19 18 4 2 1.43 Mel Rojas 1992 10 68 68 100.7 70 34 7 1 1.43 John Wetteland 1993 43 70 70 85.3 113 28 9 3 1.37 Mike Jackson 1994 4 36 36 42.3 51 11 3 2 1.49 Jose Mesa 1995 46 62 62 64.0 58 17 3 0 1.13 Tony Fossas 1995 0 58 58 36.7 40 10 3 0 1.47 Randy Myers 1997 45 61 61 59.7 56 22 2 3 1.51 Trevor Hoffman 1998 53 66 66 73.0 86 21 4 2 1.48 Ugueth Urbina 1998 34 64 64 69.3 94 33 6 3 1.30 Ray King 2000 0 36 36 28.7 19 10 3 2 1.26 Robb Nen 2000 41 68 68 66.0 92 19 4 3 1.50 B. Villafuerte 2002 1 31 31 32.0 25 12 1 2 1.41 Chris Hammond 2002 0 63 63 76.0 63 31 7 2 0.95 Joey Eischen 2002 2 59 59 53.7 51 18 6 1 1.34
There are a good number of middle relievers and setup men in the mix but there are also closers, especially ones that predate Fingers and Goose Gossage, who did it the same year.
Well, maybe Fingers did something extraordinary that didn't show up in the numbers to enable the Brewers to get to the playoffs. Here are Fingers' game logs for the season.
Keep in mind that the Brewers were in third place at the time of the strike (31-25), three games behind division-leading New York (34-22). In the second half, they won the division with a 31-22 record, 1.5 games ahead of Detroit and Boston (29-23) and 2 games ahead of Baltimore (28-23). Fifth-place Cleveland (26-27) was just 5 games back and sixth-place New York, for whom the second half was meaningless since they had "won" the first, was also five back (25-26). Even last-place Toronto was just 7.5 games back (21-27). In the West the only team in striking distance of the second-half champs, the A's, was Texas, in second by five games. Therefore, any games with Detroit, Boston, Baltimore, Cleveland, Oakland, and Texas could be said to have playoff implications. I, frankly, don't know how to classify the Yankee games-obviously, their spirit was not in the second half and their record reflects this. However, they did have a playoff-caliber team, one that eventually represented the AL in the World Series that year.
Therefore, the question remains as to Fingers' contribution in the second half especially in those pennant race games and whether his MVP and Cy Young candidacy should be thereby enhanced. Fingers had 12 saves, one win, and 2 losses at the time of the strike with a 1.34 ERA in 23 relief appearances constituting 40.1 innings pitched in the first half. His second half numbers are even more impressive: 23 games, 37.2 innings, 5-1 record, 16 saves, and 0.72 ERA.
Here is a log of his second-half appearances ("*" indicates that he faced the tying or go-ahead run when he entered the game and a "-" indicates a blown save. Thanks to Retrosheet.com for the data.):
- Aug. 10 vs Clev: 1 IP, Blew save. Entered game with Brewers leading 2-1 n ninth and allowed a run to tie it. Milwaukee eventually won in 13, 5-2.
Aug. 13 vs. Clev: 1 IP, save in 8-5 win, pitched one inning and entered with game already 8-5.
Aug. 16 vs. Tor: 1.2 IP and save in 6-2 win-came in with one out men at first and second in the eighth (already 6-2).
*Aug. 16 (game 2) vs. Tor: 1.2 IP and save in 2-0 win-came in with one out and man on first in eighth (2-0).
*Aug. 18 vs. Tex: 1.2 IP and save in 3-1 win-came in with bases loaded, one out, and one run already across in the inning in the eighth inning (3-1).
*Aug 22 vs. Minn: 2 IP and win in 4-3, 10-inning victory-came in with score tied to start ninth (3-3).
Aug. 23 vs. Minn: 1.1 IP and save in 8-5 win-came in with man on third, two out, and two runs already across in the inning in the 8th (7-5).
Aug. 28 vs. Tex: 1.2 IP and save in 6-3 win-in 8th, came in with man on first, one out, 1 run already across in the inning (6-3).
Aug. 30 vs. Tex: 0.2 IP and save in 6-2 win-came in with men at first and second and one out in ninth (6-2).
*Aug. 31 vs. KC: 2.1 IP and save in 5-1 win-came in with men at second and third, 2 out, and score 3-1 in the 7th.
- Sept 2 vs. KC: 0.2 IP and loss in 5-4 defeat-came in to start the ninth of a 4-4 tie.
*Sept. 3 vs. Minn: 1.1 IP and save in 4-3 win-came in with man on first and two out in 8th (4-3).
Sept 5 vs. Minn: 1 IP and save in 5-3 win-came in with none out and none on in the ninth after Jim Slaton had lost his no-hitter by giving up three runs in ninth.
*Sept. 6 vs. Minn: 2 IP and win in 8-7 victory-came in to start ninth with score tied 7-7.
*Sept. 9 vs. NYY: 2.2 IP and save in 5-3 win-came in in 7th with one out, men on first and second, and score 5-2 (one inherited run scored).
Sept. 12 vs. Balt: 1 IP and save in 6-3 win-came in with man on first and none out in ninth (6-3).
*Sept 15 vs. NYY: 2 IP and save in 2-1 win-came in to start 8th (2-1).
*Sept. 16 vs. NYY: 2 IP and save in 3-2 win-came in to start 8th (3-2).
Sept. 19 vs. Balt: 2.2 IP and save in 11-8 win-came in with men on first and second, one out, and 7-5 Milwaukee lead in 7th (two inherited runs scored plus one uninherited).
- Sept. 22 vs. Bos: 2.2 IP and win in 10-8 victory-came in with one out, man on second, and score 8-7 Brewers in the 7th. Gave up inherited run to tie score and later win it.
Sept. 25 vs. Det: 1 IP and save in 8-6 win-came in to start ninth (8-6).
*Sept. 26 vs. Det: 1 IP and save in 4-3 win-came in with none on, none out, and 2 runs across in the inning in the 9th (4-3).
Sept. 30 vs. Bos: 1.1 IP in 10-5 win-came in with men at first and second and one out in the 8th (10-5).
*Oct. 3 vs. Det: 1.1 IP and win in 2-1 victory-came in with two out, man on first, and the Brewers trailing 1-0 in the 8th. This victory clinches the division for the Brewers.
Actually, it looks more impressive on paper than I anticipated, especially the September numbers. He has 11 of my qualified saves (i.e., facing winning or go-ahead run when he entered) and 3 blown saves. His numbers versus the pennant race teams that we mentioned earlier is 3 "saves" and 2 blown saves (plus 3 "saves" vs. the Yankees). They look more impressive because they helped clinch the pennant and were against the Yankees, but his stats are less impressive against the teams in the race.
Also, consider that Gossage finished 5th in Cy Young voting and 9th in MVP voting probably because his Yankees were never in a real playoff race, but as we documented above, Fingers was not as impressive as one would believe in the pennant race against the tougher teams. Further John Wetteland, whose 1993 season was similar to Fingers' 1981 as I indicated earlier, finished 24th in the MVP vote that year and got no mention in the Cy Young vote even though fellow closers Bryan Harvey and Randy Myers did.
It should also be pointed out that there were a number of players have very good season in 1981 (three of them on the Brewers):
Player Win Share Adj OPS Rickey Henderson 27 150 Dwight Evans 26 163 Cecil Cooper 22 151 Bobby Grich 21 164 Eddie Murray 21 156 Gorman Thomas 20 146 Robin Yount 20 114 Dwayne Murphy 20 129
One could argue that not only was Fingers not the AL MVP, not only was he not the Brewer MVP, he was the fourth most valuable on his own team.
How valuable was his season after all if his injury-plagued 1982 matches it in most stats but ERA but failed to garner a single Cy Young vote and finished 16th in MVP that year:
Year Ag Tm Lg W L G GS CG SHO SV IP H ER HR BB SO ERA *lgERA *ERA+ 1981 34 MIL AL 6 3 47 0 0 0 28 78.0 55 9 3 13 61 1.04 3.44 331 1982 35 MIL AL 5 6 50 0 0 0 29 79.7 63 23 5 20 71 2.60 3.80 146
I have to side with James in this argument. Fingers had a very fine season but was far from being MVP-worthy. So why did Fingers win? I think it was a combination of things. I think the shortened season threw off everyone's season numbers making it more difficult for voters. I also think Fingers to a certain degree gets the benefit for the time he lost. Why else would a closer with only 28 saves get the MVP when the record had been 38 for nine seasons and Bruce Sutter had had 37 just two years before? Why else would his 1981 season overwhelm voters while his 1982 season did anything but.
Besides Ted Abernathy had had similar statistics in 1967 (adjusting the saves per era): he lead the majors in saves with 28, won six games, and had an ERA a little over 1.00. And Abernathy did it 106.1 innings, a more impressive accomplishment. So why was Abernathy twentieth in the 1967 MVP vote? Well, the Reds did finish in fourth 14.5 games back, but third-place Roberto Clemente was not held back by his .500 team.
Obviously, the way that a closer was viewed in 1981 was fundamentally different from the way it was viewed in 1967. I submit that analysts of the day had an inflated view of the closer's worth. Sutter had just made the reliever's role a glamorous one (again) two years earlier. Writers were just waiting for the next big thing when Fingers and a strike-shortened season gave it to them.
I also submit that this view carried through until when Fingers was eligible for the Hall. Fingers had been the first man to break 300 saves, had the MVP season, and a very good career. He also retired one year removed from his peak at the age of 38. Compare him to near contemporary Goose Gossage: Gossage was, for many arguments that have been listed since he became Hall-eligible, as viable a candidate as Fingers-they are listed as the player most comparable to each other by Bill James Similar Pitcher system. Gossage was still a valuable pitcher when he retired at age 42 but was at least 5 good years removed from closing. However, he started his career four years after Fingers and ended it nine years after Fingers.
Fingers was voted into the Hall on his second ballot (1992). Gossage has yet to get in in three tries. He hasn't even been close. So what's the difference? Well, in 1992 Dennis Eckersley, Gossage's teammate at the time, was re-writing the record books or at least the margins thereof with only the second 50+ save season. It was the culmination of five dominant years by Eck. Fingers' excellent career was still fresh in the writers' minds. It proved to be Eckersley's last dominant season. By 2000, when Gossage first became available, the save was already becoming devalued as a means to measure closers. Saves were a dime-a-dozen, even Gossage's 310 of them. I would say that was the difference in Fingers' rather easy entrance into the Hall and Gossage's yet unsuccessful one.
Eckersley plays a big part in the momentary resurgence of closers in the late Eighties, the subject of our next study.
1987: The Year That the Modern Closer Almost Died (Bye Bye, Miss American Pie)
In 1987 everyone in baseball was talking about the number of balls flying out of the park. The talk didn't slow even though the home runs did after the All-Star break. The ball was juiced, that's what everyone said. They called it the "lively-ball" or "livelier-ball theory". Street and Smith's 1988 Baseball Annual quoted Bobby Bonds, then a 41-year-old coach for the Indians and a proponent of the livelier-ball theory, as saying that when he took an occasional turn in the batting cage:
"I hit the ball as far as I did when I was 25-years-old. I'm not that strong. I hit balls really terrible and they went over the fence. When I was playing, I'd hit balls and say, oh my Gos, and they didn't go out. During my batting practice now, I hit balls and said, oh my God, and they cleared the fence by 30 feet."
Bonds' "Oh my God!"'s may be more easily explained by his son's ability to hit the ball farther as he approaches forty than when he was twenty-five: Maybe it runs in the family. Or maybe Bonds was upset that so many players joined him in the exclusive 30-30 club in 1987, increasing the membership to 10 men, 4 from 1987 (i.e., Eric Davis, Joe Carter, Darryl Strawberry, and Howard Johnson).
However, no one could argue with the record number of home runs being hit. On May 9th alone, Eddie Murray homered from both sides of the plate for the second consecutive game, and weak-hitting Chris Speier hit his second grand-slam home run in a week, after going his first 15 seasons without one. May 27 Greg Gross hits his first home run since 1978. On May 28 Joe Carter hits three home runs and Mike Young becomes only the fifth player ever to hit two home runs in extra innings.
And that's just the anecdotal evidence. Here is a table of the number of home runs per game with the percent increase from the previous year and from five years previous to mitigate one-year spikes. I included every year because, heck, I do like numbers and I thought some of you might too:
Year HR/G % Change 5-year % Change 1871 0.185 - - 1872 0.096 -48.32% - 1873 0.128 34.00% - 1874 0.091 -29.36% - 1875 0.061 -32.75% -67.10% 1876 0.077 26.37% -19.56% 1877 0.067 -13.33% -47.97% 1878 0.063 -6.25% -30.95% 1879 0.090 44.55% 48.42% 1880 0.091 0.92% 18.53% 1881 0.113 24.04% 69.64% 1882 0.156 37.58% 148.95% 1883 0.152 -2.57% 67.80% 1884 0.223 47.40% 145.07% 1885 0.181 -18.79% 60.45% 1886 0.196 8.17% 26.16% 1887 0.286 45.90% 88.92% 1888 0.239 -16.70% 6.76% 1889 0.306 28.26% 68.61% 1890 0.236 -22.76% 20.39% 1891 0.264 11.79% -7.76% 1892 0.226 -14.31% -5.10% 1893 0.293 29.42% -4.24% 1894 0.395 34.93% 67.29% 1895 0.304 -23.10% 15.08% 1896 0.255 -16.11% 12.66% 1897 0.227 -11.07% -22.58% 1898 0.162 -28.44% -58.94% 1899 0.190 17.06% -37.50% 1900 0.223 17.47% -12.49% 1901 0.205 -8.17% -9.64% 1902 0.160 -22.11% -1.65% 1903 0.150 -5.81% -20.87% 1904 0.133 -11.87% -40.63% 1905 0.137 3.11% -33.34% 1906 0.107 -21.62% -32.92% 1907 0.099 -7.22% -33.92% 1908 0.107 8.02% -19.01% 1909 0.105 -2.39% -23.32% 1910 0.145 37.96% 34.95% 1911 0.208 43.76% 109.12% 1912 0.180 -13.46% 67.53% 1913 0.190 5.70% 81.41% 1914 0.189 -0.49% 30.85% 1915 0.170 -9.92% -18.02% 1916 0.154 -9.84% -14.58% 1917 0.134 -12.53% -29.32% 1918 0.116 -13.90% -38.84% 1919 0.200 72.86% 17.36% 1920 0.255 27.69% 66.22% 1921 0.381 49.34% 183.80% 1922 0.426 11.77% 268.43% 1923 0.397 -6.73% 98.79% 1924 0.364 -8.42% 42.57% 1925 0.476 30.79% 24.86% 1926 0.350 -26.54% -17.93% 1927 0.373 6.66% -6.15% 1928 0.444 19.03% 21.99% 1929 0.549 23.62% 15.30% 1930 0.634 15.54% 81.34% 1931 0.432 -31.80% 15.94% 1932 0.551 27.34% 24.04% 1933 0.435 -20.98% -20.71% 1934 0.549 26.27% -13.35% 1935 0.539 -1.82% 24.76% 1936 0.551 2.11% 0.04% 1937 0.577 4.75% 32.61% 1938 0.603 4.50% 9.75% 1939 0.587 -2.67% 8.79% 1940 0.636 8.28% 15.36% 1941 0.535 -15.82% -7.30% 1942 0.438 -18.22% -27.45% 1943 0.366 -16.46% -37.72% 1944 0.416 13.89% -34.50% 1945 0.409 -1.66% -23.48% 1946 0.489 19.49% 11.80% 1947 0.630 28.70% 72.23% 1948 0.629 -0.16% 50.99% 1949 0.687 9.32% 67.85% 1950 0.837 21.85% 71.17% 1951 0.752 -10.20% 19.43% 1952 0.686 -8.70% 9.21% 1953 0.837 21.95% 21.83% 1954 0.783 -6.47% -6.49% 1955 0.901 15.10% 19.86% 1956 0.926 2.73% 34.86% 1957 0.891 -3.70% 6.50% 1958 0.907 1.73% 15.83% 1959 0.909 0.20% 0.84% 1960 0.861 -5.27% -7.01% 1961 0.955 10.89% 7.07% 1962 0.926 -3.03% 2.07% 1963 0.835 -9.79% -8.10% 1964 0.849 1.71% -1.34% 1965 0.828 -2.50% -13.25% 1966 0.849 2.55% -8.26% 1967 0.710 -16.45% -15.03% 1968 0.614 -13.49% -27.73% 1969 0.801 30.55% -3.23% 1970 0.882 10.05% 3.85% 1971 0.739 -16.25% 4.10% 1972 0.682 -7.73% 11.03% 1973 0.798 17.12% -0.39% 1974 0.681 -14.69% -22.79% 1975 0.698 2.43% -5.57% 1976 0.576 -17.37% -15.44% 1977 0.866 50.33% 8.54% 1978 0.703 -18.84% 3.25% 1979 0.818 16.30% 17.24% 1980 0.733 -10.33% 27.23% 1981 0.637 -13.12% -26.47% 1982 0.802 25.88% 14.04% 1983 0.783 -2.40% -4.30% 1984 0.774 -1.12% 5.54% 1985 0.856 10.66% 34.44% 1986 0.907 5.86% 13.06% 1987 1.059 16.80% 35.31% 1988 0.757 -28.50% -2.16% 1989 0.732 -3.33% -14.53% 1990 0.788 7.64% -13.09% 1991 0.804 2.04% -24.08% 1992 0.721 -10.28% -4.74% 1993 0.888 23.12% 21.33% 1994 1.033 16.34% 31.13% 1995 1.012 -2.08% 25.84% 1996 1.094 8.18% 51.73% 1997 1.024 -6.45% 15.29% 1998 1.041 1.69% 0.77% 1999 1.138 9.34% 12.53% 2000 1.172 2.94% 7.08% 2001 1.124 -4.13% 9.74% 2002 1.043 -7.20% 0.15%
Note how this trend was a long time coming with increases in 1977, 1979, and 1982. The largest increases were in the 1985-'87 period though, with 1987 reaching the then-historic (and now de rigueur) sum of one home run per game.
From The Sporting News 1988 Baseball Guide regarding the home run increase in the 1987 season:
Subpar pitching and the umpire's shrinking strike zone were theories advanced as explanations for the record home run output. Over the first half of the 1987 campaign, the homer total was well ahead of the previous year's record clip, though the pace slowed slightly after the All-Star break.Both leagues attained new home run highs. With American League hitters unloading 2,634 and the National League accounting for 1,824, the total of 4,458 amounted to nearly a 17 percent increase over the record of 3,813 set a year earlier. Six A.L. teams-Detroit, Toronto, Oakland, Texas, Kansas City and Cleveland- established new marks, as did three N.L. clubs-Chicago, San Francisco and New York. One of the more unusual homers was hit September 5 by California third baseman Jack Howell at Yankee Stadium. Facing reliever Tim Stoddard, Howell drove a pitch into the left-field stands, even though his bat broke in half about 12 inches from the knob.
Oakland first baseman Mark McGwire was the A.L.'s leading home run hitter with 49, smashing the rookie record of 38. Outfielder Andre Dawson also had 49 for the Chicago Cubs to pace the senior circuit. New York Yankee first baseman Don Mattingly accomplished two remarkable feats, equaling one record with home runs in eight consecutive games and establishing another by hitting six grand slams...
The home run barrage stirred speculation that the baseballs had been "juiced up." Denials by representatives of the manufacturer, Rawlings Sporting Goods Co., were met with skepticism, but scientific tests arranged separately by USA Today and the league offices confirmed that the 1987 baseballs were no livelier than those of recent years. The newspaper had Hailer Testing Laboratories of Plain-field, N.J., perform tests early in July on 116 baseballs collected from all 26 teams. A few weeks later, at the request of the two leagues, the Science and Aeronautics Department of the University of Missouri at Rolla compared several dozen 1985 and 1987 balls manufactured by Rawlings.
The homer outburst also spawned several brawls and charges of cheating on the part of hitters as well as pitchers. Fourteen bench-clearing brawls erupted during the first half of the campaign. The biggest took place at Wrigley Field on July 7 after the Cubs' Dawson was struck on the face by a pitch from San Diego's Eric Show, causing wounds that required 24 stitches. Two days later, N.L. President A. Bartlett Giamatti issued an edict threatening "severe penalties, possibly including suspension," for any act clearly intended to maim or injure another player. The warning had a quick, positive effect.
Because certain pitchers long had been suspected of scuffing baseballs, Giamatti and his counterpart, A.L. President Bobby Brown, ordered umpires from both leagues to keep a close watch for illegal activity. And when the long-ball exploits of Mets infielder Howard Johnson, who hit 36 homers after totaling only 40 in five previous seasons, and other slightly-built players aroused suspicions of corked bats. Commissioner Ueberroth sent out an August 6 directive that permitted umpires to impound one bat per team per game upon request of the opposing manager. The confiscated bats were shipped to league headquarters to be X-rayed.
Three players, two of them pitchers, drew suspensions. Joe Niekro, veteran knuckleballer with Minnesota, was banned 10 days for doctoring baseballs; pitcher Kevin Gross of Philadelphia received the same sentence when umpires detected an illegal substance on his glove, and Billy Hatcher of Houston was suspended for 10 days for using a corked bat. No violations were found in the bats of other players that were examined...
While hitters generally fared well, pitchers struggled through a rough season. Boston's Roger Clemens and Oakland's Dave Stewart were the only hurlers to reach the coveted 20-victory level with 20-9 and 20-13 records, respectively. Clemens recorded his 20 wins despite a spring training holdout and 4-6 start. Rick Sutcliff e of the Chicago Cubs was the National League's top winner with 18 victories. Only four pitchers working the 162 innings required to qualify for earned-run honors finished under 3.00. The lone National League hurler to do so was veteran Nolan Ryan, who had a 2.76 ERA but a disappointing 8-16 record as a consequence of weak offensive support by his Houston mates. Jimmy Key of Toronto (2.76) edged Viola (2.90) and Clemens (2.97) for the American League's ERA title.
For the record, here are the men with a double-digit increase in their home run output between 1986 and 1987 (and played at least 100 games in 1986-the largest increase was 43 by rookie Mark McGwire). Only four men (Rickey Henderson (-11 but played only 95 games), Jesse Barfield (-12), Doug Decinces (-10 in his final year), and Don Baylor (-15, played 128 games)) experienced double-digit dropoffs:
Name 1986 HR 1987 HR Diff Andre Dawson 20 49 29 Will Clark 11 35 24 George Bell 31 47 16 John Kruk 4 20 16 Wade Boggs 8 24 16 Brook Jacoby 17 32 15 Dale Murphy 29 44 15 Keith Moreland 12 27 15 Ruben Sierra 16 30 14 Eddie Murray 17 30 13 Larry Sheets 18 31 13 Darryl Strawberry 27 39 12 Juan Samuel 16 28 12 Ozzie Virgil 15 27 12 Robin Yount 9 21 12 Wally Joyner 22 34 12 Alvin Davis 18 29 11 Chili Davis 13 24 11 Gary Ward 5 16 11 Terry Pendleton 1 12 11 Bill Doran 6 16 10 Eric Davis 27 37 10 John Shelby 11 21 10 Nick Esasky 12 22 10
The general consensus now seems to be that the ball was juiced and that it was then-commissioner Peter Ueberroth's attempt (and if so, then a successful one) to rejuvenate interest in the game. Although I do not know if any evidence was ever found to support that conclusion.
Okay, so a lot of home runs were hit. Big deal! What does that have to do with relief pitching?
Well, as home runs flew out of parks, staffs became jittery and managers changed styles. The percentage of games completed by starting pitchers dwindled from just over 20% in 1980 to under 14% in 1986 and '87. The percentage of all pitchers who were used solely as starting pitchers, which had been climbing steadily throughout the Seventies, plateaued and then increased by six percentage points after the home run explosion stopped in '88. The same goes for the falling percentage of swingman, which dropped almost nine points in 1988. Meanwhile all pitching roles were taking their lumps: all three (starter, reliever, and swingman) had average ERAs over 4.00 in 1987; that was the first time since 1950.
The way that relief pitchers were used changed dramatically as well. From 1955 to 1979 the number of pitchers used per game increased by just one-tenth of a man. Between 1979 and 1989 that number went up by more than a third a man. 1987 witnessed the lowest save leader over a full season (Steve Bedrosian with 40) for the period 1983 to the present.
Closers got fewer saves in 1987 as managers tried different ways to hold a lead. Here are the average number of saves for team's "closer" (i.e., pitcher with most saves prorated to 162 games):
Year Sv/162G 1970 19.63 1971 15.13 1972 16.51 1973 16.63 1974 12.70 1975 13.90 1976 14.41 1977 17.60 1978 18.23 1979 17.60 1980 19.20 1981 19.23 1982 19.57 1983 19.86 1984 22.32 1985 22.15 1986 22.53 1987 19.93 1988 25.84 1989 27.38
The number of closers in baseball who met the typical closer-type numbers dwindled. Here are the number of "high-save" closers (³15 saves 1970-'79, ³13 saves 1981, and ³ 20 saves 1980, '82-'89 (total is prorates to 13 for the strike year of 1981)):
Year High-Save Closers 1970 18 1971 13 1972 12 1973 14 1974 8 1975 10 1976 11 1977 17 1978 15 1979 15 1980 14 1981 11 1982 12 1983 14 1984 14 1985 13 1986 17 1987 10 1988 18 1989 25
Also, the percentage of games saved dropped in 1987:
Year Pitchers/G SV% Sv/RA 1970 2.664 22.58% 13.57% 1971 2.493 17.78% 11.91% 1972 2.455 19.71% 13.55% 1973 2.370 21.08% 15.39% 1974 2.398 13.29% 9.50% 1975 2.397 17.30% 12.38% 1976 2.415 17.61% 12.45% 1977 2.525 20.09% 13.17% 1978 2.401 19.12% 13.65% 1979 2.520 20.02% 13.17% 1980 2.564 21.43% 13.70% 1981 2.668 21.70% 13.01% 1982 2.620 22.12% 13.66% 1983 2.603 23.16% 14.45% 1984 2.655 23.59% 14.25% 1985 2.735 23.23% 13.39% 1986 2.796 23.87% 13.29% 1987 2.888 23.06% 12.22% 1988 2.745 24.98% 14.31% 1989 2.875 25.38% 13.53%
Throughout the era of the "modern" closer, the percentage of games that resulted in saves had been increasing. Suddenly, it dropped almost a full percentage point in 1987. More pitchers were used per game than had ever been used before, the increase outpacing the modest, evolutionary snowballing of the last ten years. Note also that the percentage of relieve appearances that resulted in a save for the reliever took a hit during the 1985-'87 offensive increase, with 1987's 1+ point drop being the worst of the three. All of these numbers returned to the normal projections in 1988.
One would be lead to believe that the closer role was becoming less important as more pitchers with more appearances, fewer of which ended in saves, were becoming the norm. However, if a count of the total number of pitchers who saved games in a given were tallied, that would not seem to be the case:
Year Savers/Tm 1960 6.875 1961 6.556 1962 7.600 1963 6.400 1964 7.000 1965 6.700 1966 6.700 1967 6.450 1968 6.450 1969 6.042 1970 6.250 1971 5.625 1972 5.833 1973 6.167 1974 4.875 1975 5.333 1976 5.292 1977 5.269 1978 5.154 1979 4.962 1980 5.615 1981 4.769 1982 5.615 1983 5.231 1984 5.577 1985 5.808 1986 5.769 1987 5.692 1988 5.577 1989 4.923 1990 5.654 1991 5.692 1992 4.885 1993 5.071 1994 5.071 1995 4.821 1996 4.893 1997 5.000 1998 4.933 1999 4.733 2000 4.500 2001 4.333 2002 4.367
Note that the number of pitchers who saved at least a game per team actually increased during the 1985-'87 period and has never been that high since.
One logical conclusion of fewer saves and more pitching changes would be that relief pitchers in general and closers in particular were throwing fewer innings. The number of 3-inning saves and endurance-based saves would therefore be the culprit. However, the number of 100-inning pitchers actually increased. Here is a table of the number of 100-inning relievers per year (with fewer than 10 starts (7 in '81), at least 20 relief appearances, and at least 100 IP (66 in '81)):
Year 100-IP relievers 1970 16 1971 11 1972 15 1973 17 1974 24 1975 17 1976 22 1977 40 1978 25 1979 18 1980 25 1981 28 1982 36 1983 23 1984 25 1985 19 1986 19 1987 22 1988 12 1989 18
Evidently relievers in general did still pitch 100 innings. So maybe the manner in which closers were employed was the culprit of fewer saves. To test this I selected the "closer" for each team per year. This was the man with the most saves on the team. I then took the average for all such closers in the majors for each year. If two or more men were tied for the team save lead, I averaged their stats before adding them to the majors totals and deriving the major-league average. Here are the results (MTL = Miminum Team Leader, the team leader with the most saves; all the other stats are based on the closer average):
Year Sv/ MTL/ W L G GS IP ERA K/ HR/ K/BB WHIP
162G 162G 9IP 9IP
1970 19.63 8.00 6.13 5.92 60.25 0.33 91.44 3.01 6.39 0.65 1.90 1.256
1971 15.13 4.01 6.15 5.67 54.56 1.58 90.15 2.93 6.41 0.64 1.71 1.274
1972 16.51 4.18 5.48 5.48 50.50 0.75 80.47 2.78 6.56 0.51 1.82 1.246
1973 16.63 6.00 6.32 5.65 54.99 1.25 97.06 2.88 6.05 0.61 1.73 1.266
1974 12.70 3.00 6.96 6.25 59.46 0.92 106.42 2.90 5.58 0.54 1.82 1.257
1975 13.90 5.03 6.02 5.60 52.88 0.50 87.98 3.13 5.97 0.55 1.62 1.311
1976 14.41 6.02 7.08 6.08 57.67 0.42 98.58 2.76 6.25 0.40 1.73 1.245
1977 17.60 8.01 7.65 6.50 60.69 0.92 106.23 2.97 6.66 0.67 2.11 1.235
1978 18.23 9.02 7.31 7.23 58.04 0.19 93.94 2.82 6.59 0.57 1.83 1.229
1979 17.60 6.02 7.35 6.73 57.19 0.96 94.50 2.89 6.32 0.58 1.78 1.268
1980 19.20 6.00 6.65 5.96 62.54 0.31 98.35 2.75 5.64 0.46 1.80 1.233
1981 19.23 4.53 4.35 4.08 41.40 0.23 65.41 2.75 5.63 0.48 1.61 1.254
1982 19.57 7.00 6.77 7.08 61.40 0.46 100.62 2.93 6.02 0.60 2.01 1.221
1983 19.86 6.99 6.35 6.69 59.81 0.27 93.41 2.97 6.29 0.60 1.99 1.231
1984 22.32 8.00 5.83 6.79 60.63 0.04 90.62 2.96 6.43 0.66 2.08 1.234
1985 22.15 9.01 6.46 6.17 60.85 0.42 90.78 2.95 6.50 0.71 2.22 1.210
1986 22.53 10.01 6.58 6.88 60.38 0.92 87.91 3.26 7.21 0.76 2.09 1.292
1987 19.93 8.00 5.23 5.65 56.27 0.37 84.40 3.36 7.71 0.88 2.41 1.261
1988 25.84 13.04 4.46 5.27 57.46 0.04 73.87 2.88 7.66 0.57 2.49 1.205
1989 27.38 15.00 4.17 4.27 59.35 0.04 73.82 2.61 7.77 0.57 2.39 1.181
A number of interesting conclusions may be drawn. First, note that the average number of saves per closer is lower in 1987 than in the surrounding years, just as we saw earlier with saves in general. Note also that the lowest team closer has a save total lower than expected. The lowest in 1988 would be more than 50% higher than 1987's.
Note too the ERA upswing in 1987. Clearly this was affected by that year's offensive/home run explosion. One logical consequence of a higher ERA for a closer would be fewer saves, but one would also expect more losses and possibly more wins, as the pitcher's team regains the lead with him on the mound. However, neither was the case as closers experienced historically low win and loss totals.
Closer's innings pitched did decrease in 1987 by three innings, but I cannot imagine that a few innings cost that many saves. It did portend the sub-80-inning closer that came thereafter. Note that the number of appearances per closer did decrease slightly but clearly closers pitched fewer innings per appearances. Compare the similar appearance totals for 1976-1983 and for 1987. Note that there are a number of years in the '76-'83 range in which the average closer had about the same number as he did in 1987. However, the closer in the earlier range was expected to pitch 90-100 innings as opposed to the 84 in 1987.
Note that 1987 was also a transition for the number of games started by the closer. Whereas closers would start an average of almost one game prior to the "modern" period (1977 and '79), the average closer started only 0.37 games in 1987, or rather only one in three closers started a game on average. As late as 1986, a start per closer was the norm, possibly to combat the offensive onslaught of the mid-Eighties by enlisting a starter as a closer or a closer as a starter. Note that the games started average plummets after 1987. Again this year is a transition point.
Also, note the increase in strikeout pitchers being used as closers. Both the strikeouts-per-nine-innings and the strikeouts-to-walks-ratio were historically high for closers. When scoring is high, even large leads can be lost quickly. Managers began selecting pitchers who would keep batters off the basepaths via the strikeout. These were fireballers who still had good control, which is evident by the slight increase in 1987 over the norm in Walks-Plus-Hits-Per-Innings-Pitched (WHIP). 1987's average closer WHIP is actually lower than 1986's. The strikeout stats remained high even after scoring returned to normal after 1987, and control improved as the closer's WHIP went down with the scoring.
I see 1987 as a year in which the "modern closer" established by Bruce Sutter in the late Seventies started to break down and a new closer who was a power pitcher with good control, pitched fewer innings per appearance, almost never started a game, and was rarely involved in win-loss decisions. The "neo-modern" closer had more saves and was more widely used than the Sutter-type.
Of course, a man, who personified all of these elements, began his closer career in 1987 and would go on to be widely-held as the best reliever of all time. That man is, of course, Dennis Eckersley. Eck would walk few, strikeout many (anout one per inning), would never pitch more than 80 innings in a year as a reliever, and would set the standard for the next generation of closers.
Eckersley would never have been able to succeed without his excellent supporting bullpen staff in Oakland. The growth of the setup men is the subject of the last study.
Setting 'Em Up And Knocking 'Em Down
To Be Continued...
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