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“Hall’s of Relief”—Final Analysis, Part II
2004-02-05 00:26
by Mike Carminati

Previous entries:

The 1870s, ‘80s, and ‘90s
The 1900s and ‘10s
The 1920s, ‘30s, and ‘40s
The 1950s
The 1960s
The 1970s
The 1980s
The 1990s and 2000s
2003 Notes: Part I & II
To Come: Final Analysis: I, II, III, and IV.

Bull by Committee

A committee is an animal with four back legs.

—John "Max" le Carre

2003 became a litmus test for the bullpen or closer by committee. In the offseason the Red Sox hired Bill James and allowed their itinerant closer, Ugueth Urbina, leave via the free agent route. Boston then adopted James’ theories with regards to relief pitching and voila, it was all around the hot stove circuit that the Sox were employing a bullpen by committee.

Of course, the source for all the Jamesian theorizing, an article titled “Valuing Relievers” in The New Historical Baseball Abstract, does not mention anything about a bullpen by committee or a closer by committee. Actually, James doesn’t even user the term closer. He prefers “ace reliever”. And the point of the article is to arrive at a means to value and to maximize the ace reliever’s contribution. His observations I have already documented in the Gagne section above.

Anyway, James vociferously defended the Red Sox plans as having nothing to do with a bullpen by committee. But the press saw the Red Sox picking up veteran relievers like Chad Fox, Ramiro Mendoza, and Mike Timlin and labeled the Boston bullpen a “committee”.

So who was right? Well, the Red Sox did use ten different pitchers, including two in their rotation (Wakefield and Fossum), to save games. Is that unusual? Actually, it hasn't happened since the 1995 Detroit Tigers traded Mike Henneman (1.53 and 18 saves) to Houston for Phil Nevin just after the trade deadline and used nine different relievers not too effectively to finish out the year. Before that it hadn't happened since 1987 when Baltimore and Cleveland both let 10 relievers pick up saves. Here's the complete list (The first to do it was the Tigers in 1909 when every pitcher on the staff but one—he only appeared in two games—picked up a save, posthumously):

YrTeam# with Saves
1973Texas Rangers12
1959Kansas City Athletics12
1961Kansas City Athletics12
1941Brooklyn Dodgers11
1951St. Louis Cardinals11
1954Chicago White Sox11
1979Los Angeles Dodgers11
1973Atlanta Braves11
1946Brooklyn Dodgers11
1967Boston Red Sox11
1962Los Angeles Angels11
1966Kansas City Athletics11
1970Boston Red Sox10
1964San Francisco Giants10
1972Atlanta Braves10
1953New York Yankees10
1964New York Yankees10
1964Milwaukee Braves10
1956New York Yankees10
1964St. Louis Cardinals10
1958Detroit Tigers10
1960New York Yankees10
1970Cleveland Indians10
1963San Francisco Giants10
1968California Angels10
1965New York Mets10
1995Detroit Tigers10
1971Cleveland Indians10
1965St. Louis Cardinals10
1966St. Louis Cardinals10
1964Detroit Tigers10
1948Chicago White Sox10
1909Detroit Tigers10
1985Seattle Mariners10
1973Milwaukee Brewers10
1950Brooklyn Dodgers10
1980Los Angeles Dodgers10
1987Baltimore Orioles10
1987Cleveland Indians10
1982New York Mets10
1948Boston Braves10
2003Boston Red Sox10

By the way, the only team to have more than 10 pitchers record a save since Bruce Sutter revolutionized the closer role was the 1979 Dodgers. Bobby Castillo led them with 7 saves (20.6% of the team's 34 saves) and a 1.11 ERA in just 24.1 innings. Don Sutton (1 save), Jerry Reuss (3), and Bob Welch (5 saves) were even in the mix. Fourteen different Dodgers finished games; eight finished 10 or more games. Now, that's a bullpen by committee.

Castillo's seven saves comprised just 20.6% of the Dodgers saves that year. That was the all-time low for a team saves leader…until this year. The Tigers' save co-leaders Franklyn German and Chris Mears recorded just 5 saves each. The Tigers had a woeful 27 saves as a team. Even so, that means that the saves leader for Detroit only registered 18.52% of the team's saves, the lowest ever. Here's the list of all team "closers" who recorded 30% or less of their team's saves:

YrTmNameTeam savesSaves%
2003DETFranklyn German/Chris Mears27518.52%
1979LA Bobby Castillo34720.59%
1984SEAMike Stanton35822.86%
1994CLEJeff Russell/ Paul Shuey21523.81%
1979NYNSkip Lockwood36925.00%
1979MilwBill Castro23626.09%
1990ATLJoe Boever30826.67%
1976PITBob Moose351028.57%
1977HOUKen Forsch28828.57%
1986SFScott Garrelts351028.57%
1987DETEric King31929.03%
1982TEXDanny Darwin24729.17%
1994PITAlejandro Pena24729.17%
1982CALDoug Corbett27829.63%
1985TORBill Caudill471429.79%
1981OAKDave Beard/ Jeff Jones10330.00%
1999BOSDerek Lowe/ Tim Wakefield501530.00%

OK, so back to the Red Sox. They certainly shared the saves around, but does that mean that the constituted a bullpen by committee? What is a bullpen by committee anyway?

Well, it seems to me that a bullpen by committee would not only share the saves among many pitchers, but they would share them pretty equally at least among the better relievers. What if we looked at the numbers for the pitchers who finished second and third in team saves.

Here is a table of the men who finished second in saves on their respective teams with the highest save totals all-time (co-team leaders are both listed):

YrTeamNameSavesTeam SavesLeader's Saves% of Ldr% of Tm
1992CINRob Dibble25552696.15%45.45%
1991TORDuane Ward23603271.88%38.33%
1986NYNJesse Orosco21462295.45%45.65%
1965CHAHoyt Wilhelm20532483.33%37.74%
1983SFNGary Lavelle20472290.91%42.55%
1999NYNJohn Franco19492286.36%38.78%
1999CINScott Williamson19552770.37%34.55%
1993ATLGreg McMichael19462770.37%41.30%
2003MilwMike DeJean18442185.71%40.91%
1989KCASteve Farr183818100.00%47.37%
1989KCAJeff Montgomery183818100.00%47.37%
1990SFNSteve Bedrosian17451989.47%37.78%
1985NYNRoger McDowell173717100.00%45.95%
1989SFNSteve Bedrosian17472085.00%36.17%
1971KCATom Burgmeier17442373.91%38.64%
1985NYNJesse Orosco173717100.00%45.95%
1961CINJim Brosnan164016100.00%40.00%
1961CINBill Henry164016100.00%40.00%
1979CINDoug Bair16401794.12%40.00%
1987OAKDennis Eckersley164016100.00%40.00%
1973CHATerry Forster16351888.89%45.71%
1987OAKJay Howell164016100.00%40.00%
1991PITStan Belinda16511794.12%31.37%
1987NYNJesse Orosco16512564.00%31.37%
1994MONMel Rojas16462564.00%34.78%
1970NYAJack Aker16492955.17%32.65%
1988NYNRoger McDowell16462661.54%34.78%
1970CINClay Carroll16603545.71%26.67%
1970MINStan Williams15583444.12%25.86%
1975CINWill McEnaney15502268.18%30.00%
1992NYNJohn Franco153415100.00%44.12%
1992NYNAnthony Young153415100.00%44.12%
1989TORDuane Ward15382075.00%39.47%
1982SDNLuis DeLeon15411693.75%36.59%
1984NYNDoug Sisk15503148.39%30.00%
1992CHAScott Radinsky15522268.18%28.85%
1991SFNJeff Brantley15452462.50%33.33%
1976CLEJim Kern15462171.43%32.61%
1991CHNPaul Assenmacher15401788.24%37.50%
1977PHIRon Reed15471978.95%31.91%
1988TORDuane Ward15472560.00%31.91%
1997CLEMike Jackson15391693.75%38.46%
1997CHAMatt Karchner15522755.56%28.85%
1999BOSTim Wakefield155015100.00%30.00%
1999BOSDerek Lowe155015100.00%30.00%
2003TexFrancisco Cordero15432657.69%34.88%

Now here are the men who finished third (or fourth) on their teams with the most saves:

YrTmPlayersavesTeam SavesLeader's Saves2nd Saves% of Ldr% of Tm
1992CHARoberto Hernandez1252221554.55%23.08%
2000ATLMike Remlinger/Kerry Ligtenberg1253241250.00%22.64%
1999BOSTom Gordon1150151573.33%22.00%
1984ATLGene Garber/Steve Bedrosian1149161168.75%22.45%
1976PHIGene Garber/Tug McGraw1144141178.57%25.00%
1971CINWayne Granger/Joe Gibbon1138151173.33%28.95%
2003CHADamaso Marte/Billy Koch1136121191.67%30.56%
1972OAKBob Locker1043211147.62%23.26%
1968CHABob Locker1040161262.50%25.00%
1993CLEDerek Lilliquist1045151166.67%22.22%
1995COLCurt Leskanic1043141171.43%23.26%
1980HOUDave Smith1041171158.82%24.39%
1985TORJim Acker1047141371.43%21.28%
2002CHADamaso Marte1035111190.91%28.57%
1977KCALarry Gura1042141271.43%23.81%
1962LANEd Roebuck946201145.00%19.57%
1967DETFred Lasher940121075.00%22.50%
1980PITGrant Jackson943211142.86%20.93%
1998CHABobby Howry942181150.00%21.43%
1983ATLGene Garber948191347.37%18.75%
1977PHITug McGraw947191547.37%19.15%
1986BOSCalvin Schiraldi941161256.25%21.95%
1990MONSteve Frey950201345.00%18.00%
1984TORDennis Lamp933101090.00%27.27%
1988LANJesse Orosco949211242.86%18.37%
2000MINEddie Guardado935141064.29%25.71%
1964NYAPedro Ramos84512966.67%17.78%
1973OAKHoracio Pina84122936.36%19.51%
1970CALEddie Fisher84917947.06%16.33%
1972CINTom Hall860371121.62%13.33%
1989OAKTodd Burns857331224.24%14.04%
1997SEABobby Ayala838141057.14%21.05%
1999OAKJason Isringhausen848261030.77%16.67%
1998SLNRich Croushore844151453.33%18.18%
1998CINDanny Graves84223934.78%19.05%
1993CLEJeremy Hernandez (4th)845151153.33%17.78%
1973CINTom Hall843141457.14%18.60%
1982CHNBill Campbell843171047.06%18.60%
1985TORGary Lavelle (4th)847141357.14%17.02%
2000MONUgueth Urbina83914957.14%20.51%
1986KCASteve Farr83112966.67%25.81%
1984MONGary Lucas848231034.78%16.67%
1983LANDave Stewart840181144.44%20.00%
1992PITRoger Mason84318944.44%18.60%
1996PITJohn Ericks837121166.67%21.62%
1993CALMike Butcher841131161.54%19.51%
1984SDNDave Dravecky844251032.00%18.18%
1967BALEddie Watt/Stu Miller83612866.67%22.22%
1962LAADean Chance/Ryne Duren8479888.89%17.02%
1976MILEduardo Rodriguez/Bill Castro8279888.89%29.63%
1991MILDan Plesac/Edwin Nunez84115853.33%19.51%

In 2003 the Red Sox’s saves leader was mid-season acquisition Byung-Hyun Kim with 16. Next was Brandon Lyon at nine, and then Chad Fox at three. Actually, if you look at the Red Sox game log for 2003, it’s pretty apparent that they were not employing anything like a bullpen by committee. They just had a succession of unsuccessful, putative closers or as James puts it, relief aces.

The 2003 season started with a bang for the Red Sox pen. Game one, March 31 at Tampa Bay, the Sox led 4-1 going into the bottom of the ninth. In what was potentially a save situation, Boston turned to Allan Embree. When he relinquished two runs on a Terry Shumpert home run, Chad Fox was summoned. Fox was acting as James’ relief ace, coming in with a one-run lead. It was also a save opportunity. Fox lost the game on a three-run, two-out, walk-off home run by Carl Crawford. And Grady Little started to stray from the relief ace construct that James laid out though Fox remained the closer for a short time.

In the next game Bobby Howry was given an 8-6 lead in the bottom of the eighth and he quickly lost it, giving up two runs in one-third inning. The Red Sox did win, 9-8 in the 16th, however, and Brandon Lyon pitched three solid innings to pick up the win. Howry did have a save opportunity (if he had pitched the final two innings and kept the lead). However, he was not acting as James’ relief ace since they are only employed with a one-run lead, in a tie ballgame, or when the team trails by one.

Game three Boston lead 7-5 in the eighth. Fox came in to record his first save though this was not technically an opportunity according to James in which to use the relief ace. Game four was a blowout and Fox rested.

The Sox then went to Baltimore and won a one-run game, 8-7. However, there was no save or relief ace opportunity because Boston led 8-1 going into the bottom of the seventh and 8-3 going into the bottom of the ninth. Ramiro Mendoza gave up four runs in the ninth. Again Fox was rested.

The wheels started to come off the relief ace concept in game 6. Boston and Baltimore were tied, 1-1, as the bottom half of the ninth began. Boston turned to Chad Fox as the relief ace in a non-save opportunity but an ideal opportunity according to James’ relief ace criteria. Fox spelled the always bubbly Pedro Martinez and quickly relinquished a one-out walk to B.J. Surhoff. Conine doubled, and with first open, Gobbons was intentionally passed to load the bases (a strategy probably not advocated by James). Fox went 3-0 to Miguel Batista, then worked a full count, but finally walked in the winning run.

Their next save opportunity (or relief ace opportunity) did not come for six games. On April 13, the Red Sox led the Orioles 2-0 at home. Starter Tim Wakefield came in with the two-run lead in the eighth and earned the two-inning save. However, it should be pointed out that this was not a relief ace opportunity. Fox had only been used for one scoreless inning during these six games, in a blowout game apparently to get a little work.

The next game, Boston led Tampa 5-1 in the top of the eighth. Ramiro Mendoza quickly allowed two runs and left with no outs, two men on, and a 5-3 lead. Mike Timlin let the Devil Rays toe the game on a Marlon Anderson one-out single, but stayed in the game and earned the win after the Sox scored a run in the ninth. This was technically a relief ace opportunity (after Tampa tied the game). Chad Fox was rested but was not used. It seemed that he remained the closer but that the concept of the relief ace was no more. It seems odd given that ESPN chose to criticize the Jamesian bullpen approach as “Closer by Calamity and Closer by Catastrophe” in the recap of a game in which James theories were not ever employed.

Even odder, Fox was used in the next game with Boston trailing 4-2 to lead off the eighth. Fox pitched a scoreless eighth and then earned his first win as the Red Sox scored 4 in the bottom of the eighth. Lyon came in for the save.

Fox then pitched a mop ninth three days later in a 7-3 win over Toronto. On April 20, the Red Sox and Jays were tied 5-5 in the top of the eighth at Fenway. Mike Timlin was used for the last two inning and the Red Sox won 6-5.

On April 22 in Arlington, Fox was then entrusted with a one-run lead (5-4) with one out in the eighth, after Timlin allowed three runs. He earned his second win with a 1.2 hitless innings. On April 25, Fox earned his third and final save in a Boston uniform, holding a three-run lead with two out in the eighth and two men on.

Meanwhile Lyon was being used to finish the blowout games and carried a 1.64 ERA through April 24. On April 27, Boston won a game 6-4 over the Angels in 14 innings. They had led 4-2 in the bottom of the eighth and turned to Lyon in the save non-relief ace opportunity. Lyon gave up a run and Fox was brought in for the ninth. He allowed the tying run in one-third inning, and that was the end of Fox as the Red Sox closer.

The Sox had long since abandoned the relief ace concept. On April 30, they had just tied the Royals 2-2 entering the eighth. Ramiro Mendoza who had pitched horribly to that point was left in the game and allowed two runs to score. The two runs scored after Lyon replaced Mendoza. The Sox won with three runs in the bottom of the ninth.

On May 1 Brandon Lyon was anointed the official closer with a save, his second, in a 6-5 win over the Royals. Lyon remained the closer pretty much until he handed the job over to Kim in July. Kim remained the closer for the rest of the year aside from a 4-inning save by Casey Fossum, a three-inning save by Bronson Arroyo, and a save by Mike Timlin in relief if Kim in the ninth on September 19.

So there you have it. The Red Sox had nothing close to a bullpen/closer by committee. They did follow James’ tenets for a short time but quickly abandoned them. From mid-April on they employed the same strategy as most any other team; they just got poor performance from the closer role.

When I think about bullpen by committee, I see Cleveland in 1993, Toronto in 1985, and LA in 1979. The Indians had a good group of relievers (Eric Plunk, Derek Lilliquist, Jeremy Hernandez, Jerry Dipoto, and Bill Wertz). All had a park-adjusted ERA between 20% and 92% better than the league average. None of them amassed more than 15 saves, but the first four had at least 8 each (and career highs for Lilliquist and Plunk). Also, each of the first four finished between 22 and 40 games.

The Blue Jays in 1985 had four relievers who recorded between 8 and 14 saves each and finished 19 to 51 games (Bill Caudill, Tom Henke, Jim Acker, and Gary Lavelle). Their top five relievers had park-adjusted ERAs between 31% and 109% better than league average (between 2.03 and 3.32).

The '79 Dodgers, I discussed above. They were led in saves by Bobby Castillo (7 with a 1.11 ERA), followed by Dave Patterson (6 with a 5.26 ERA), Bob Welch (5 with a 3.98 and 12 starts), Lerrin LaGrow (4, 3.41 ERA), Jerry Reuss (3 with a 3.54 ERA and 21 starts in 39 games), three others with two saves, and three with one save. Of the 8 pitchers on the staff that started at least 10 games, five appeared as relievers. They may have transcended the bullpen by committee mold and may have anachronistically approached the old John McGraw teams at the start of the twentieth century. McGraw solidified the use of relief ace, but would cannibalize his starters (Joe McGinnity, Christy Mathewson) to accommodate it.

Also, Sparky Anderson and his quick hook were highly influential in the history of the bullpen-by-committee approach. In his nine seasons in Cincy, he had five in which the pitcher who finished third in saves amassed at least 7. And only in five seasons did he have a reliever record 20 or more saves, even though the Reds had three 100-win seasons and just one with fewer than 88 wins during his reign.

Finally, the 2000 Baltimore Orioles should be a cautionary tale for anyone considering the bullpen by committee route. They started the year with a rotation of Mike Trombley, Buddy Groom, and Mike Timlin. They blew 22 of their first 49 save opportunities. The trio finished the year with 19 total saves and ERAs between 4.12 and 4.89. Finally, rookie Ryan Kohlmeier was given the job. He pitched well (2.39 ERA with 13 saves in 25 games), but fell apart in 2001 (7.30 ERA with 6 saves) and was out of baseball. The problem, as with the Red Sox's original configuration, was that the personnel was not strong enough or deep enough to fill out the entire bullpen and act as the closer as well.

Where To, Buddy (Groom)?

The excessive increase of anything often causes a reaction in the opposite direction.

—Plato "Shrimp"

All of this non-standard use of relievers got me to thinking about the state of relief pitching in 2003. There seemed enough clues to indicate that something related to relief pitcher use was afoot around baseball. With Detroit's all-time low save co-leader (by percentage of team saves), Boston's sharing the saves among ten pitchers, and the White Sox's splitting the closer job among three pitchers there seemed to be a change in the way relievers were used.

The closer role seems to reflect the economy during the current Bush administration. The elite are excelling (e.g., Gagne, Smoltz), the poor are floundering (the Tigers), and the middle class are getting squeezed (Ugueth Urbina, Armando Benitez, Billy Koch) and everyone is looking for a bargain (Rod Beck, Joe Borowski). Maybe I'm overstating the case. How do we know that there's anything more than the normal cyclical changing of the guard for a number of teams' closer role?

Well, here's a table for every year since the save stat became official of the average percentage of the team save leader's save total to the team's total saves, the yearly change in the percentage, and the average save total per "closer":

YrLdr/Tm Sv % ChangeAvg Ldr Sv

Note that greatest dropoff in leader-to-team save percentage was last year, the only year with a greater than 10% decrease. This came after a pretty steady increase following Dennis Eckersley's role redefining season in 1988 (the era that I call the post-modern closer era).

And it’s not as if the Tigers' closer issues skewed the data. There were a number of teams with low percentages:


Another indication that change is afoot is that the standard deviation from the average leader-to-team save percentage shot up to the highest in thirteen years and the second highest in the save era, especially odd since one would expect the standard deviation to drop as the majors expand (because of the additional teams being averaged):

Yr% Std Dev
1969 15.74%
1970 12.09%
1971 16.33%
1972 17.06%
1973 15.65%
1974 19.86%
1975 12.14%
1976 17.79%
1977 15.41%
1978 13.05%
1979 17.65%
1980 15.15%
1981 16.68%
1982 14.93%
1983 18.17%
1984 18.16%
1985 17.92%
1986 15.05%
1987 17.73%
1988 14.52%
1989 12.81%
1990 18.05%
1991 20.98%
1992 17.61%
1993 18.47%
1994 18.48%
1995 17.58%
1996 18.58%
1997 18.94%
1998 17.82%
1999 19.56%
2000 18.33%
2001 17.49%
2002 17.93%
2003 20.35%
Average 16.97%

Here’s one more illustration, expanding a table that I created in the Nineties section. It contains the percent of team save leaders who amassed a certain percentage of the team’s total saves. For example, the 100% column tells you the percentage of all “closers” who registered all of their team’s saves. Note how each bracket is increasing especially into the late Nineties and early 2000s until 2003:


So what's going on? Well, one thing is that teams are dramatically cutting payroll. That makes them question if paying perennially mediocre closers like Ugi Urbina and Bill Koch four million dollars is being fiscally responsible (or if it’s preferable to line the owners’ pockets instead). The impecunious A's seem content to mine for undervalued closers and then let them go when their price tag goes up. They have had four closers in the last five seasons (Billy Taylor, Jason Isringhausen, Koch, and Keith Foulke) and will have a new one in 2004 (Dusty Rhodes?).

I think that with the offenses back in obeyance, managers went back full bore to the tried and true closer role, which is if there is a save opportunity in the ninth, bring out the closer. However, as the media and the fans became more sabermetrically informed, they began questioning a strategy that left supposedly the best closer in the pen in the seventh and eighth when the game may be on the line. Oftentimes, once the ninth inning rolled around the save opportunity had already evaporated. So the cresting wave of one-inning closers broke and fell back this last season.

Another problem was the quality of some of the closers. They too often, like Greg Brady’s Johnny Bravo, merely fit the suit. Jose Mesa in Philly is a perfect example. He had a few years with high save totals and sub-3.00 ERAs, but given his wildness never seemed too secure on the mound. All of that came back to haunt him in his deplorable 2003 season. Again why pay someone four million dollars to come into a 4-1 game in the ninth and then walk the bases full while striking out the side?

So where to next? It seems that 2003 was not a one-season anomaly and rather a shift in reliever usage. Relief pitching strategy seems to change every ten or so years. It’s like they say that there is a war every twenty years or for each generation: baseball’s generations just cycle a bit more quickly. The current usage pattern started with Eckersley’s 1988 and became entrenched around 1990. Perhaps the offensive surge in the mid- to late-Nineties, two rounds of expansion, and/or the expansion of the middle relievers’ roles extended its shelf life.

With just a handful of elite closers, teams seem content to muddle through by jury-rigging the closer role. Indeed, many clubs seem to dissemble and re-assemble a bullpen almost every offseason. That’s what a surfeit of free agent pitchers will do for you.

I may be wrong and Gagne’s big 2003 season may be the clarion call back to the clearly defined, ninth-inning-only closers, but I doubt it.

One thing that would move the process along would be to redefine the outdated save rule by eliminating the automatic three-inning save and the automatic three-run-lead save. They could also make the hold stat official. Why not credit a reliever who holds a lead at an important junction. A hold may be more important to a game than a save, at least under its current configuration. If a closer’s saves and holds were citable in arbitration and free agency cases, then the closers would be more amenable to coming in with a one-run lead in the seventh.

One thing I think will probably not be tried again for some time is the bullpen/closer by committee. Even though the Red Sox never really employed it, they gave the bullpen by committee a bad name. A manager would be vilified in the press and by the fans if he chose to use one any time soon. The preferred method now seems to give a series of relievers the closer role on a trial period. If one succeeds, great, ride him until he fails and then get someone else.

Finally, here are the appearance and saves leaders for the decade so far:

Paul Quantrill3235323
Steve Kline31632316
Scott Sauerbeck3023302
Dave Weathers29712297
Braden Looper29646296
Felix Rodriguez2955295
Scott Sullivan2944294
Mike Remlinger29113291
Tim Worrell28841288
Mike Myers2845284
Keith Foulke281130281
Armando Benitez280138280
Jason Grimsley2782282
Billy Koch276124276
Arthur Rhodes2768276
Ray King2741274
Mike Stanton27411274
Mike DeJean27348273
Todd Jones27356274
Mike Timlin27217273
Jose Mesa272112272
Eddie Guardado271107271
Buddy Groom27018270
La Troy Hawkins26744267
Mike Williams264120264
Mark Guthrie2632263
Matt Herges25911263
Steve Reed2582258
Jose Jimenez258102265
Alan Embree2575257
Byung-Hyun Kim25485267
Jeff Nelson25314253
Antonio Alfonseca25292252
Roberto Hernandez25086250
Octavio Dotel25028270
Mariano Rivera246154246
B.J. Ryan2463246
Gabe White2455245
Dave Veres24449244
Felix Heredia2443244
Rheal Cormier2432243
Dan Plesac2424242
Billy Wagner240124240
Kyle Farnsworth2394244
Ricardo Rincon2373237
Justin Speier23610236
Paul Shuey2333233
Kerry Ligtenberg23214232
Jason Isringhausen231121231
Rick White2316231
Aaron Fultz2312231
Shigetoshi Hasegawa22826228
Kazuhiro Sasaki228129228
Jeff Fassero22615255
Jeff Tam2267226
Juan Acevedo22434224
Steve Karsay22440224
Troy Percival221144221
Armando Almanza2212221
Jim Mecir21910219
Mike Venafro2185218
Robb Nen215129215
Alan Levine21510221
Scott Strickland21420214
Ugueth Urbina210104210
Kelly Wunsch2091209
Pedro Borbon2092209
Jay Powell2057205
Bobby Howry20512205
Turk Wendell2033203
Graeme Lloyd2026202
Trevor Hoffman202124202
Guillermo Mota2011201
Danny Graves20096230
Ben Weber2007200

Mariano Rivera246154246
Troy Percival221144221
Armando Benitez280138280
Keith Foulke281130281
Kazuhiro Sasaki228129228
Robb Nen215129215
Billy Wagner240124240
Billy Koch276124276
Trevor Hoffman202124202
Jason Isringhausen231121231
Mike Williams264120264
Jose Mesa272112272
John Smoltz168110173
Eric Gagne164107207
Eddie Guardado271107271
Ugueth Urbina210104210
Jose Jimenez258102265
Danny Graves20096230
Antonio Alfonseca25292252
Roberto Hernandez25086250
Byung-Hyun Kim25485267
Bob Wickman17582175
Jeff Shaw13770137
Derek Lowe13866206
Jorge Julio14961149
Todd Jones27356274
Dave Veres24449244
Matt Mantei13648136
Mike DeJean27348273
John Rocker15948159
Braden Looper29646296
Kelvim Escobar15844219
La Troy Hawkins26744267
Esteban Yan18642206
Tim Worrell28841288
Steve Karsay22440224
Tom Gordon14739147
Scott Williamson16935179
Rocky Biddle11935151
Joe Borowski14135142
John Wetteland623462
Juan Acevedo22434224
Steve Kline31632316
Danys Baez12931155
Curt Leskanic19631196

Here’s an update for pitchers per role for the Aughts including the 2003 season (RA=Relief Appearances; P/G=Pitchers per game; #P=Number of pitchers in total):



Here’s the breakdown for starters:


Relief pitchers:




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