California is a place in which a boom[er] mentality and a sense of Chekhovian loss meet in uneasy suspension; in which the mind is troubled by some buried but ineradicable suspicion that things had better work here, because here, beneath that immense bleached sky, is where we run out of continent.

—Joan "Bo" Didion

It seems that David Wells' on-again/off-again relationship with the Yankees is off…again. The estimable Post reports that Wells is headed to San Diego for between $1.5 to $1.75 M, eschewing the Yankees offer of a minor-league deal with weight clauses. Word has it that Wells will be paid in donuts by the Padres. The Yankees had refused to do so.

The deal makes no sense for the floundering Padres, who cannot hope to finish any higher than third in 2004, except for the fact that they are moving into a new stadium and perhaps think they can draw a few extra fans with Wells' name.

Wells pitched well in 2003—his adjusted ERA was 6% better than the league average—until bowing out of game five of the World Series in the second inning with a back injury. Wells was made the goat in the Series, but he did pitch well in the postseason (2-1 with a 2.31 ERA in 5 appearances). Wells' season started oddly when he claimed that he was drunk when he pitched his perfect game with the Yankees in 1998 in his apparently intentionally scurrilous autobiography. I guess the bow-out was the perfect way to bookend his season especially after bragging about his lack of a workout regimen the day before. It does seem odd that Wells, who's supposed to be historian of the game and tough competitor, would allow his swan song in the Big Apple be that abbreviated appearance, especially at an age when most players are trying to cozy up to the locals for the post-career career. I guess Wells felt that those bridges had been burnt already or that he didn't want to suffer the indignity of weight clauses, no matter how much he needs them.

Lefty Andy Pettitte also recently signed with Houston. This leaves the Yankees with no left-handed starters for the first time since 1947. Given the short right-field porch, it's always been assumed that a lefty or two is needed in the Yankee rotation.

Witness the following totals for Yankee left-handed pitchers. The totals are represented as a percentage of Yankee pitchers' stats and an ERA % under 100% is good (the opposite of ERA+). Also, I have the averages at the bottom for every season and then split up by the pre-Yankee Stadium era (1903-1922):

Yr	GS	%	GP	%	IP	%	ERA	%
1903	36	26.47%	39	24.07%	283.7	23.61%	3.30	107.16%
1904	3	1.94%	9	4.79%	49.3	3.57%	2.74	106.55%
1905	18	11.84%	33	14.47%	165.0	12.19%	3.55	121.20%
1906	21	13.55%	27	12.11%	167.0	12.30%	3.34	120.30%
1907	24	15.79%	33	15.07%	222.0	16.65%	3.04	100.35%
1908	19	12.26%	32	13.91%	130.0	9.52%	3.12	98.72%
1909	16	10.46%	19	8.76%	121.0	8.96%	3.27	123.69%
1910	30	19.23%	40	18.78%	270.0	19.30%	2.30	88.06%
1911	21	13.73%	34	14.66%	177.3	13.03%	4.47	126.21%
1912	12	7.84%	27	12.68%	110.0	8.24%	4.99	120.97%
1913	23	15.03%	52	20.63%	219.0	16.29%	4.19	128.01%
1914	4	2.55%	6	2.50%	28.3	2.03%	4.76	169.28%
1915	5	3.25%	13	5.91%	62.3	4.51%	2.31	75.51%
1916	44	28.21%	81	31.40%	415.3	29.08%	2.49	89.86%
1917	53	34.19%	93	37.50%	481.0	34.08%	2.90	109.06%
1918	63	50.00%	110	51.40%	628.7	54.32%	2.62	88.19%
1919	43	30.50%	68	29.44%	362.7	28.18%	2.70	95.98%
1920	31	20.13%	58	23.48%	276.3	20.20%	4.23	127.69%
1921	8	5.23%	10	4.02%	61.7	4.52%	4.52	118.43%
1922	0	0.00%	6	2.69%	16.0	1.15%	3.38	99.55%
1923	27	17.76%	35	15.91%	238.3	17.26%	3.13	86.48%
1924	34	22.22%	42	15.85%	288.3	21.21%	3.00	77.63%
1925	35	22.44%	58	20.79%	325.0	23.42%	3.38	77.98%
1926	39	25.16%	82	27.15%	369.7	26.94%	3.43	89.02%
1927	52	33.55%	77	29.17%	420.7	30.27%	3.49	109.00%
1928	39	25.32%	48	18.05%	324.7	23.61%	2.91	77.90%
1929	68	44.16%	128	42.95%	623.7	45.63%	4.06	96.67%
1930	52	33.77%	73	24.01%	405.0	29.61%	5.00	102.40%
1931	61	39.35%	109	37.98%	573.7	40.68%	3.69	87.67%
1932	52	33.33%	81	32.53%	443.7	31.51%	4.34	109.01%
1933	58	38.16%	85	30.91%	465.7	34.38%	3.88	89.00%
1934	43	27.92%	75	28.30%	393.7	28.47%	3.38	90.09%
1935	49	32.89%	69	25.65%	411.3	30.90%	3.54	98.35%
1936	30	19.35%	57	20.80%	238.0	17.00%	4.84	116.04%
1937	44	28.03%	50	19.46%	366.3	26.24%	2.83	77.43%
1938	32	20.38%	33	13.31%	240.0	17.37%	3.34	85.27%
1939	37	24.34%	47	19.18%	314.0	23.28%	3.04	91.79%
1940	29	18.71%	44	15.71%	221.3	16.12%	3.62	93.10%
1941	50	32.05%	51	18.55%	366.0	26.21%	3.37	95.55%
1942	18	11.69%	22	9.05%	125.3	9.12%	3.73	128.49%
1943	16	10.32%	35	13.83%	133.3	9.42%	4.39	149.99%
1944	17	11.04%	41	15.47%	129.3	9.30%	4.45	131.55%
1945	9	5.92%	20	7.87%	102.0	7.53%	2.82	81.75%
1946	26	16.88%	72	23.53%	241.3	17.73%	3.73	118.98%
1947	4	2.58%	61	20.68%	154.7	11.25%	2.44	72.05%
1948	43	27.92%	119	37.66%	468.0	34.27%	3.69	98.47%
1949	60	38.71%	123	39.17%	546.7	39.86%	3.26	88.22%
1950	79	50.97%	144	48.65%	650.7	47.40%	4.00	96.32%
1951	58	37.66%	127	40.71%	533.7	39.04%	3.51	98.48%
1952	49	31.82%	101	34.01%	444.3	32.17%	3.44	109.62%
1953	67	44.37%	118	36.09%	562.3	41.40%	2.98	93.02%
1954	66	42.58%	99	29.38%	513.7	37.24%	3.42	104.73%
1955	81	52.60%	111	32.27%	588.3	42.87%	3.20	98.89%
1956	56	36.36%	120	35.82%	510.7	36.95%	3.17	87.46%
1957	42	27.27%	84	25.23%	387.0	27.74%	2.91	96.92%
1958	42	27.10%	63	18.58%	345.3	25.04%	2.50	77.76%
1959	33	21.29%	68	18.04%	298.7	21.35%	2.83	78.63%
1960	39	25.16%	119	28.47%	353.3	25.27%	3.29	93.48%
1961	59	36.20%	140	38.46%	553.7	38.16%	3.35	96.75%
1962	43	26.54%	161	39.27%	469.3	31.92%	3.22	86.99%
1963	59	36.65%	126	36.95%	547.3	37.77%	2.84	92.52%
1964	78	47.56%	126	33.25%	602.3	39.98%	3.02	95.70%
1965	70	43.21%	137	33.09%	537.3	36.81%	3.15	96.00%
1966	74	46.25%	132	34.11%	581.0	41.04%	3.22	94.38%
1967	82	50.31%	137	33.09%	588.7	39.76%	3.16	97.69%
1968	58	35.37%	112	30.43%	454.7	30.99%	2.89	103.56%
1969	65	40.12%	135	37.40%	568.7	39.47%	3.20	98.98%
1970	64	39.26%	127	31.59%	498.3	33.86%	3.56	109.56%
1971	60	37.04%	108	30.77%	498.7	34.34%	3.72	107.88%
1972	81	52.26%	180	52.48%	691.3	50.34%	3.28	108.12%
1973	50	30.86%	111	36.39%	404.3	28.32%	3.87	115.92%
1974	32	19.75%	140	40.70%	405.0	27.83%	2.53	76.28%
1975	54	33.75%	143	46.58%	509.7	35.79%	3.28	99.94%
1976	34	21.38%	137	43.49%	425.7	29.26%	3.15	98.70%
1977	58	35.80%	143	45.25%	577.7	39.86%	3.24	89.36%
1978	49	30.06%	118	33.62%	479.3	32.82%	2.57	80.91%
1979	77	48.13%	150	39.79%	670.0	46.78%	3.13	81.26%
1980	110	67.90%	170	45.70%	884.7	60.41%	3.34	92.97%
1981	85	79.44%	120	44.78%	600.0	63.29%	3.02	104.12%
1982	109	67.28%	210	50.85%	911.7	62.49%	3.69	92.37%
1983	127	78.40%	152	41.76%	930.3	63.87%	3.78	97.18%
1984	95	58.64%	206	45.88%	772.3	52.71%	4.04	106.53%
1985	57	35.40%	183	42.36%	589.3	40.92%	3.18	86.16%
1986	81	50.00%	253	56.10%	787.7	54.57%	3.86	93.98%
1987	91	56.17%	236	53.64%	757.7	52.39%	4.45	101.40%
1988	83	51.55%	188	40.43%	597.0	41.00%	3.98	93.31%
1989	66	40.99%	215	48.97%	624.3	44.13%	4.37	96.29%
1990	65	40.12%	232	46.03%	605.7	41.92%	4.07	96.25%
1991	37	22.84%	202	37.48%	438.3	30.36%	4.37	98.69%
1992	27	16.67%	130	27.66%	277.0	19.07%	5.07	120.13%
1993	77	47.53%	192	38.87%	634.3	44.10%	3.96	90.63%
1994	75	66.37%	171	48.31%	572.0	56.10%	4.52	103.99%
1995	58	40.00%	122	27.29%	423.7	32.98%	4.63	101.54%
1996	94	58.02%	174	30.37%	624.7	43.38%	4.71	101.32%
1997	89	54.94%	208	39.25%	719.0	48.99%	3.84	99.95%
1998	62	38.27%	180	36.29%	547.3	37.57%	3.95	103.19%
1999	34	20.99%	135	25.91%	306.3	21.28%	4.38	105.30%
2000	49	30.43%	169	31.12%	424.7	29.82%	5.23	110.02%
2001	71	44.10%	190	36.33%	552.0	38.03%	4.47	110.66%
2002	66	40.99%	186	37.58%	557.3	38.38%	3.70	95.15%
2003	65	39.88%	198	37.36%	575.7	39.38%	4.03	100.34%
Avg	49.80	32.01%	105.60	31.79%	427.13	30.69%	3.57	99.71%
Pre-Stadium	23.70	15.68%	39.50	17.53%	212.33	15.75%	3.16	103.00%
Yank Stad	56.25	35.90%	121.93	34.00%	480.17	34.24%	3.61	97.65%

Yankee lefties have fared better than righties in the Yankee Stadium era (3% better ERA). However, the latest Yankee dynasty didn't seem to benefit much from southpaws (5.23 ERA in 2000?).

Given the turnover in the Yankee rotation—just Mike Mussina remains from the 2003 rotation—they have other things to worry about than the lack of left-handers. Such as Kevin Browns' age and history of injury, Jon Leiber's rehabilitation, whether Jose Contreras is a viable major-league starter, etc. It will be odd if Felix Heredia leads all Yankee left-handers in wins next year though.

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OK, when last we left our Hall of Fame study, we saw that the players that retired in the Thirties had a ridiculously better chance of making it to the Hall than any other decade. Also, a general decline in the numbers since then has been the trend. Some of this can be attributed to the fact that we are dealing with a moving target: The Thirties classes have the advantage of being a decade more of voting than the ones from the Forties, etc. However, that doesn't explain why there are so few players from the Twenties retirement classes in the Hall.

I think clearly the bloated offensive numbers in the late Twenties and early Thirties unfairly helped the players that were at their peak during this period and unfairly hurt the players that had the best years before this period. This doesn’t bode well for veterans whose careers cam before the offensive surge of the last decade like Rice, Dawson, and Murphy.

Another phenomenon is the trend for voters to latch onto a candidate early in their eligibility and get him elected. This seemed to start with the retirement classes from the Seventies and has become the norm. It seems to be much more difficult to get in if one doesn't get elected in the first couple of elections.

What I would like to do next is segregate the Hall of Famers by the body that elected them. I will include all of the baseball writers' election in one group and the various veterans' committees in the other. And I am still basing this on retirement class. One could look at the elections over time, but I prefer grouping by retirement class. I want to know what happens to a player who retires at a certain time. If Rollie Fingers had had the longevity of Goose Gossage would he be in the Hall? I think not. If Goose Gossage had retired a few years earlier, would he have gone into the Hall? I believe so. Gary Carter gets in after a bit of a wait but Gil Hodges doesn't.

Next, I will use the writers' eligibility rules over the years to determine how many first-year inducted there were, how many were elected in their first ten years, how many were elected in their last five years, and how many were elected after their first 10 years of eligibility but prior to their last five. Eligibility for those retiring prior to 1936 starts in 1936. I want to determine how the different eras' voters reacted to first-ballot candidates, relatively new candidates, candidates in that middle period, and candidates running out of time (last five years).

I will also look at how the veterans selected players over the years. Did they select players still eligible to the writers? Did the select a lot from one era as opposed to another?

Here are the baseball writers' Hall of Famers:

Decade	1st yr	<=10 yrs	Middle yrs	Last 5 yrs	Total
1870s
1880s
1890s
1900s
1910s	2	3			5
1920s	2	1			3
1930s	1	6	6		13
1940s	0	11	2	2	15
1950s	2	1	2	3	8
1960s	4	6	1	1	12
1970s	9	3	3		15
1980s	11	5	1		17
1990s	7	1	1		9
2000s					0
	38	37	16	6	97

Notice that the first-year candidates have taken hold since the Seventies, but that aside from the disdain for Fifties retirees, the writers had selected between 13 and 17 players from the Forties to the Eighties retirees. Some Nineties retirees are still not eligible, so the jury's still out for them. I also found it interesting that only one player in recent memory (Duke Snider in 1980) has been elected in his last five years of eligibility.

It seems that the expectation is that Hall-worthy players go in quickly or not at all. That doesn't bode well for Bert Blyleven.

Now here are the veterans' selections (eligible players only):

Decade	<=cutoff	>cutoff	Total
1870s	0	0	0
1880s	0	0	0
1890s	5	7	12
1900s	10	5	15
1910s	11	2	13
1920s	6	4	10
1930s	1	20	21
1940s	0	8	8
1950s	0	8	8
1960s	0	3	3
1970s	0	3	3
1980s	0	0	0
1990s	0	0	0
2000s	0	0	0
Total	33	60	93

(Note: Remember Addie Joss, who never played 10 seasons, is not part of this study. However, he would fall in the 1910s decade in the greater than cutoff column.)

So not only do the vets love the Thirties retirees, they haven't been too supportive of the players since.

To be continued…

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…And die of nothing but a rage to live.

—Alexander "The" Pope

The Phillies have had one golden period in their 121-year history. It stretched from the mid-Seventies to the mid-Eighties and covered the team's only World Series victory, two of its five World Series appearances, its only 100-win seasons, and six of its nine postseason appearances. It was also a time that witnessed the team's greatest position player (Mike Schmidt) and arguably its best pitcher (Steve Carlton—Pete Alexander played only seven seasons in Philly).

And yet there was one man who loomed over the period for the Phils. No, I don't mean Danny "Half this game is ninety percent mental" Ozark. I mean, of course, Paul "The Pope" Owens. Owens passed away this weekend at the age of 79.

As the Phils' farm director in the early Seventies, he oversaw the development of the core of the great Phillies teams of that era: Mike Schmidt, Greg Luzinski, Bob Boone, Larry Bowa, Dick Ruthven, and Larry Christenson .As GM of the Phillies, Owens brought Pete Rose, Garry Maddox, Bake McBride, Joe Morgan, Manny Trillo, Jim Kaat, Tug McGraw, Jim Lonborg, John Denny, and Al Holland.

Everyone remembers that he relieved Pat Corrales of the manager job in 1983 with the Phils in first. But no one seems to remember that they were just one game over .500 at the time and had just lost 17 of their last 324, and that under Owens the Phils recorded a .610 winning percentage en route to their second World Series appearance in four years.

Legend has it that Owens got a bit tipsy at the 1974 winter meetings and traded Boone and Christenson to Detroit for Bill Freehan and Jim Northrup. The next day he couldn't remember a thing about the trade much to the chagrin of Tiger GM Jim Campbell.

Owens started to lose his legendary GM magic soon after the Phils' first World Series victory in 1980. First, he traded Larry Bowa and then-youngster Ryne Sandberg to the Cubs for Ivan DeJesus. DeJesus was supposed to be Bowa's replacement at short. He was supposedly seven years younger than Bowa, but given his rapid decline and the dubious birth dates of Latin players of that era, the difference was probably much less. Whatever the reason, both DeJesus and Bowa lost their starting shortstop gigs after the 1984 season, the year that Sandberg won the NL MVP award. DeJesus also had a very poor performance in the '83 Series, committing an error that allowed the winning run in game three. DeJesus was probably selected because of his friendship and experience with then Phils' second baseman Manny Trillo. But throwing in Sandberg was at best ill-advised and at worst disastrous for a rapidly aging club (Trillo was 31 in 1982 and had just come off a season in which he missed almost 70 games). By the way, the Cubs became a Phils Midwest in the Eighties, acquiring any and every ex-Phil player apparently in attempt to duplicate the success of the Sandberg trade.

Next, was the infamous 5-for-1 trade brought newly appointed team savior Von Hayes from the Indians for Julio Franco, Trillo, George Vukovich, Jerry Willard, and Jay Baller, all of whom played for some time in the majors. Now, Hayes became a good, if not great, player for the Phils and of the players traded only Julio Franco had much of a career ahead of him. Trillo kicked around for another six seasons though he played only 83 games in Cleveland. Willard started one season at catcher and then became a journeyman for a handful more. Vukovich was the starting right fielder in Cleveland for a few years and had a good season in 1984 but quickly vanished form the scene. Baller was nothing more than a journeyman reliever. Franco, of course, is still playing at the age of 85. He will play first for the Braves until he decomposes into a mound of dust. He's also collected 2358 hits and 155 homers—not bad for a guy who came up as a shortstop.

Hayes never shook the "Five-for-one" tag even though he had many quality seasons in Philly. I guess his poor 1983 campaign set the tone. He did give the Phils seven solid to very good seasons thereafter however.

The "savior" tag didn't help either nor was it fair. Looking back at his early stats, there's no reason to think that Hayes would have been any better than he turned out to be—actually I'm surprised he was as good as he was. Despite his five-tool-edness, Hayes didn't draw too many walks as a youngster (42 walks and .310 OBP as a rookie n 1982) and didn't slug a ton (.389 in 1982). Although he had good speed, he was often caught stealing (20 stolen bases and 12 caught stealing in 1983, 32 and 13 in 1982) and grounded into a bunch of doubleplays (at least 10 a year for five of the six seasons from 1982 to 1987), doubly odd because he was a left-handed bat. Anyway, I would have doubted that he would never have received 100 walks in a season as he did twice (1987 and '89) nor had an OBP over .400 (1987).

In the final assessment, Hayes though a good player was never the franchise player that he was expected to be and the amount of young talent given up to get him was excessive. This was of course, pre-Moneyball GM'ing.

Lastly, Owens tenure as manager in 1983-84 was when the crest broke for the Phils' "Golden Age". The '83 club dubbed the "Wheeze Kids" was stocked with aging players. The 1984 club passed the baton to younger players like Hayes, Juan Samuel, Lenny Matuszek, Glenn-Bo Wilson, Ozzie Virgil, Marty Bystrom, Kevin Gross, and Charlie Hudson. Other youngsters like Don Carman, Rick Schu, Jeff Stone, John Russell, Steve Jeltz, and Mike LaValliere waited in the wings. It was the same formula that used to great success a decade earlier, they just didn't have the right players. They also didn't have Owens building the minor-league system to feed the right players.

Whatever the reason, that team ended up 81-81. Owens stepped down, turned the manager's job over to John Felske, and returned to the front office though not as GM. Aside from the lightning-in-a-bottle season of 1993, the Phils haven't been much more than a mediocre team ever since, and they have been for worse than that at times. Owens' passing comes as the Phils prepare to move into a new stadium and as they build a team that will probably be favored to win the NL East in 2004. It's too bad Owens won't be a part of it.

---

The Montreal Expos signed third baseman Tony Batista a few days ago. Now, the 'Spos do not have the funds to keep any of their decent younger players like Vlad Guerrero and Javier Vazquez, but GM Omar "Oh My!" Minaya can spend reportedly $1.5 M on a 30-year-old whose adjusted OPS was 76% of the league average last season.

Quoth Omar the Magnificent:

"We have added a much-needed right-handed bat to our lineup with the addition of Tony Batista. Tony's presence also provides us with a veteran glove at third base, and his right-handed bat adds balance to our lineup."

The AP article on the signing states that Montreal "added some much needed power to their lineup" and mentions that Batista has averaged 31 home runs over the last five seasons. Batista had decent pop a few years ago (slugged .518 or .519 from 1998 to 2000), but his .393 slugging average last season was 18th among the 19 third baseman who qualified for the batting title (Edgardo Alfonzo was last at .391).

It's true that Batista still can hit his share of home runs, but given that his average has not been over .245 since 2000 and that his on-base percentage has not been over .310 since 1999, they're not enough. As for his "veteran glove" at third, a) Batitsa has only been a third baseman for about three and one-half seasons. Prior to that he was a shortstop. And b) Batista's range at third has never been anything to write home about. Last year his range was well below average (his range factor was 2.53 as compared to 2.67 for the average Al third baseman).

Batista is a player rapidly losing his skills as well. His defense fell of severely last season, along with his OBP (.270, .32 points below his poor career average). His slugging average was the lowest since he was a 23-year-old role player, as was his batting average. He walked 26 times in 670 plate appearances. His performance was not that much worse than his career averages, but it was lower in just about every facet of his game.

And we are not talking about Mike Schmidt here. Batista's career-high adjusted OPS for a full season is just 12% better than the league average and that was over four years ago. Since then he has been 3% better than average, 14% worse, 2% better, and 24% worse last year. Batista's game started to erode with the inability to draw a walk probably due to his ridiculous batting stance. And a move from short to third meant that his power was marginalized.

The 'Spos can hope that 2002 was just an off year and he bounces back to being an average offensive third baseman, but given his age and his salary isn't it a bad bet? There aren't great options on the free agent market, but Shane Halter, Greg Norton, and 2003 Expo Todd Zeile are probably not much worse than Batitsta and can be had for a song. Or why not hand the job to Triple-A third sacker Scott Hodges and save a million or so? He is basically Batista minus a few homers and a few years.

Oh, but I forgot that Minaya is a genius so of course, it'll all work out as well as the man he is replacing at third, Fernando Tatis. OK, that wasn't Minaya's fault, but acquiring Hernandez brothers' salaries sure was and those helped the Expos wave bye-bye to Guerrero and Vazquez but allowed them to sign Batista. That’s how these Expos tick.

---

The best laid schemes o’ mice and men Gang aft agley;

An’ lea’e us nought but grief an’ pain, For promis’d joy!

— "Sleepy" Robert Burns

I started this Hall of Fame analysis last week but found that the data in the source that I use and my interpretation of the data were problematic. I used the new historical data on the Hall's website to update the data. I also had to change my analysis to account for past voting peculiarities.

First, the five-year waiting period was not imposed to relatively recently. In the past, even active players received Hall of Fame votes. I still will be evaluating players by retirement classes, but it complicates things a bit.

Second, from the Forties to the Sixties the baseball writers would skip one or two years between Hall votes.

Third, in 1946, 1949, 1964, and 1967 the writers used a two-phase system. First all players were voted on and then a certain number of the highest vote getters would be voted on again in the second round.

In 1946, the top twenty candidates in the "Nominating Ballot" still needed 75% in the "Final Ballot" to gain entrance. No one did—Frank Chance was the top vote getter at 57% even though, or maybe because, just about everyone in the final twenty would eventually be elected to the Hall. In 1949, again the top 20 from the "First Ballot" were on the "Run-off Ballot". This time, the top vote getter was guaranteed admittance. Charlie Gehringer and his 85.03% of the vote ended up not needing the safety net. In 1964, the top 30 on the "First Ballot" went on the "Run-off Ballot". This time two players topped 75%, but only one, the top vote getter, Luke Appling (at 84%), was enshrined. Red Ruffing and his 81.78% would have to wait. The procedures were the same for the 1967 election, and this time Ruffing (86.93%) did get in, but Ducky Joe Medwick (81.05 %) would have to wait to get his plaque until the next year's election.

The Hall recognizes only the vote in the final round in each of the cases above, even though in the first round Gehringer received only 66.67%, Appling 70.64%, and Ruffing 72.60%. While neither the first or second round can be said to truly represent the voters' view of the player, I thought that taking an average of the two would do best.

Here are the updated percentages for all Hall inductees based on average voting percentage for the year they were elected. Note that they are all still over 75%:

Yr	Name	Voting PCT
1992	Tom Seaver	98.84%
1999	Nolan Ryan	98.79%
1936	Ty Cobb	98.23%
1999	George Brett	98.19%
1982	Hank Aaron	97.83%
1995	Mike Schmidt	96.52%
1989	Johnny Bench	96.42%
1994	Steve Carlton	95.82%
1936	Babe Ruth	95.13%
1979	Willie Mays	94.68%
1989	Carl Yastrzemski	94.63%
1962	Bob Feller	93.75%
1993	Reggie Jackson	93.62%
1966	Ted Williams	93.38%
1969	Stan Musial	93.24%
1990	Jim Palmer	92.57%
1983	Brooks Robinson	91.98%
2002	Ozzie Smith	91.74%
1936	Christy Mathewson	90.71%
1991	Rod Carew	90.52%
1982	Frank Robinson	89.16%
1955	Joe DiMaggio	88.84%
1980	Al Kaline	88.31%
1974	Mickey Mantle	88.22%
1951	Mel Ott	87.17%
1947	Carl Hubbell	86.96%
1972	Sandy Koufax	86.87%
1976	Robin Roberts	86.86%
1952	Harry Heilmann	86.75%
1980	Duke Snider	86.49%
1955	Ted Lyons	86.45%
1939	George Sisler	85.77%
1987	Billy Williams	85.71%
1972	Yogi Berra	85.61%
2003	Eddie Murray	85.28%
1956	Hank Greenberg	84.97%
1968	Joe Medwick	84.81%
1984	Luis Aparicio	84.62%
1947	Frankie Frisch	84.47%
2001	Dave Winfield	84.47%
1981	Bob Gibson	84.04%
1977	Ernie Banks	83.81%
1985	Hoyt Wilhelm	83.80%
1983	Juan Marichal	83.69%
1936	Honus Wagner	83.63%
1936	Walter Johnson	83.63%
1937	Nap Lajoie	83.58%
1952	Paul Waner	83.33%
1973	Warren Spahn	83.16%
1984	Harmon Killebrew	83.13%
1954	Rabbit Maranville	82.94%
1988	Willie Stargell	82.44%
1964	Luke Appling	82.34%
2001	Kirby Puckett	82.14%
1937	Tris Speaker	82.09%
1990	Joe Morgan	81.76%
1955	Dazzy Vance	81.67%
1998	Don Sutton	81.61%
1986	Willie McCovey	81.41%
1992	Rollie Fingers	81.16%
1938	Pete Alexander	80.92%
1997	Phil Niekro	80.34%
1954	Bill Dickey	80.16%
1967	Red Ruffing	79.77%
1985	Lou Brock	79.75%
2000	Carlton Fisk	79.56%
1947	Mickey Cochrane	79.50%
1978	Eddie Mathews	79.42%
1969	Roy Campanella	79.41%
1951	Jimmie Foxx	79.20%
1953	Dizzy Dean	79.17%
1956	Joe Cronin	78.76%
1976	Bob Lemon	78.61%
1984	Don Drysdale	78.41%
1942	Rogers Hornsby	78.11%
2003	Gary Carter	78.02%
1974	Whitey Ford	77.81%
1939	Eddie Collins	77.74%
1955	Gabby Hartnett	77.69%
1948	Herb Pennock	77.69%
1962	Jackie Robinson	77.50%
1999	Robin Yount	77.46%
1954	Bill Terry	77.38%
1970	Lou Boudreau	77.33%
1991	Gaylord Perry	77.20%
2000	Tony Perez	77.15%
1948	Pie Traynor	76.86%
1947	Lefty Grove	76.40%
1987	Catfish Hunter	76.27%
1937	Cy Young	76.12%
1972	Early Wynn	76.01%
1949	Charlie Gehringer	75.85%
1939	Willie Keeler	75.55%
1975	Ralph Kiner	75.41%
1991	Fergie Jenkins	75.40%
1953	Al Simmons	75.38%

Finally, only 96 players have been voted into the Hall. The rest were selected by various veteran committees, none of who revealed their methods or madnesses to the public directly. That is, until the procedures were changed last year. So there are voting results from the Veterans' Committee for 2003 but none from any other year. Even with this anomaly I decided to keep the data in because I love numbers.

Anyway, without further ado here is the revamped version…

“Rudy, You’re like school on Saturday…no class.”

—Russell from the Fat Albert show.

I was recently reviewing this year’s Hall of Fame class and attempted to handicap each candidate’s probability of being elected. That got me to thinking about what it means to be elected to the Hall at any given time.

Is it easier to get in on the first ballot today or not? To get in within the 20 years, when his candidacy on the writers’ ballot expires and he must pass to the Veterans’ Committee? Is it easier to get in within the first five years of a player’s candidacy or the last five? Is someone more likely to get elected after, say, 10 years on the writers’ ballot or after going on the veterans’ ballot?

First, I took a look at the length of time it took a player from a given era to get into the Hall. Here are the ground rules: First, a player must have been active in the majors for at least ten years. That eliminates Addie Joss, for whom they bent the rules, as well as Monte Irvin and Satchell Paige, who were elected largely for their play in the Negro Leagues. Second, the player must have gone in as a player, not a manager, executive, or any other capacity.

One other complication is waiting period. Today, an eligible candidate must wait five full seasons after retirement to be considered. It turns into 6 years because of the timing of the voting. Paul Molitor retired in 1998 but has just become eligible for the 2004 election. Also, only players active in the previous 20 years are eligible. Therefore, there is a 15-year window.

This was not always the case, however. Originally, anyone was eligible, including active players. Active players Lou Gehrig, Dizzy Dean, Jimmy Foxx, Frankie Frisch, Al Simmons, Lefty Grove, Gabby Hartnet, Pie Trayunor, Rogers Hornsby, and Mickey Cochrane all received votes in the first election. Babe Ruth was elected after one year of retirement. This wasn't a Minnie Minoso or Jose Rijo-type comback (both of whom received Hall of Fame votes after the five-year waiting period and then went on to play major-league baseball again). These players were still in their primes. Even though the five-year wait was instituted in 1954 , Warren Spahn received one vote in 1958. That year he won 22 games; he would go on to win 20 four more times. He is, however, still considered a first-ballot Hall of Famer, becoming be-plaqued in 1973 in the first election after his five-year wait period was up.

By the way, Joe DiMaggio was elected to the Hall in 1955, just four years after his retirement. However, he had been exempted from the waiting period. When the rule was implemented, players who had received at least 100 votes in the 1953 election were spared. DiMaggio was the sole beneficiary, the Burleigh Grimes as it were, of the 5-year rule.

Between 1946 and 1953 one-year waiting period had been the rule, yet players would still receive votes in the year in which they retired. This was the case for Bill Dickey and Ted Lyons in 1946, Dizzy Dean in 1947, in Ducky Joe Medwick in 1948, and Bucky Walters in 1950. Also, Satchel Paige received a vote in 1951 when he was still pitching for the Browns. This was the only vote he ever received in the baseball writers election.

Prior to 1946, there was no specified waiting period. The custom of voting for active players died out after the second election in 1937 (Bill Cissell—huh?—was the only active player to receive a vote in 1937). But it did have a comeback during World War II, when it was difficult to determine the playing status of players in the military and when some retired players returned to the majors. Thus, Joe DiMaggio, Pepper Martin, Babe Herman, Joe Gordon, Dizzy Dean, John Vander Meer, Hank Greenberg, Ted Lyons, and Bill Dickey all received votes during the war and then returned to action in the majors.

At the end of the eligibility spectrum, the cutoff year, which is now 20 years, has changed over the years as well. No cutoff was specified initially, making it more difficult to focus on worthy more recent players. In 1946, a cutoff of 25 years was implemented. That became 30 years in 1956, and then the current 20 in 1963.

This rule has not been enforced very stringently even as recently as five years ago. Ron Santo was allowed to stay on the ballot until 1998 even though he retired in 1998. Apparently, he remained eligible for fifteen elections not 15 years. He first went on the ballot in 1980, but did not received any votes (?) from 1981-84. The original 25-year cutoff was ignored each year from 1946 to 1955. During this period 139 players who has been retired for over 25 years received votes from the writers. 64 of these players had been retired for at least 30 years. The topper was Bill Lange, who received one vote in 1953 even though he had retired 54 years earlier (and played just 7 seasons).

It seems that the thirty-year cutoff was a bone thrown to the writers to avoid such choices as Lange. The writers did seem to follow this rule more closely, though they still couldn't refuse some candidates: Ray Schalk (1 vote in 1956 after 35 years of retirement), Fielder Jones (retired 47 years), Addie Joss (retired 50 years), Heine Groh (retired 50 years), Hans Lobert (retired 43 years).

Since implementing a 20-year cutoff, the writers have bent the rules for more players than just Santo. Curt Flood stayed on the ballot for 25 years after retirement, Vada Pinson 21, Ken Boyer 25, Harvey Kuenn 25, Roy Face 21, Don Lasen 21, and Augie Galan 21.

Anyway, everyone knows that Lou Gehrig and Roberto Clemente went into the Hall in their final year as a major-leaguer via special elections after they were befell by tragedy. But aside from those two, Babe Ruth, Cal Hubbell, Mel Ott, Joe DiMaggio, and Rogers Hornsby all sat for their plaque before the now-required five-year waiting period had completed. In the Thirties, Cy Young, Nap Lajoie, and Wee Willie Keeler were all enshrined well after the now-standard 20-year cutoff date.
So all of this muddies the picture a bit. It's difficult to set analysis based on nebulous eligibility ranges. I will have to take the ranges as they were established and work from there. The ranges are:

Election Yrs   Eligibility Range

1936-45        Open

1946-53        1-25 yrs

1954-55        5-25 yrs

1956-62        5-30 yrs

1963-present   5-20 yrs

Next, we shall see if the changes to ranges affected any changes in the voting over the years. I categorized players by decade in which they retired. I then banded the number of years the player had to wait: first year, by the tenth year, 11-15, 16-20, 21-25, 26-50, and greater than 50.

Ok, so here are the percentages of players elected to the Hall by retirement decade and the number of years they had to wait:

Final Yr	<7 yrs	Eligible	%	7-10 yrs	Eligible	%	11-15 yrs	Eligible	%
1870s			0.00%			0.00%			0.00%
1880s		31	0.00%		31	0.00%		31	0.00%
1890s		102	0.00%	4	102	3.92%	1	102	1.02%
1900s		94	0.00%	5	94	5.32%	4	94	4.49%
1910s	2	125	1.60%	6	125	4.88%	6	125	5.13%
1920s	2	157	1.27%	1	157	0.65%	1	157	0.65%
1930s	3	173	1.73%	5	173	2.94%	2	173	1.21%
1940s	5	187	2.67%	6	187	3.30%	2	187	1.14%
1950s	3	176	1.70%		176	0.00%	2	176	1.16%
1960s	4	228	1.75%	6	228	2.68%	1	228	0.46%
1970s	9	292	3.08%	3	292	1.06%	3	292	1.07%
1980s	11	384	2.86%	5	384	1.34%	1	384	0.27%
1990s	7	313	2.24%	2	280	0.73%		80	0.00%
2000s			0.00%			0.00%			0.00%
	46	2262	2.03%	43	2229	1.97%	23	2029	1.16%

Final Yr	16-20 yrs	Eligible	%	21-25 yrs	Eligible	%	26-50 yrs	Eligible	%
1870s			0.00%			0.00%			0.00%
1880s		31	0.00%		31	0.00%		31	0.00%
1890s		102	0.00%		102	0.00%	6	102	6.19%
1900s		94	0.00%		94	0.00%	5	94	5.88%
1910s	1	125	0.90%	1	125	0.91%	1	125	0.92%
1920s	3	157	1.96%	1	157	0.67%	5	157	3.36%
1930s	4	173	2.45%	1	173	0.63%	18	173	11.39%
1940s	2	187	1.15%	1	187	0.58%	7	187	4.09%
1950s	3	176	1.75%		176	0.00%	8	176	4.76%
1960s	1	228	0.46%		228	0.00%	3	228	1.39%
1970s		292	0.00%	2	292	0.72%	1	292	0.36%
1980s		264	0.00%		53	0.00%		53	0.00%
1990s		0	0.00%		0	0.00%		0	0.00%
2000s		0	0.00%		0	0.00%		0	0.00%
	14	1829	0.82%	6	1618	0.40%	54	1618	3.63%

Final Yr	50+ yrs	Eligible	%	Total HoF	Eligible	%	Total players	%
1870s			0.00%	0	0	0.00%	295	0.00%
1880s		31	0.00%	0	31	0.00%	731	0.00%
1890s	1	102	1.10%	12	102	11.76%	886	1.35%
1900s	1	94	1.25%	15	94	15.96%	927	1.62%
1910s	1	125	0.93%	18	125	14.40%	1511	1.19%
1920s		157	0.00%	13	157	8.28%	1209	1.08%
1930s	1	173	0.71%	34	173	19.65%	970	3.51%
1940s		187	0.00%	23	187	12.30%	1213	1.90%
1950s		27	0.00%	16	176	9.09%	1028	1.56%
1960s		0	0.00%	15	228	6.58%	1019	1.47%
1970s		0	0.00%	18	292	6.16%	1260	1.43%
1980s		0	0.00%	17	384	4.43%	1355	1.25%
1990s		0	0.00%	9	313	2.88%	1678	0.54%
2000s		0	0.00%	0	0	0.00%	1734	0.00%
	4	896	0.56%	190	2262	8.40%	15816	1.20%

To be continued…

---

Bud Selig ended the A-Rod-for-Manny trade talks today, probably realizing that approving deal after the players' union rejected it was an untenable position.

Even Rodriguez himself was rapidly backpedalling away from the position:

"In the spirit of cooperation, I advised the Red Sox I am willing to restructure my contract, but only within the guidelines prescribed by union officials," Rodriguez said Thursday in a statement he read to The Associated Press. "I recognize the principle involved, and fully support the need to protect the interests of my fellow players.

"If my transfer to the Red Sox is to occur, it must be done with consideration of the interests of all major league players, not just one. Any statements by club officials suggesting my position is different than stated is inaccurate and unfortunate."

So A-Rod languishes another year (apparently) with a Ranger club that is all but eliminated from the postseason already. The Red Sox either have to find a way to package Ramirez and/or Nomar Garciaparra, both of whom were tabbed to play elsewhere in 2004, or find a way to play with the now-disgruntled superstars on the roster.

It's a step back for both teams. That may not be a big deal for Texas, a team already in retrograde, but this puts a big crimp in Boston's offseason improvement plan. It's not as if flipping the second-best shortstop in baseball in order to get the best while dumping another player, who happens to be one of the best in the game, would have improved Boston. But now the Red Sox have to deal with the repurcussions while filling some gapping holes (or start Lou Merloni at second).

I can't decide if the clubs will take a PR hit over the mess. It seems like the Red Sox conspiracy theory fans will point a finger elsewhere. Ranger fans will be busily mulling over who exactly this Mr. Rod fellow is while watching their 'Boys (thank God) rapidly fade into the sunset and preparing for an exciting season of NASCAR. The players' union will apparently bear the brunt of the blame for doing their job and upholding an agreement that baseball seems to have forgotten it signed with the union a little over a year ago.

---

With windlasses and with assays of bias,
By indirections find directions out.

— William “Author” Shakespeare via “Luis” Polonius, Hamlet

What is it with Bud Selig and the Red Sox? On the day that we find out that Bud is still exploiting his conflict of interest in Milwaukee, the commissioner, and I use the term loosely, is willing to endorse the Alex Rodriguez-Manny Ramirez trade even though the players’ union has rejected the changes made to Rodriguez’s contract.

MLB’s legal mouthpiece, Rob Manfred, and I use the term loosely, had this to say:

"The basic agreement contains a rule that requires any special covenant to be an actual or potential benefit to the player. In a situation like the current situation, where there was a restructuring, where the player was getting something and the club was getting something, Gene Orza [of the players’ union] is not the final arbitrator on whether the restructuring provides an actual or potential benefit to the player. The commissioner currently is considering his legal options in consultation with the two teams."

Larry Lucchino said that the players’ union the proposed "radical changes" and that "It is a sad day when the players' association thwarts the will of its members." This is the same man who called the Yankees the “Evil Empire”. He does have a gift for the polemic. I’m surprised the Republicans haven’t scooped him up yet.
Well, let’s take a looky-look at the Collective Bargaining Agreement to see what it actually says on the matter.
Under “Schedule A—Uniform Player’s Contract”, there is a section called “Payment”. It states:

Nothing herein shall interfere with the right of the Club and the Player by special covenant herein to mutually agree upon a method of payment whereby part of the Player’s salary for the above year can be deferred to subsequent years.

So maybe Lucchino is right and Orza is overstepping his bounds.

However, later on there’s this section:

No Salary Reduction
6.(c) The amount stated in paragraph 2 [i.e., Payment] and in special covenants hereof which is payable to the Player for the period stated in paragraph 1 hereof shall not be diminished by any such assignment, except for failure to report as provided in the next subparagraph (d).

It seems pretty clear-cut to me. As long as A-Rod reports to the Red Sox, which apparently he had every intention of doing, then his salary cannot be reduced. It can be deferred but not reduced.

It’s difficult to say exactly who is in the right here because the terms have not been disclosed. However, Bud Selig is toying with endorsing the trade even though the players’ union would likely file a grievance, thereby sending it to an arbitrator.

This would be the second time that Bud bent the rules to accommodate this trade. The first was allowing the Red Sox to talk to Rodriguez without a trade in place.

I just have to ask what is it that causes Bud to be so partisan when it comes to the Red Sox. I know that Bud, as a young, unctuous used car salesman in Milwukee, was upset when his beloved Braves moved from Milwaukee and that later spurred him to wrest the Brewers from Seattle. Maybe when he harkens back to the Braves moving, it’s not the move from Milwaukee that so aggrieves him but rather the move from Boston some 13 years earlier.

Perhaps he feels that he has to give back to the Beantown community in the form of Cliff Floyd, Kevin Millar-san, extensions to finalize the Curt Schilling deal, the gentle nudge to ensure that the Red Sox acquire the best shortstop in the game since the second-best one was sticking up the field, and a partridge in a pear tree.

Either that or John Henry has a Paris Hilton video starring Bud. Take your pick.

---

ESPN reports that the players' union has rejected the changes that the Red Sox made to Alex Rodriguez's contract in their deal to acquire him from the Rangers.

This doesn't completely euthanize the deal, but it certainly disconnects the life supports.

---

Two notes of interest:

1) The Cub Reporter interviews Dave Kaval, founder of the Golden Baseball
League, where Rickey Henderson will be languishing next year.

2) The Baseball Crank has a thorough comparison between Pete "Don't Call Me Grover Cleveland" Alexander and Bob "Don't Call Me Pack" Gibson. I won't tell you his conclusions, but let's just say that Tim McCarver wouldn't be pleased. That's a good thing.

---

It seldom happens that any felicity comes so pure as not to be tempered and allayed by some mixture of sorrow.

--Miguel "Miggy" de Cervantes

The O's owner Peter Angelos is again in the spending mood. Since getting burned on the Albert Belle signing in 1998, aside from an odd David Segui or Marty Cordova, Baltimore has shied away from big name signees. Well, not this year.

They signed Miguel Tejada the other day and are looking to snare Vladimir Guerrero and Pudge Rodriguez. The sad thing is that even with that much talent the Orioles may still be just the fourth best team in their own division. Well, at least they've abandoned the strategy of just employing sons of famous ballplayers (Gary Matthews Jr., Tim Raines Jr., Jerry Hairston Jr., and David Segui). Maybe they were just looking for the next Cal Ripken Jr.

Tejada will be a big upgrade from last year's starter, the execrable Deivi Cruz, and is in line with Baltimore's shortstop tradition from Hughie "Ee-yah" Jennings to Luis Apiricio to Mark Belanger to Cal "Don't Call Me Billy" Ripken. However, did the O's really need to give him six years and $72 M dollars?

Even if you believe the birth date proffered by Tejada, he will be 28 next season and 34 when the contract ends. Given that the contract is reportedly as back-ended as J-Lo after a chocolate binge, there is very little reason to believe that Tejada will be worth anywhere near that much when year six, the 2009 season, rolls around.

Rob Neyer argues that Tejada has been worth (in Win Shares) as much as Jeter and Garciaparra over the last three years. Well, that's all good an well, but a) that includes a career year for Tejada (in 2002, the only year his OPS+ was over 120, his slugging was over .480, and his OBP was over .350) and b) who's to say that Jeter and Garciaparra will be worth those deals by the time they end (assuming Nomah gets the money and contract length that have been bandied about by Neyer and others).

I would also argue that Garciaparra has been a better batter each of the last three years, including Tejada's MVP year, based on adjusted OPS. Tejada gets a big boost from defensive Win Shares, which are still somewhat speculative (ask Jimmy Rollins). Also, remember that Tejada salvaged his fine 2003 campaign with a big second half (.924 OPS) after a horrific start to the season (.725 OPS, .298 OBP, .245 batting average).

One could argue that Tejada's numbers even looked good in pitching-friendly Oakland. Take a look at his road stats and he looks A-Rod-ian: .304 batting average, .361 on-base percentage, .499 slugging, and .860 OPS over te last three seasons on the road. However, note that his homers dip on the road: 43 as opposed to 49 at home over the last three years (in 26 more at-bats).

Look, I think Tejada will have a fine season in 2004. He'll probably be a one of the better shortstops in the AL for the next few seasons.

However, to think he'll be worth $12+ M in 2009 seems an extremely poor gamble to me. The problem for me isn't not how he stacks up to Jeter and Garciaparra, but rather how he stacks up against Rich Aurilia, Vern Stephens, and Travis Fryman. Jeter and Garciaparra are on-base machines though they have punch as well. Tejada of the .331 OBP even with the fine pop is not really comparable to the "Big Three".

Tejada's most similar batters among shortstops are Rich Aurilia, John Valentin, Glenn Wright, Jose Hernandez, Alex Gonzalez, and Jose Valentin. Through age 27, the most similar are: Vern Stephens, Travis Fryman, Cal Ripken Jr., Rico Petrocelli, and Travis Jackson.

Of those, Aurilia has been sub-par (according to OPS+) since turning 29, John Valentin after turning 30, Wright after 30, Gonzalez since 26, Hernandez has been sub-par after age 28 except for a career year at 32. Stephens was about average after age 30 but lost significant playing time. Fryman move from short to third after age 25 and (aside from two fluke seasons at age 29 and 31) was not the same player. Ripken, though a sure first-ballot Hall of Famer, aside from a fluke season at age 38 (as a third baseman and playing only 85 games) was not the same player after turning 30. Petralli was washed up by 31 and had long been a third baseman by then. Jackson had a severe dropoff after age 27, though he did enjoy a fine season at age 31.

Jose Valentin is the odd-ball improving after age 30, but he also has played most of his time at third base as well.

Here is a list of all of the shortstops who have hit 20 homers, their age, and the on-base percentage. Note that only 15 of the 99 on the list are older than 30:

First	Last	Yr	HR	Age	OBP
Travis	Jackson	1929	21	25	.367
Glenn	Wright	1930	22	29	.360
Joe	Cronin	1940	24	33	.380
Vern	Stephens	1943	22	22	.357
Vern	Stephens	1944	20	23	.365
Vern	Stephens	1945	24	24	.352
Vern	Stephens	1948	29	27	.350
Eddie	Joost	1949	23	33	.429
Vern	Stephens	1949	39	28	.391
Vern	Stephens	1950	30	29	.361
Roy	Smalley	1950	21	24	.297
Eddie	Joost	1952	20	36	.388
Alvin	Dark	1953	23	31	.335
Alvin	Dark	1954	20	32	.325
Ernie	Banks	1955	44	24	.345
Ernie	Banks	1956	28	25	.358
Ernie	Banks	1957	43	26	.360
Ernie	Banks	1958	47	27	.366
Ernie	Banks	1959	45	28	.374
Woodie	Held	1959	29	27	.313
Ernie	Banks	1960	41	29	.350
Woodie	Held	1960	21	28	.342
Ron	Hansen	1960	22	22	.342
Ernie	Banks	1961	29	30	.346
Woodie	Held	1961	23	29	.354
Chico	Fernandez	1962	20	30	.305
Tom	Tresh	1962	20	24	.359
Eddie	Bressoud	1963	20	31	.329
Ron	Hansen	1964	20	26	.347
Dick	McAuliffe	1964	24	24	.334
Zoilo	Versalles	1964	20	24	.311
Denis	Menke	1964	20	23	.368
Leo	Cardenas	1966	20	27	.309
Dick	McAuliffe	1966	23	26	.373
Rico	Petrocelli	1969	40	26	.403
Bert	Campaneris	1970	22	28	.321
Jim	Fregosi	1970	22	28	.353
Rico	Petrocelli	1970	29	27	.334
Toby	Harrah	1974	21	25	.319
Toby	Harrah	1975	20	26	.403
Roy	Smalley	1979	24	26	.353
Robin	Yount	1980	23	24	.321
Roy	Smalley	1982	20	29	.346
Robin	Yount	1982	29	26	.379
Cal	Ripken Jr.	1982	28	21	.317
Dickie	Thon	1983	20	25	.341
Cal	Ripken Jr.	1983	27	22	.371
Cal	Ripken Jr.	1984	27	23	.374
Cal	Ripken Jr.	1985	26	24	.347
Alan	Trammell	1986	21	28	.347
Cal	Ripken Jr.	1986	25	25	.355
Alan	Trammell	1987	28	29	.402
Cal	Ripken Jr.	1987	27	26	.333
Dale	Sveum	1987	25	23	.303
Cal	Ripken Jr.	1988	23	27	.372
Cal	Ripken Jr.	1989	21	28	.317
Cal	Ripken Jr.	1990	21	29	.341
Cal	Ripken Jr.	1991	34	30	.374
Barry	Larkin	1991	20	27	.378
Travis	Fryman	1992	20	23	.316
Cal	Ripken Jr.	1993	24	32	.329
Travis	Fryman	1993	22	24	.379
John	Valentin	1995	27	28	.399
Cal	Ripken Jr.	1996	26	35	.341
Barry	Larkin	1996	33	32	.410
Kevin	Elster	1996	24	31	.317
Jose	Valentin	1996	24	26	.336
Alex	Rodriguez	1996	36	20	.414
Jay	Bell	1997	21	31	.368
Nomar	Garciaparra	1997	30	23	.342
Alex	Rodriguez	1997	23	21	.350
Jay	Bell	1998	20	32	.353
Nomar	Garciaparra	1998	35	24	.362
Alex	Rodriguez	1998	42	22	.360
Rich	Aurilia	1999	22	27	.336
Tony	Batista	1999	26	25	.328
Nomar	Garciaparra	1999	27	25	.418
Derek	Jeter	1999	24	25	.438
Alex	Rodriguez	1999	42	23	.357
Miguel	Tejada	1999	21	23	.325
Jose	Valentin	2000	25	30	.343
Rich	Aurilia	2000	20	28	.339
Nomar	Garciaparra	2000	21	26	.434
Alex	Rodriguez	2000	41	24	.420
Miguel	Tejada	2000	30	24	.349
Jose	Hernandez	2001	25	31	.300
Rich	Aurilia	2001	37	29	.369
Derek	Jeter	2001	21	27	.377
Alex	Rodriguez	2001	52	25	.399
Miguel	Tejada	2001	31	25	.326
Jose	Hernandez	2002	24	32	.356
Nomar	Garciaparra	2002	24	28	.352
Alex	Rodriguez	2002	57	26	.392
Miguel	Tejada	2002	34	26	.354
Nomar	Garciaparra	2003	24	29	.345
Alex	Rodriguez	2003	47	27	.396
Miguel	Tejada	2003	27	27	.336
Jose	Valentin	2003	38	33	.313
Alex S.	Gonzalez	2003	20	30	.295

Now, maybe Tejada will play at a high level his entire career like Joe Cronin or will even improve as he ages like Eddie Joost. Of course, those guys had on-base percentages over .360, a number Tejada as yet to meet. I doubt Tajada and his .331 OBP will be competing at the baseball age of 34, no matter what his actual age really is.

---

“Rudy, You’re like school on Saturday…no class.”

—Russell from the Fat Albert show.

I was recently reviewing this year’s Hall of Fame class and attempted to handicap each candidate’s probability of being elected. That got me to thinking about what it means to be elected to the Hall at any given time.

Is it easier to get in on the first ballot today or not? To get in within the 20 years, when his candidacy on the writers’ ballot expires and he must pass to the Veterans’ Committee? Is it easier to get in within the first five years of a player’s candidacy or the last five? Is someone more likely to get elected after, say, 10 years on the writers’ ballot or after going on the veterans’ ballot?

First, I took a look at the length of time it took a player from a given era to get into the Hall. Here are the ground rules: First, a player must have been active in the majors for at least ten years. That eliminates Addie Joss, for whom they bent the rules, as well as Monte Irvin and Satchell Paige, who were elected largely for their play in the Negro Leagues. Second, the player must have gone in as a player, not a manager, executive, or any other capacity.

One other complication is that the first class was in 1936 and encompassed all players who retired before that year. The first year of eligibility for this class is 1936, but the first year thereafter is 6 years after the player retires.

Next, I categorized players by decade in which they retired. I then banded the number of years the player had to wait: first year, by the tenth year, 11-15, 16-20, 21-25, 26-50, and greater than 50.

Ok, so here are the percentages of players elected to the Hall by retirement decade and the number of years they had to wait:

Final Yr	1st yr	Eligible	%	<10 yrs (not 1st yr)	Eligible	%	11-15 yrs	Eligible	%
1870s			0.00%			0.00%			0.00%
1880s		31	0.00%		31	0.00%		31	0.00%
1890s		102	0.00%	4	102	3.92%	1	102	1.02%
1900s		94	0.00%	5	94	5.32%	4	94	4.49%
1910s	2	125	1.60%	6	125	4.88%	6	125	5.13%
1920s	2	157	1.27%	1	157	0.65%	1	157	0.65%
1930s	3	173	1.73%	5	173	2.94%	2	173	1.21%
1940s	5	187	2.67%	6	187	3.30%	2	187	1.14%
1950s	3	176	1.70%		176	0.00%	2	176	1.16%
1960s	4	228	1.75%	6	228	2.68%	1	228	0.46%
1970s	9	292	3.08%	3	292	1.06%	3	292	1.07%
1980s	11	384	2.86%	5	384	1.34%	1	384	0.27%
1990s	7	313	2.24%	2	280	0.73%		80	0.00%
2000s			0.00%			0.00%			0.00%
	46	2262	2.03%	43	2229	1.97%	23	2029	1.16%

Final Yr	16-20 yrs	Eligible	%	21-25 yrs	Eligible	%	26-50 yrs	Eligible	%
1870s			0.00%			0.00%			0.00%
1880s		31	0.00%		31	0.00%		31	0.00%
1890s		102	0.00%		102	0.00%	6	102	6.19%
1900s		94	0.00%		94	0.00%	5	94	5.88%
1910s	1	125	0.90%	1	125	0.91%	1	125	0.92%
1920s	3	157	1.96%	1	157	0.67%	5	157	3.36%
1930s	4	173	2.45%	1	173	0.63%	18	173	11.39%
1940s	2	187	1.15%	1	187	0.58%	7	187	4.09%
1950s	3	176	1.75%		176	0.00%	8	176	4.76%
1960s	1	228	0.46%		228	0.00%	3	228	1.39%
1970s		292	0.00%	2	292	0.72%	1	292	0.36%
1980s		264	0.00%		53	0.00%		53	0.00%
1990s		0	0.00%		0	0.00%		0	0.00%
2000s		0	0.00%		0	0.00%		0	0.00%
	14	1829	0.82%	6	1618	0.40%	54	1618	3.63%

Final Yr	50+ yrs	Eligible	%	Total HoF	Eligible	%	Total players	%
1870s			0.00%	0	0	0.00%	295	0.00%
1880s		31	0.00%	0	31	0.00%	731	0.00%
1890s	1	102	1.10%	12	102	11.76%	886	1.35%
1900s	1	94	1.25%	15	94	15.96%	927	1.62%
1910s	1	125	0.93%	18	125	14.40%	1511	1.19%
1920s		157	0.00%	13	157	8.28%	1209	1.08%
1930s	1	173	0.71%	34	173	19.65%	970	3.51%
1940s		187	0.00%	23	187	12.30%	1213	1.90%
1950s		27	0.00%	16	176	9.09%	1028	1.56%
1960s		0	0.00%	15	228	6.58%	1019	1.47%
1970s		0	0.00%	18	292	6.16%	1260	1.43%
1980s		0	0.00%	17	384	4.43%	1355	1.25%
1990s		0	0.00%	9	313	2.88%	1678	0.54%
2000s		0	0.00%	0	0	0.00%	1734	0.00%
	4	896	0.56%	190	2262	8.40%	15816	1.20%

To be continued…

---

The Red Sox-Rangers deal involving the two highest paid players in baseball—Alex Rodriguez and Manny Ramirez—either has stalled or is taking on an air of inevitability depending on your point of view.

It seems to be based on money according to all the reports merging about the deal. According to Sean McAdams, the Red Sox are adamant that they will not pay any of Ramirez remaining contract if they trade him.

Meanwhile, the second-best shortstop in baseball, Nomar Garciaparra, is publicly feuding with the Sox through his agent eliciting nasty responses from team owner John Henry. This is all while the Red Sox refuse to discuss the possibility of a trade.

And again MLB is stepping in to add GM-in-training Theo Epstein make the deal [Thanks to Chris for the article]:

The deal would be a swap of baseball's only $20 million-a-year players. In a sign of how extraordinary the situation is, commissioner Bud Selig is allowing the Red Sox to speak directly with Rodriguez. In most situations, a tentative trade must be in place before baseball grants a window for a team to speak with a player under contract to another club.

"To the extent that it happened, the commissioner has approved it," said Sandy Alderson, executive vice president of baseball operations in the commissioner's office.

Double-speak much, Sandy? To quote Bill Ray Valentine, "Thanks, you've been halpful."

Texas GM John Hart has requested that the deal be resolved by the end of the GM meetings on December 16:

"As long as this potentially is alive, it precludes us from having a road map of what we can do with anybody else," Hart said Sunday.

C'mon, John. Nobody wants to go to Texas anyway. The Sox should be worried about losing focus since they are ignoring at least one glaring hole (second base) and potentially creating two (add left field).

This is my basic problem with the deal for the Red Sox. The Rangers are making to lop off some of A-Rod's salary. The Sox, however, have more urgent needs than replacing the second-best shortstop in baseball with the best. Aside from losing starting second baseman, Todd Walker, and having no viable replacement, the Sox are still weak in the tail-end of the rotation and in the pen. Reports have them pursuing Keith Foulke, who would be a fine pickup if a bit pricey.

Besides, let's say the Sox make the deal. They have A-Rod at short and either flip Nomar for a starting left fielder or a second baseman. Anaheim is interested in Garciaparra but has already stated that they will not trade Garrett Anderson to obtain him.

I'm still not convinced that Theo Epstein is nothing more than a rotisserie league GM. He cornered the market on first base-left field- DH guys last year. They started the season with two starting third basemen but no viable closer.

If Epstein really were a genius and really were trying to improve the club, the one player he would divest the Sox of would be Johnn Damon in center. If he were creative, he'd find a way for the Mets to take on Damon's contract while coughing up a decent tail-end starter.

How much better is A-Rod expected to be than Garciappara? Or perhaps a better question is, how much better is A-Rod and a player-to-be-named in left than Garciaparra and Ramirez? Especially when the PTBNL probably will come in a trade for the suddenly superfluous Garciaparra, when they have no leverage.

I can see what they are thinking though: Garciaparra is reticent in dealing with the media and his contract will be up soon. Ramirez is a pain in the neck and Tim McCarver doesn't like him. This would kill both of those birds off with one A-Rod.

But the more I think about it, the more it reminds me of the Mets plans in the late Eighties to improve that proved to unravel the team. It started with swapping Lenny Dykstra and Roger McDowell for Juas Samuel. Next, they trade five young pitchers for one veteran one, Frank Viola. The then traded the other center fielder, Mookie Wilson. Before you could say Frank Robinson, their mini-dynasty was at an end.

The Sox should learn from the Mets' troubles. Maybe Bud can help Epstein do that as well.

---

Well, the winter meetings haven’t even started and it's already been an interesting offseason. Today, as I'm sure you heard, longtime Yankee Andy Pettitte signed with a team a bit closer to home for reportedly less money with the Astros, heralding in the coming Armageddon according to some Yankee fans. But as quick as you can say Bruce Willis and Ben Affleck, Brian Cashman and George Steinbrenner, not necessarily in that order, have swooped down and apparently liberated Kevin Brown from the Dodgers and left their own little bomb, Jeff Weaver, in his place.

But Yankee fans will protest that though Brown and Vazquez are competent starters, they can't be compared to what the Yankees lost, a 300-game winner in "retired" Roger Clemens and a two-time twenty game winner in Pettitte. Between them Clemens and Pettitte have won 20 eight times, including Pettite's 21 this past year. Brown's 14 wins in 2003 were his most since 1999. He's only won 20 once. Vazquez has never won more than 16.

Well all that's true, but I submit that not only have the Yankees backfilled those holes nicely, they have improved themselves. They have gotten younger and better (and did I mention they dumped Jeff Weaver). Pettitte is very good as a number three pitcher, but has never been a staff leader. Overall, Pettitte was a pretty good pitcher in NYC, very good occasionally. His best years were 1996-97 and 2002. He never was a "bad" pitcher, except maybe 1999.

Yes, he's a great number three pitcher, but even with 20 wins this season and the very good 2002 season, his best years seem to be behind him or at least he has been having many more poor ones. But look at it this way: Clemens' adjusted ERA for his career is 40% better than the league average. Pettitte had only one season better than Clemens' average and that was seven years ago.
I think it's a really dumb move on his part. First, because of his home-road splits for the last three years. It doesn't bode well:

	ERA	W	L	GS	CG	IP/G	WHIP	K/9IP	K:BB	HR/9IP	Op AVG
Home	3.46	28	9	42	5	6.56	1.19	7.38	4.71	0.52	.262
Away	4.20	21	14	44	1	6.09	1.46	7.22	2.87	0.84	.289

The next reason is that lefties who leave the Bronx don't tend to fare as well their first season with their new team (through 2002):

Name	Yr	W	L	ERA	Yr2	W	L	ERA
Al Closter	1972	0	0	11.57	1973	0	0	14.54
Al Downing	1969	7	5	3.38	1970	5	13	3.52
Al Leiter	1989	1	2	6.08	1989	0	0	4.05
Al Schulz	1914	1	3	4.76	1914	9	12	3.37
Ambrose Puttmann	1905	2	7	4.27	1906	2	2	5.30
Art Schallock	1955	0	0	6.00	1955	3	5	4.15
Bill Miller	1954	0	1	6.35	1955	0	1	13.50
Bill Wight	1947	1	0	1.00	1948	9	20	4.80
Billy Brewer	1996	1	0	9.53	1997	1	2	4.13
Bob Kuzava	1954	1	3	5.45	1954	1	3	4.18
Bob Meyer	1964	0	3	4.91	1964	2	5	4.20
Bob Shirley	1987	1	0	4.50	1987	0	0	14.73
Bob Wiesler	1955	0	2	3.91	1956	3	12	6.44
Bobby Shantz	1960	5	4	2.79	1961	6	3	3.32
Curt Young	1992	3	0	3.32	1993	1	1	4.30
Danny McDevitt	1961	1	2	7.62	1961	1	0	2.36
Dave LaPoint	1990	7	10	4.11	1991	0	1	16.20
Dave Rajsich	1978	0	0	4.05	1979	1	3	3.52
Dave Righetti	1990	1	1	3.57	1991	2	7	3.39
David Wells	1998	18	4	3.49	1999	17	10	4.82
Dennis Rasmussen	1987	9	7	4.75	1987	4	1	3.97
Denny Neagle	2000	7	7	5.81	2001	9	8	5.38
Don Hood	1979	3	1	3.07	1980	4	6	3.39
Ed Lopat	1955	4	8	3.74	1955	3	4	4.22
Ed Wells	1932	3	3	4.26	1933	6	14	4.20
Fred Heimach	1929	11	6	4.01	1930	0	2	4.91
Fritz Peterson	1974	0	0	4.70	1974	9	14	4.36
Garland Braxton	1926	5	1	2.67	1927	10	9	2.95
George Mogridge	1920	5	9	4.31	1921	18	14	3.00
Gil Blanco	1965	1	1	3.98	1966	2	4	4.70
Graeme Lloyd	1998	3	0	1.67	1999	5	3	3.63
Grant Jackson	1976	6	0	1.69	1977	5	3	3.86
Greg Cadaret	1992	4	8	4.25	1993	3	2	4.31
Hank Thormahlen	1920	9	6	4.14	1921	1	7	4.48
Harry Smythe	1934	0	2	7.80	1934	1	1	5.91
Herb Pennock	1933	7	4	5.54	1934	2	0	3.05
Hippo Vaughn	1912	2	8	5.14	1912	4	3	2.89
Jake Wade	1946	2	1	2.29	1946	0	0	4.76
Jerry Nielsen	1992	1	0	4.58	1993	0	0	8.03
Jesse Tannehill	1903	15	15	3.27	1904	21	11	2.04
Jim Abbott	1994	9	8	4.55	1995	11	8	3.70
Jim Deshaies	1984	0	1	11.57	1985	0	0	0.00
Jim Kaat	1980	0	1	7.20	1980	8	7	3.82
Jim Roland	1972	0	1	5.04	1972	0	0	8.10
Jimmy Key	1996	12	11	4.68	1997	16	10	3.43
John Candelaria	1989	3	3	5.14	1989	0	2	3.31
John Cumberland	1970	3	4	3.94	1970	2	0	0.82
Johnny Johnson	1944	0	2	4.05	1945	3	0	4.26
Johnny Schmitz	1953	0	0	2.08	1953	2	7	3.68
Ken Brett	1976	0	0	0.00	1976	10	12	3.32
Ken Holtzman	1978	1	0	4.08	1978	0	3	6.11
Kenny Rogers	1997	6	7	5.65	1998	16	8	3.17
Larry Gura	1975	7	8	3.51	1976	4	0	2.30
Lee Grissom	1940	0	0	0.00	1940	2	5	2.81
Lee Guetterman	1992	1	1	9.53	1992	3	4	5.82
Lefty Gomez	1942	6	4	4.28	1943	0	1	5.79
Lefty O'Doul	1922	0	0	3.38	1923	1	1	5.43
Marshall Bridges	1963	2	0	3.82	1964	0	3	5.70
Mickey McDermott	1956	2	6	4.24	1957	1	4	5.48
Mike Kekich	1973	1	1	9.20	1973	1	4	7.02
Mike McCormick	1970	2	0	6.10	1971	0	0	9.31
Mike Wallace	1975	0	0	14.54	1975	0	0	2.08
Pat Clements	1988	0	0	6.48	1989	4	1	3.92
Paul Assenmacher	1993	2	2	3.12	1994	1	2	3.55
Paul Mirabella	1979	0	4	8.79	1980	5	12	4.34
Ray Fontenot	1984	8	9	3.61	1985	6	10	4.36
Ray Francis	1925	0	0	7.71	1925	0	2	7.71
Rich Hinton	1972	1	0	4.86	1972	0	1	2.38
Rick Honeycutt	1995	0	0	27.00	1996	2	1	2.85
Rip Coleman	1956	3	5	3.67	1957	0	7	5.93
Rob Gardner	1971	0	0	3.00	1971	0	0	2.35
Rob Murphy	1994	0	0	16.20	1995	1	2	10.95
Rudy May	1976	4	3	3.57	1976	11	7	3.78
Russ Van Atta	1935	0	0	3.86	1935	9	16	5.34
Sam McDowell	1974	1	6	4.69	1975	2	1	2.86
Shane Rawley	1984	2	3	6.21	1984	10	6	3.81
Slim Love	1918	13	12	3.07	1919	6	4	3.01
Sparky Lyle	1978	9	3	3.47	1979	5	8	3.13
Sterling Hitchcock	1995	11	10	4.70	1996	13	9	5.35
Steve Barber	1968	6	5	3.23	1969	4	7	4.80
Steve Hamilton	1970	4	3	2.78	1970	0	0	6.00
Steve Trout	1987	0	4	6.60	1988	4	7	7.83
Stubby Overmire	1951	1	1	4.63	1952	0	3	3.73
Ted Gray	1955	0	0	3.00	1955	1	2	8.22
Ted Kleinhans	1936	1	1	5.83	1937	1	2	2.30
Ted Lilly	2002	3	6	3.40	2002	2	1	4.63
Terry Mulholland	1994	6	7	6.49	1995	5	13	5.80
Tim Lollar	1980	1	0	3.34	1981	2	8	6.10
Tippy Martinez	1976	2	0	1.93	1976	3	1	2.59
Tom Underwood	1981	1	4	4.41	1981	3	2	3.18
Tom Zachary	1930	1	1	6.48	1930	11	5	4.58
Tommy Byrne	1951	2	1	6.86	1951	4	10	3.82
Tommy John	1982	10	10	3.66	1982	4	2	3.86
		294	292	4.18		369	437	4.13

The average departing southpaw maintains his ERA but has a severe dropoff in winning percentage.

Speaking of winning percentage, this is already a concern for Pettitte. What, you say, how can that be an issue for a pitcher with a .656 winning percentage.

Well, Andy Pettitte has been helped greatly by pitching for a winner in the Bronx. I made a table of the 70-odd pitchers who have won at least a 100 games and debuted after 1980. I took their winning percentage and I compared it against their teams'. Here 'tis:

Name	W	L	W PCT	Tm W	TM L	Tm W PCT	% of Tm
Pedro Martinez	173	71	.709	1403	1383	.504	140.79%
Randy Johnson	230	114	.669	1397	1288	.520	128.50%
Curt Schilling	155	108	.589	1283	1404	.477	123.43%
Roger Clemens	310	160	.660	1609	1399	.535	123.31%
Mike Mussina	182	102	.641	1086	949	.534	120.08%
Dwight Gooden	194	112	.634	1531	1331	.535	118.52%
Ramon Martinez	135	88	.605	1132	1067	.515	117.60%
Kevin Brown	200	136	.595	1617	1556	.510	116.80%
Bret Saberhagen	167	117	.588	1430	1398	.506	116.29%
Kenny Rogers	158	114	.581	1292	1235	.511	113.61%
Greg Maddux	289	163	.639	1601	1242	.563	113.54%
Tom Browning	123	90	.577	955	921	.509	113.44%
Tom Glavine	251	157	.615	1461	1219	.545	112.85%
David Cone	194	126	.606	1609	1380	.538	112.62%
Pat Hentgen	129	103	.556	1011	1029	.496	112.20%
Kirk Rueter	119	73	.620	1037	840	.552	112.18%
Jack McDowell	127	87	.593	995	879	.531	111.77%
Jose Rijo	116	91	.560	1106	1095	.502	111.52%
Kevin Appier	169	136	.554	1336	1347	.498	111.28%
Jamie Moyer	185	132	.584	1500	1343	.528	110.61%
Mark Langston	179	158	.531	1293	1395	.481	110.42%
Frank Viola	176	150	.540	1236	1290	.489	110.33%
David Wells	185	121	.605	1547	1275	.548	110.29%
Brad Radke	116	110	.513	673	764	.468	109.60%
Jimmy Key	186	117	.614	1325	1037	.561	109.43%
Denny Neagle	124	92	.574	1241	1123	.525	109.36%
Kevin Tapani	143	125	.534	1147	1199	.489	109.14%
Dave Burba	111	86	.563	1212	1135	.516	109.11%
Andy Pettitte	149	78	.656	865	571	.602	108.97%
Eric Show	101	89	.532	848	881	.490	108.38%
Mark Portugal	109	95	.534	1241	1268	.495	108.03%
Orel Hershiser	204	150	.576	1520	1327	.534	107.94%
Al Leiter	145	112	.564	1490	1358	.523	107.84%
Chuck Finley	200	173	.536	1423	1428	.499	107.43%
Pete Harnisch	111	103	.519	1144	1219	.484	107.14%
Bryn Smith	108	94	.535	1025	1024	.500	106.88%
John Smiley	126	103	.550	1053	984	.517	106.44%
Scott Erickson	140	128	.522	994	1027	.492	106.21%
Mike Hampton	120	89	.574	930	787	.542	106.00%
Pedro Astacio	118	109	.520	1079	1121	.490	105.99%
Aaron Sele	122	88	.581	949	768	.553	105.11%
Charles Nagy	129	103	.556	1078	959	.529	105.07%
Alex Fernandez	107	87	.552	816	736	.526	104.90%
Storm Davis	113	96	.541	1234	1147	.518	104.32%
Bob Tewksbury	110	102	.519	1098	1103	.499	104.01%
Andy Benes	155	139	.527	1198	1152	.510	103.42%
Sid Fernandez	114	96	.543	1319	1184	.527	103.02%
John Burkett	166	136	.550	1348	1178	.534	103.00%
Bobby Jones	103	103	.500	1233	1292	.488	102.39%
Tim Belcher	146	140	.510	1178	1182	.499	102.27%
Ron Darling	136	116	.540	1248	1112	.529	102.06%
John Smoltz	163	120	.576	1332	1026	.565	101.96%
Darryl Kile	133	119	.528	973	906	.518	101.92%
Mike Witt	117	116	.502	1024	1030	.499	100.72%
Doug Drabek	155	134	.536	1086	952	.533	100.65%
Ken Hill	117	109	.518	1378	1291	.516	100.27%
Shane Reynolds	114	95	.545	1023	856	.544	100.19%
Tom Gordon	113	107	.514	1297	1228	.514	99.99%
Bud Black	121	116	.511	1350	1285	.512	99.65%
Greg Swindell	123	122	.502	1533	1479	.509	98.64%
Todd Stottlemyre	138	121	.533	1281	1084	.542	98.37%
Tom Candiotti	151	164	.479	1391	1458	.488	98.18%
Tim Wakefield	116	101	.535	961	802	.545	98.07%
Jaime Navarro	116	126	.479	999	1040	.490	97.84%
Mike Moore	161	176	.478	1077	1125	.489	97.68%
Jeff Fassero	113	108	.511	1242	1120	.526	97.24%
Mark Gubicza	132	136	.493	1116	1084	.507	97.10%
Terry Mulholland	116	127	.477	1763	1734	.504	94.69%
Kirk McCaskill	106	108	.495	984	893	.524	94.48%
Bobby Witt	142	157	.475	1505	1487	.503	94.42%
Kevin Gross	142	158	.473	1186	1176	.502	94.27%
Greg Harris	119	154	.436	1950	2184	.472	92.41%
Walt Terrell	111	124	.472	1076	1028	.511	92.36%
Danny Jackson	112	131	.461	1367	1318	.509	90.53%

Now, this list is far from the be-all/end-all for evaluating pitchers, but one does notice the better ones gravitating to the top, and on it Pettitte is 30th, slightly above average. Yeah, Pettitte is probably a better pitcher than Tapani and Burba, but if you look at his most similar pitchers, McDowell, Reuter and Hampton are there. I think it's a fairly appropriate position for Pettitte.

Now, if you look at Pettitte's career adjust ERA, it's 117. That's a good performance but far from a superstar. Vazquez's is just 109, but he recorded a 153 figure last year, just one point short of Pettitte's career high, and consider that he is still improving. He also has pitched at least 215 innings each of the last four seasons, something that Pettitte has not done since 1998.

As far as the Clemens for Brown "swap" improving the team, Clemens had adjusted ERAs of 97, 137, 128, 101, and 112 in New York, for an average of under 115. Brown has had adjusted ERAs of 160, 148, 167, 152, and 169 (with a 79 in an injury-shortened 2002). That's an average of just under 160. I am leery of pitchers leaving the confines of Dodger Stadium, just as I would be for a hitter leaving Coors. However, Brown is no Hideo Nomo: he has performed well with many teams in many parks over the years. His checkered history of injuries is a concern though, and at 39 will continue to be a major issue for Brown.

So Pettitte goes to Houston, but he'll likely be no more than a number three pitcher there as well, behind Roy Oswalt and Wade Miller. The worst consequence for the Yankees is a dearth of left-handed starters, almost assuring that David Wells is in the rotation next year. Let's say he had pitched for the Astros this year. Using his average above, if he had a 9% better winning percentage than the team in, say, 25 decisions, he would end up 15-10. With his 9% better than average adjusted ERA, he would have posted a 3.54 ERA in ex-Enron. Those are good numbers, not great. If Pettitte's winning percentage hits the skids like past ex-Yankees while keeping the same ERA, he could be more like 10-15 with a 4.00 ERA. I doubt that will happen, but it's probably as likely as another 20-win season in 2004.

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The Phils acquired Tim Worrell the other day as free agent. Worrell has been one of the better setup men in the NL since 2000 and did a fine job last year subbing for Robb Nenn as the Giants closer (38 saves, fourth in the NL, 2.87 ERA). However, he will return to his setup role for the Phils, who also acquired premier closer Billy Wagner this offseason.

Either Worrell could not find a job as a closer elsewhere or the wanted to return to the setup role. Or he just followed the call of cash in Philly, one of the few teams willing to spend a some dinero of late.

Whatever the reason, Worrell is a fine addition to the Phils bullpen, a major sore spot for the club down the stretch. And I have to say, it's about time they got him...

Why? Because Philadelphia is truly the city of brotherly love. Or to be more exact, it's the city of inferior brother-ly love. In almost every pair of baseball brothers, the Phils have gotten their hands on the runt of the litter almost every time.

Worrell is a fine pitcher, but his brother Todd was an All-Star. Joining him on the Phils rolls are lesser brothers Ken Brett rather than George, Mike Maddux rather than Greg, Mark Leiter rather than Al, Jeremy Giambi rather than Jason, Tom Barrett rather than Marty, Ron Roenicke rather than Gary. They had Mack, not Zack, Wheat. The didn't have Joe Dimaggio or even Dom. They had Vince Dimaggio. OK, they had Granny Hamner, but ruined it with a year of Garvin Hamner (which is preferable to Marvin Hamlisch). I'm surprised they never signed up Tommie Aaron, Ozzie Canseco, and Billy Ripken. At least they got the right Delahanty brother (Ed) and there were five to choose from. Well, they did give Tom a try as well.

Even in fathers and sons, they get screwed: Bob Boone was never as good as his father Ray nor his sons Bret and Aaron. David Bell has been less than revelatory since signing with the Phils. Why couldn't they have gotten his dad, Buddy, in his prime? (Though they had a pretty good third baseman in those days.) They even had the inferior Terry Francona, not Tito, manage the team a few years ago.

I think it all goes back to being managed so early on (1884-1893) by Harry Wright. I know he's a Hall of Famer and the founder of the late great Cincinnati Red Stockings, but as a player he could never hold a candle to his brother George.

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Charlie Mikolajczak writes in with an interesting question:

A couple of buddies and myself were hoisting a few yesterday when we started talking about the Vazquez trade. My one buddy absolutely loves JV and things he's a lock for a ridiculous season since he's on a team that's gonna give him run support now (the #'s his threw out were PlayStation like and obviously liquor-influenced, but you get the point). Anyway, he seemed to think that he'll be able to have a great season despite the shaky Yanks D is because he's a strikeout pitcher. While I think he's gonna have a good season in NY, I pointed out that his K's are most likely to go down by about 30 this season because he no longer gets the benefit of whiffing the pitcher 3 times a game. I tried to do a quick comparison on recent pitchers K's after switching leagues but it's a pretty short list for a good comparison. Just curious as to your thoughts on it...

Well, I did a little research...

That's a good question. Unfortunately, it's not as straightforward as one would anticipate. There are actually two pposing "forces".

Since the institution of the dreaded DH, the AL has had a significantly lower strikeout percentage. Ks per 9 IP have been between 5-10% lower in the AL over the last decade. The highest percent difference was in 1978, 13.5% lower, and the lowest was .78% in 1987. On average, pitchers strike out about twice as often as the baseball population taken as a whole (about 30% of all plate appearances as opposed to 15% over the last decade). All this translates into about .3 or .4 strikeouts fewer per every 9 IP in the AL. For Vazquez's 230.2 innings last year, that only translates into 10 fewer strikeouts.

However, it appears that pitchers in the AL have been allowed to go deeper into games because they did not to be pinch-hit for. I say appears because all I can go on is the stats for pitchers who have started exclusively since baseball doesn't split out its data historically by starters and relievers. Using that group, it appears that pitchers in the AL pitch between 1-3% longer. Given the splits in ESPN for 2003, starters in the AL did last 1% longer in the AL (5.87 IP/GS vs. 5.90, or .55%). So if Vazquez pitches 1% longer next year, he would have an extra 2-3 strikeouts. If it's closer to 3%, then it's 6-9 strikeouts.

So overall, the first "force" seems to be the stronger one, but either way, there does not appear to make too much of a difference. Especially, since his K/9 IP shot up from 6.99 to 9.40 last year. I'd be more concerned about his propensity to give up the long ball.

Remember that when Jeff Weaver was traded mid-2002 to the Yankees, his strikeouts-per-nine innings went up by 1 (5.55 to 6.58). It's not all about strikeouts. By the way, his strikeouts-per-nine innings was a career low 5.25 in 2003.

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Alex Belth interviews Sports Illustrated's Tom Verducci.

I dig this interchange:

BB: What is the relationship between the mainstream sportswriters and sites like Baseball Prospectus, Baseball Primer? Or even with amateur’s like myself who run their own sports blogs?

Verducci: I would hesitate to speak for the mainstream as a whole, but for myself I absolutely love it. The discourse about major league baseball is much more intelligent, and reasoned and well-thought out because of everything that’s out there on the web and in some of the other ancillary publications you mentioned. I really think it has forced people to be on their toes. I think that a lot of things in this game were accepted without a basis in fact. Now a lot of people have challenged those notions and that’s a good thing. But I think there is a downside to it too. The pride of the beat writer is that he’s the one in that locker room, he’s the one that’s asking the hard questions after the games, and he’s the one who knows if a guy is having problems with his wife at home and that’s why he’s 0-4, and it has nothing to do with how good the opposing pitcher was that night. The downside is that some members of the mainstream media will write off the alternative opinions as being uniformed because they are not actually on the front lines. I tend to think that is a little extreme. I think that even from afar you can have something intelligent to offer. I think that the whole statistical analysis of the game has raised the level of criticism and analysis of baseball, and I think we’re all better for it.

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