Baseball Toaster was unplugged on February 4, 2009.
"Welcome to the Hall's of Relief", VIII
Previous entries:
The 1870s, '80s, and '90s
The 1900s and '10s
The 1920s, '30s, and '40s
The 1950s
The 1960s
The 1970s
The 1980s
To Come: Final analysis-best reliever of all time and greatest bullpen of all time.
The 1990s and 2000s
The Chase.--Third Day..."D'ye see him?" cried Ahab; but the whale was not yet in sight.
"In his infallible wake, though; but follow that wake, that's all... Here's food for thought, had Ahab time to think; but Ahab never thinks; he only feels, feels, feels;...How the wild winds blow...as the torn shreds of split sails lash the tossed ship they cling to. A vile wind that has no doubt blown ere this through prison corridors and cells, and wards of hospitals, and ventilated them, and now comes blowing hither as innocent as fleeces. Out upon it!--it's tainted...And yet, 'tis a noble and heroic thing, the wind! who ever conquered it? In every fight it has the last and bitterest blow. Run tilting at it, and you but run through it. Ha!...Would now the wind but had a body; but all the things that most exasperate and outrage mortal man, all these things are bodiless...These warm Trade Winds, at least, that in the clear heavens blow straight on, in strong and steadfast, vigorous mildness; and veer not from their mark, however the baser currents of the sea may turn and tack, and mightiest Mississippies of the land swift and swerve about, uncertain where to go at last. And by the eternal Poles! these same Trades that so directly blow my good ship on; these Trades, or something like them--something so unchangeable, and full as strong, blow my keeled soul along! To it! Aloft there! What d'ye see?"
"Nothing, sir."
"Nothing! and noon at hand!...I've oversailed him...Aye, he's chasing ME now; not I, HIM--that's bad; I might have known it, too...About! about!
Steering as she had done, the wind had been somewhat on the Pequod's quarter, so that now being pointed in the reverse direction, the braced ship sailed hard upon the breeze as she rechurned the cream in her own white wake.
-Moby Dick-Or the Whale, Chapter 135, By "Don't Call Me Babe"Herman Melville
After killing many e-trees with my last two installments on relief pitching (covering the 1970s and '80s) and anticipating the final analysis phase of this little project, I will keep my comments on the last thirteen years to a minimum. For the sake of brevity-and since I do not know how to refer to the current decade, which is only three years old anyway-I will refer to this period as the Nineties.
So what happened in the Nineties? Basically, baseball continued on its megalomaniacal course. Bullpens got bigger and more specialized. The closer role became synonymous with the save statistic as closers earned their arbitration and free agent living based on the stat. Save totals went up. Swingmen became an endangered species. "And Leon is getting laaaarrrrrger."
It is my assertion that the entire system has, like Ahab in the excerpt above, passed its goal by without realizing it. I am intently interested in what the Red Sox will be doing this year to "rechurn the cream" of the relief pitching wake. But more on that in the analytical section. For now, I'll try to keep an open mind.
In the Nineties:
The 50-save reliever was born and born again. In 1990, Bobby Thigpen set the one-year record of 57 saves that still stands today. Two years later Dennis Eckersley became the second to reach 50. Reaching 50 saves in a season has now been done eight times and five times since the last round of expansion in 1998.
In 1993, Lee Smith became the first pitcher to surpass 400 saves in his career. Smith ended his career with 478 saves in total. John Franco joined Smith in the 400-save club in 1999.
The number of men in the 300-save and 200-save clubs exploded as well. Here is a progression of those men at the end of each decade (I used 100 as the minimum in previous analyses, but given that there are now 99 men with at least 100 saves for their career, this figure becomes cumbersome):
After 1969 | After 1979 | After 1989 | Today
Name Sv | Name Sv | Name Sv | Name Sv
Hoyt Wilhelm 210+| Hoyt Wilhelm 227+| Rollie Fingers 341+| Lee Smith 478
| Sparky Lyle 223 | Rich Gossage 307 | John Franco 422*
| Rollie Fingers 221+| Bruce Sutter 300 | Dennis Eckersley 390
| Jeff Reardon 266 | Jeff Reardon 367
| Dan Quisenberry 244 | Trevor Hoffman 352*
| Sparky Lyle 238 | Randy Myers 347
| Lee Smith 234 | Rollie Fingers 341+
| Hoyt Wilhelm 227+| John Wetteland 330
| Gene Garber 218 | Roberto Hernandez 320*
| Rick Aguilera 318
| Robb Nen 314*
| Tom Henke 311
| Rich Gossage 310
| Jeff Montgomery 304
| Doug Jones 303
| Bruce Sutter 300
| Rod Beck 266*
| Todd Worrell 256
| Dave Righetti 252
| Troy Percival 250*
| Dan Quisenberry 244
| Mariano Rivera 243*
| Sparky Lyle 238
| Hoyt Wilhelm 227+
| Jose Mesa 225*
| Gene Garber 218
| Gregg Olson 217*
| Dave Smith 216
| Jeff Shaw 203
| Bobby Thigpen 201
* indicates active
+ indicate Hall of Famer
The Eighties save totals were explosive when compared with the Sixties and Seventies, but they were nothing compared to the Nineties. The totals for 200-save men per decade are one as of 1969, 3 after 1979, 9 after 1989, and 30 today (six of which are still active). That's basically 30, 31,32, and 33 (well, plus 3)-a nice exponential progression.
Meanwhile, the men who had led in saves in the past-i.e., Wilhelm and Fingers-were getting elected to the all of Fame. Now, Fingers is 7th in saves, Wilhelm is 24th-right ahead of the redoubtable Jose "Make A" Mesa-, and no one else has been elected to the Hall.
The saves numbers have changed so rapidly that the change has obscured the value of pitchers like Goose Gossage (13th), Bruce Sutter (16th), and Dan Quisenberry (21st), all of whom were arguably more valuable to their teams in the day than three of the top four in career saves (Lee Smith, John Franco, and Jeff Reardon) were to theirs.
This argument I feel is a stronger explanation for the current dearth of Hall of Fame relievers than the ubiquitous "The Hall voters don't value saves" argument. They value saves, just not the relievers who have high totals in that statistic. I believe that there are voters who do not select the worthy candidates that I mentioned because they are over one hundred saves behind John Franco, a player who will not be regarded as a strong Hall candidate when he retires. No one would vote for Ned Williamson because his 27 home runs in 1884 were astronomical when put in context (if with the home field help). 27 home runs just isn't that impressive a number. More investigation is needed into the context of the earlier save totals but the Hall voters are not interested in investing time in such a project.
OK, I'm back down from my soapbox. In the Nineties closers became poster children for the save stat. Here as a table of the cumulative stats for closers per decade. I posted this in the Eighties entry but for the Nineties, I would like to base the numbers on team save leaders not on an arbitrary save cutoff (20 saves) as I used in the Eighties study (RA= Relief Appearance; percentages are of games pitched):
Decade %RA %W %L %Sv IP/G 1970s 98.63% 11.71% 10.79% 28.16% 1.67 1980s 99.43% 9.89% 10.13% 36.08% 1.49 1990s 99.65% 6.05% 7.57% 46.81% 1.12 2000s 99.57% 5.70% 6.58% 47.77% 1.07 30-yr diff 0.94% -6.02% -4.21% 19.61% -0.60
A closer in the 2000s pitches a hair over one inning, records a save in almost every other appearance, and has little to do with wins and losses, especially wins. Look at the change since the 1970s especially in saves and innings per appearance.
Here is a table of the percent of team save leaders who amassed a certain percentage of the team's total saves. For example, the 100% column tells you the percentage of all "closers" who registered all of their team's saves. Note how each bracket is increasing especially into the late Nineties and early 2000s:
Year 100% 90% 75% 50% 25% 10% 1980 0% 0% 12% 58% 100% 100% 1981 0% 0% 19% 54% 100% 100% 1982 0% 0% 12% 58% 100% 100% 1983 0% 4% 15% 50% 100% 100% 1984 0% 0% 19% 62% 96% 100% 1985 0% 4% 27% 62% 100% 100% 1986 0% 0% 12% 58% 100% 100% 1987 0% 0% 15% 42% 100% 100% 1988 0% 4% 27% 85% 100% 100% 1989 0% 0% 31% 88% 100% 100% 1990 0% 4% 23% 69% 100% 100% 1991 0% 8% 35% 65% 100% 100% 1992 0% 4% 35% 69% 100% 100% 1993 0% 21% 43% 86% 100% 100% 1994 0% 4% 32% 79% 96% 100% 1995 0% 11% 54% 82% 100% 100% 1996 4% 7% 54% 86% 100% 100% 1997 0% 11% 46% 75% 100% 100% 1998 0% 17% 53% 87% 100% 100% 1999 0% 30% 57% 83% 100% 100% 2000 0% 17% 53% 83% 100% 100% 2001 0% 20% 57% 90% 100% 100% 2002 3% 40% 77% 90% 100% 100%
The closers became save machines pitching one inning at a time. So how did this affect the rest of the staff?
First starters almost never complete a game today. The number of pitchers per game is approaching an average of four. The concept of swingmen has disappeared almost completely. A reliever was a reliever by trade even if he didn't close. They began to start games less often. Here's the closer table from above for middle relievers:
Decade %RA %W %L %Sv IP/G 1970s 94.30% 9.50% 9.37% 8.95% 1.85 1980s 95.81% 8.86% 8.62% 7.92% 1.72 1990s 97.23% 7.07% 6.81% 4.63% 1.33 2000s 98.04% 6.29% 6.19% 3.07% 1.18 30-yr diff 3.74% -3.21% -3.18% -5.88% -0.67
The percentage of relief appearances goes up while the wins, losses, saves and inning pitched go down. Well, why is that if the middle relievers are taking up the slack from the starters and closers? Because there are more of them (6.37 per team in 2002).
Study One: 1990, the Year of the Reliever?
When one looks at the history of relief pitching, one year stands out as a high water mark: 1990.
It is the year in which the current saves record was established by Bobby Thigpen, who, though he only had a handful of serviceable years as a closer, cracked the once-elite 200-save club (see above). Thigpen had a truly impressive season adding a 1.83 ERA, 110% better than the park-adjusted league average, and 70 strikeouts (though 32 walks) in 88.2 innings to his record 57 saves. Thigpen not only broke the record; he obliterated, by 11 saves.
Dennis Eckerlsey's 1990 season may have been even better: 48 saves (2 better than the pre-1990 save record), a 0.61 ERA (506% better than the league average), 73 strikeouts (about one per inning), and only 4 walks and 41 hits allowed in 73.1 innings. Though Thigpen beats him out in Win Shares (which I feel are somewhat more than problematic in measuring reliever effectiveness), Eck's season may be the most singular achievement for a reliever. Here's a quick comparison (SV% is the ratio of saves to appearances):
1990 WHIP K/9IP K:BB HR/9 IPSV % Eckersley 0.61 8.96 18.25 0.027 76.19% Thigpen 1.04 7.11 2.19 0.056 74.03%
Eckersley's ratios are, to quote Wally Shawn, "inconceivable". His 18.25 strikeout-to-walk ratio is the best I have run across for a closer all-time. And he recorded a save a larger percentage of the time than Thigpen did. I realize that there is a great deal of worth in Thigpen's extra appearances (14 more), but c'mon, that's pretty good.
Here's what Bill James had to say in The Baseball Book 1991 about Thigpen's record-breaking accomplishment and what it meant for the future of the save statistic:
Thigpen broke the old record by eleven, saving 57. That's impressive, but it has very little to do with whether the record will or will not be broken. That's looking backward, comparing Thigpen's performance to the past. The record, if it is to be broken, will be broken in the future, so the question is how this will compare to future performance norms.I would argue that the more stunning an individual performance is, the greater the likelihood that the record will be broken. Consider, for example, the home run record. When Babe Ruth hit 59 home runs in 1920 this was a shattering event-more than twice the previous record, which Ruth himself had set the previous year. But did that mean that the record could never be broken, or did that merely mean that the game of baseball had changed in some way so that more home runs would be hit? When Ruth himself hit 60 home runs in 1927 no one paid much attention, because by that time seasons of 40 or more homers were no longer shocking, and so no one really thought that the record of 60 would stand-but it did, lasting for 34 years.
Think about it. If you edge past an existing record, then it may be that the previous standards still apply, and the record was broken simply by a superb individual performance. If the record is smashed, however, it must be because the performance norms in this category have changed. Bobby Thigpen is a fine reliever, but there have been fine relievers before, right? If the performance standards for saves remained the same, would it be possible for him to be 25% better than anybody else ever has been, in his best season?
Of course it would not. Obviously, Thigpen's record was brought about in part because of a change in the way that relief pitchers are used-a generalized change, operating thoughout [sic] baseball.
He does have a good point about records. Look at the home run record in 1998. Mark McGwire destroyed the old record by 9 homers. Sammy Sosa also broke the home run record in finishing second overall. Ken Griffey's total was only five homers behind the old record. And just three seasons later Barry Bonds passed McGwire.
In 1990, Thigpen and Eckersley both passed the old save record, and Doug Jones was only three off the mark. Surely, the saves record would fall soon especially when the save-producing trend to which James points reached maturity. Well, the trend did continue as we have seen. Closers became more specialized and were brought in more and more in save situations.
So why has the record lasted so long? Well, there are a few things that James did not anticipate. First, it is extremely difficult for a player to get over 60 save opportunities in a season especially when he is pitching one inning at a time. James could not have known about the offensive explosion of the Nineties in which leads seemed never to be safe. Closers were rarely used for more than an inning because teams became fearful of giving up a lead in the ninth. Second, the ratio of saves to innings pitched did increase quickly (more on that later), but the number of innings a typical closer threw shrank even more quickly. Therefore, the saves did not continue to explode.
OK, so 1990 had two historically impressive seasons by a closer, but it may be best remembered for what has been called by many the greatest bullpen of all time, the Cincinnati Reds' "Nasty Boys" (I reserve judgment for my analysis epilogue).
Here are the numbers for the five main relievers and the totals for the entire Cincinnati bullpen:
Name G W L SV IP ERA WHIP K/9IP K:BB HR/9IP Rob Dibble 68 8 3 11 98.00 1.74 0.98 12.49 4.00 0.28 Randy Myers 66 4 6 31 86.67 2.08 1.12 10.18 2.58 0.62 Tim Layana 55 5 3 2 80.00 3.49 1.44 5.96 1.20 0.79 Norm Charlton* 40 6 4 2 50.67 3.02 1.38 10.12 2.59 0.36 Tim Birtsas 29 1 3 0 51.33 3.86 1.81 7.19 1.71 1.23 1990 Reds 316 27 22 50 472.67 2.91 1.27 8.57 2.28 0.69 * = as a reliever
However, I prefer the A's bullpen to the Reds that year:
Team G W L SV IP ERA WHIP K/9IP K:BB HR/9IP 1990 Reds 316 27 22 50 472.67 2.91 1.27 8.57 2.28 0.69 1990 A's 303 14 10 64 417.33 2.35 1.05 6.02 2.23 0.52
Both pretty impressive, but the A's have an edge in every stat but innings pitched and strikeouts per nine innings. Also, remember than the five main A's relievers that year had ERAs under 3.00 (Eckersley, Rick Honeycutt, Gene Nelson, Todd Burns, and Joe Kink). The A's bullpen points was 1.15 points better than its starters; The Reds bullpen was 71 points better than its starters.
Whichever bullpen one prefers doesn't really matter. What I'm interested in is what made 1990 such a big year for relievers. There's nothing at first blush that reveals the solution. In 1990, complete games were down, but that's been going down ever since John McGraw turned to Iron Joe McGinnity to save ballgames. Relief appearances increased by about 7% but that was hardly unusual for the era. For the first time, teams averaged three pitchers per game, but they're approaching four per game now.
I think the answer to the 1990 hegemony lies in the 1985-'87 offensive outburst and the then impending offensive outburst from 1993 until pretty much today. In the Eighties section I wrote that 1985-'87 offense helped develop what I call the "post-modern" closer, i.e., the closer in the Dennis Eckersley mold brought in to save games almost exclusively.
I contend that the bullpen infrastructure and depth effected by the mini offensive boom created inflated bullpen stats during the offensive "lag" of 1988-'92 with an apex right at the center at 1990. The bullpens were built to withstand an offensive-minded game and they were more than enough for a somewhat less offensively minded era. Let's test that theory.
Check out the runs, home runs, and saves per game (both teams) for the "modern" closer years:
Year R/G HR/G SV/G % Inc
1977 4.47 0.87 0.201
1978 4.10 0.70 0.191 -4.81%
1979 4.46 0.82 0.200 4.63%
1980 4.29 0.73 0.214 7.07%
1981 4.00 0.64 0.217 1.28%
1982 4.30 0.80 0.221 1.92%
1983 4.31 0.78 0.232 4.73%
1984 4.26 0.77 0.236 1.83%
1985 4.33 0.86 0.232 -1.52%
1986 4.41 0.91 0.239 2.76%
1987 4.72 1.06 0.231 -3.38%
1988 4.14 0.76 0.250 8.29%
1989 4.13 0.73 0.254 1.62%
1990 4.26 0.79 0.264 4.17%
1991 4.31 0.80 0.269 1.76%
1992 4.12 0.72 0.263 -2.12%
1993 4.60 0.89 0.263 -0.24%
1994 4.92 1.03 0.243 -7.56%
1995 4.85 1.01 0.249 2.70%
1996 5.04 1.09 0.246 -1.30%
1997 4.77 1.02 0.251 2.11%
1998 4.79 1.04 0.260 3.48%
1999 5.08 1.14 0.251 -3.64%
2000 5.14 1.17 0.242 -3.24%
2001 4.78 1.12 0.249 2.72%
2002 4.62 1.04 0.252 1.28%
Saves shot up in 1988 and 1990 after the offensive onslaught of 1985-'87. Saves per game shot up in 1990 and '91 to their highest figures. Apparently what was being brewed during the 1985-'87 seasons came to fruition after Dennis Eckersley's role re-defining 1988 season.
As offenses started to creep back up (i.e., runs and home runs per game) in 1990 and '91, teams followed the Eckersley "post modern" example. It seems to be viewed as successful as offensive went back down in 1992. However, ever since the expansion of 1993 and the attendant historic offensive outburst in the intervening ten years, the number of successful save attempts per game has declined.
Given the circumstances, I'm not sure if 1990 was such an historically tremendous season for relievers or if a strategy reached maturity just as it was made available to counter an slight upsurge in offense. The circumstances were very favorable for fine relief stats: the upsurge was enough to spur managers to go full bore with the new "post modern" relief strategy but they were not so much to change the perception of the newly defined role.
The last tens years on the other hand have left managers scratching their noggins. They rely just as heavily on their closers as managers did in 1990, but because of the offensive surge the closer does not record a save as successfully. Instead of chucking the strategy altogether managers have instead relied on it more heavily. The average closer in 2002 recorded 32.93 saves a year (81 of his team's saves) while the closer in 1990 recorded just 26.81 saves (only 62.62% of his team's total).
So the feats of the average bullpen today are more impressive than they were in 1990, so the "Year of the Reliever" appellation may no longer fit. It's especially so with perceptions of and expectations for closers and relievers in general starting to change. Will managers continue to save his best reliever for the ninth inning of a ballgame and use him only in save opportunities? Let' check that out as well.
Study Two: The Future?
Managers have been accelerating their reliance on closers to save ballgames and middle relievers to bridge the game from starters to closers. Complete game percentages and average number of pitchers per ballgame state this pretty firmly.
However, if the past is any prologue to the future for bullpens, things should change and change very soon. In the history of baseball there have been few periods in which reliever use was not reinvented every 10-12 years. The exception in the post-19th century era came in the 1920s, '30s, and 40s. Ever since then the reliever role has been revamped sometimes due to the success of one or two individuals, for example Joe Page in the late Forties, Sutter in the late Seventies, and Eckersley in the late Eighties.
Ever since Eckersley redefined the closer role in 1988, managers have been steering the same course ever since. The only change overall has been to more heavily rely on the strategy at all costs. As a result, managers are criticized more and more for not bringing in their best reliever when the game was on the line before the ninth inning. Many teams have tried closer- or bullpen-by committee over that period, but that has usually been due to a lack of a quality closer.
That's fourteen years with the same strategy for relievers, which is a long time. The Red Sox with the help of Bill James this spring have developed a new approach in which a quality, veteran staff of middle relievers will be used in a true closer-by-committee system. It is too early to determine if it is a success since it has yet to be used in regular-season game situation. Suffice it to say though, that if the Sox wrest the pennant away from the Yankees while employing the strategy, it may became the new standard. It should be interesting to watch.
Whatever happens with Sox pen in 2003, expect some change over the next few years as the baseball mood is rife with discontent on the issue. Again don't expect this strategy, be it closer-by-committee or a return to 100-inning closers, to last for much more that a decade itself, if history is any indication.
So is James onto something? Certainly having a number of quality pitchers who can pitch more than an inning, i.e., potentially the most ballyhooed but least important one, the ninth, is more valuable than a closer who gets fewer than one save opportunity every three games and is rarely used otherwise. Even if the closer is supported by quality setup men, the best reliever in theory, the closer, is completely underutilized.
But is there something in the statistical trends in the last few years to indicate that the ground has been properly prepared for such a drastic change? Let's see. First, I want to review what has happened since the birth of the "post modern" closer. Let's start with some more of James' 1991 comments on Bobby Thigpen breaking the save record:
The record for saves in a season will settle somewhere above 80, possibly as high as 90.Why? Because there is nothing to stop the trends which are in motion from continuing in motion before that point is reached. In 1985 Dan Quisenberry saved 45 games-but he pitched 139 innings to do it. Quisenberry pitched primarily in save situations, but he was normally called into the game in the seventh or eighth inning. Only on occasion would he pick up a save by getting one or two outs, and his ratio of innings pitched to saves was about 3 to I.
When Dave Righetti saved 46 games in 1986 he pitched 107 innings, so his ratio was more like 2 to 1. He was being called into the game later than Quisenberry was. When Jeff Russell saved 38 games in 1989 he pitched only 73 innings, a ratio of less than 2 to 1. Last year Thigpen picked up 57 saves while pitching 89 innings, a ratio about one and a half to one.
In theory, a relief pitcher could save 60 games while pitching only 20 innings. That's not going to happen, of course, but the ratio between saves and innings pitched has been flattening out for fifty years. It is nowhere near its theoretical limit. Is there any reason why it would stop flattening out right now?
None at all-none that I can see anyway. Next there's going to be a pitcher who pitches 80 games, 80 innings and saves 60 games, or some combination like that. Then there's going to be a pitcher who pitches 85 games, 75 innings and saves 62 games, and so on.
What is the limit? Where does it have to stop?
Well, think about it. Pitching less than an inning a game, as some relief aces already are, how much can a pitcher pitch? Maybe 110 games, 90 innings a season? That would certainly seem to be possible, wouldn't it? Mike Marshall in 1974 pitched 106 games, 208 innings, and major league pitchers have told me that while they wouldn't want to try that, they could certainly pitch 110 games if it was just a couple of hitters a game.
How many games could a pitcher save if he was used in that way?
All records tend to be set in a combination of near-optimal circumstances. Home run records are set in home run parks, etc. Let's assume near-optimal conditions for some un-named relief pitcher, at some un-named point maybe twenty years from now. That means:
a. pitching for a great team, a team winning more than a hundred games,
b. in a season when they have a lot of close games-say, 80% close games,
c, and having a great season himself.This is more likely to occur in a pitcher's park than in a park like Wrigley, where scores are higher and one-run margins therefore less common, but really, no team wins all that many games by more than three runs. Most games are won by less than three runs.
Anyway, how many saves would this create? I don't know exactly, but the answer is clearly over seventy, and could be as high as the low nineties. In the year 2025, if the save rule isn't changed, the record for saves in a season will be about 83.
As I said earlier James did not anticipate some other forces keeping save totals from breaking Thigpen's mark let alone 80 or 90 saves. Those 80 or 90 save opportunities for a 100-game-winning team never presented themselves as offensives ran up bigger scores and greater margins of victory. Closers were used less frequently as teams grew fearful of losing games, even ones they led by a healthy margin, in the ninth inning. They were held back in case the opposition got back into games. Sometimes it wasn't necessary and sometimes the lead change hands so quickly while managers were running their fourth best relievers out to the mound that the closer was never used. The "closer equals save opportunity" mentality limited the closer's use and number fo save opportunities available as the closer became more and more pigeonholed.
James' saves per innings concept is very interesting though. Here is a list using James' stat of saves per innings pitched for all closers (i.e., team leaders in saves) over 60%:
Name Year SV/IP SV George Wood 1888 100.00% 2 Lee Smith 1994 86.09% 33 Lee Smith 1993 86.00% 43 Matt Mantei 1999 75.86% 22 Randy Myers 1997 75.42% 45 Mike Williams 2002 75.00% 46 Lee Smith 1995 75.00% 37 Mike Henneman 1996 73.81% 31 Trevor Hoffman 1998 72.60% 53 Jose Mesa 1995 71.88% 46 Trevor Hoffman 2001 71.27% 43 Troy Percival 2002 71.01% 40 Jeff Shaw 1998 70.75% 25 Jeff Russell 1993 70.71% 33 Randy Myers 1993 70.35% 53 Mitch Williams 1993 69.35% 43 John Smoltz 2002 68.46% 55 Randy Myers 1995 68.26% 38 Dennis Eckersley 1997 67.92% 36 Dave Righetti 1990 67.92% 36 John Wetteland 1998 67.74% 42 Troy Percival 2001 67.63% 39 John Wetteland 1996 67.54% 43 Kazuhiro Sasaki 2001 67.50% 45 Jeff Reardon 1991 67.42% 40 Todd Worrell 1996 67.35% 44 Ugueth Urbina 2002 66.67% 40 Bill Bishop 1889 66.67% 2 Eddie Guardado 2002 66.50% 45 Tom Henke 1995 66.26% 36 Randy Myers 1998 66.14% 28 Rick Aguilera 1995 65.93% 20 Todd Jones 2000 65.63% 42 Dennis Eckersley 1990 65.45% 48 Mariano Rivera 1999 65.22% 45 Bryan Harvey 1993 65.22% 45 John Wetteland 1999 65.15% 43 Gregg Olson 1993 64.44% 29 Lee Smith 1991 64.38% 47 Jeff Montgomery 1998 64.29% 36 Antonio Alfonseca 2000 64.29% 45 Bobby Thigpen 1990 64.29% 57 Trevor Hoffman 2002 64.04% 38 Troy Percival 2000 64.00% 32 Jeff Reardon 1992 63.78% 27 Dennis Eckersley 1992 63.75% 51 Tom Henke 1991 63.58% 32 Rod Beck 1998 63.49% 51 Mike Fetters 1995 63.46% 22 Eric Gagne 2002 63.16% 52 Troy Percival 1998 63.00% 42 Duane Ward 1993 62.79% 45 Mike Jackson 1998 62.50% 40 Billy Wagner 2001 62.23% 39 Robb Nen 2000 62.12% 41 Mariano Rivera 2001 61.98% 50 Jeff Brantley 1996 61.97% 44 Dennis Eckersley 1988 61.93% 45 Rick Aguilera 1992 61.50% 41 Mike Henneman 1995 61.36% 18 Jeff Russell 1995 61.22% 20 Tom Henke 1992 61.08% 34 Kazuhiro Sasaki 2002 60.99% 37 Rick Aguilera 1991 60.87% 42 Mariano Rivera 2002 60.87% 28 Rick Aguilera 2000 60.84% 29 Jose Mesa 2001 60.58% 42 Rod Beck 1993 60.50% 48 Billy Taylor 1999 60.47% 26 Jeff Montgomery 1994 60.45% 27 Mariano Rivera 1997 60.00% 43 John Franco 1994 60.00% 30 John Franco 1997 60.00% 36
You'll notice that aside from a couple of 19th-century anomalies and Dennis Eckersley's groundbreaking 1988 season, the pitchers are all from 1990 on.
But is this becoming more the norm or holding steady? Here is a table of the saves-per-innings pitched for the average closer over the last 25 years:
Year Sv/IP 1977 16.55% 1978 19.37% 1979 18.56% 1980 19.51% 1981 19.46% 1982 19.46% 1983 21.29% 1984 24.62% 1985 24.36% 1986 25.59% 1987 23.60% 1988 34.88% 1989 37.10% 1990 36.74% 1991 38.35% 1992 38.32% 1993 49.12% 1994 39.71% 1995 46.58% 1996 43.42% 1997 42.53% 1998 44.89% 1999 42.07% 2000 41.35% 2001 45.87% 2002 47.33%
1993 is the highest but 2002 is next. It appears that the numbers are climbing over the last couple of years as offenses are coming back down to earth, analogous to the 1990 season. I don't see anything here that indicates that managers are willing to junk the one-inning closer any time soon. But then again someone reviewing the state of pitching circa 1979, would think by Kent Tekulve's and Mike Marshall's performances that closers would continue to pitch 90 games and 130 innings a year for some time.
Something tells me though that something like what the Red Sox are doing, something so much different, will be tried and will be successful over the next few years. That new germ of an idea will reinvigorate the bullpen and the closer role specifically. It may be James' closer-by-committee. It may be the second coming of Kent Tekulve. Who knows?
However, I doubt that it will be closers pitching fewer innings and recording more saves, like James envisioned twelve years ago. I think that some asymptote (read limit) has just about been reached. Given that closers are now pitching fewer innings, there is a greater volatility year-to-year in the ERAs and general overall effectiveness. A guy may look great in a small sample like 60 innings in year one but terrible in the same number of innings in year two. Case in point, here are the team leaders in saves since 1977, whose ERA was over 5.50. Note that most of them had their fair share of successes as well in the careers:
Year ERA Closer 1994 8.71 Mike Perez 1994 8.49 Paul Shuey 1997 7.27 Norm Charlton 1999 6.84 Jeff Montgomery 1994 6.65 Joe Grahe 1993 6.48 Rob Dibble 1991 6.00 Dave Smith 2001 5.96 La Troy Hawkins 1987 5.89 Jay Howell 2000 5.86 Jeff Brantley 1996 5.79 Mike Henneman 1997 5.79 Heathcliff Slocumb 1989 5.74 Willie Hernandez 2002 5.74 Hideki Irabu 1983 5.61 Dave Beard 1993 5.56 Doug Henry
So all I can say is that I believe that the current strategy will not last long though I don't know what will replace it. I guess that is in the nature of a discontinuous break from history: it's a new road that can head anywhere, in theory. Let's all watch what the Sox are doing this year, and as other closers with 4.00+ ERAs struggle on various teams, let's see how those teams react. It should be interesting.
Here are the leaders in relief appearances and saves for the last thirteen years. Note that there is a good mix of closers and middle relievers:
Name RA SV G Mike Stanton 814 64 815 Dan Plesac 782 56 796 Mike Jackson 769 130 769 Roberto Hernandez 693 320 696 Jesse Orosco 691 23 691 Steve Reed 671 18 671 Doug Jones 668 225 672 Mike Timlin 660 114 664 Mark Guthrie 652 14 687 Jeff Nelson 644 23 644 Paul Assenmacher 643 42 644 Rod Beck 642 266 642 Robb Nen 639 314 643 Chuck McElroy 636 17 643 Trevor Hoffman 632 352 632 Jeff Shaw 614 203 633 Todd Jones 607 184 607 John Franco 605 274 605 Jose Mesa 605 225 695 Buddy Groom 604 25 619 Rich Rodriguez 604 8 606 Bob Wickman 599 156 627 Dennis Cook 589 9 638 Rick Aguilera 588 311 607 Mike Fetters 585 99 591 John Wetteland 582 329 587 Doug Henry 582 82 582 Jeff Montgomery 578 285 578 Stan Belinda 577 79 577 Dave Veres 574 94 574 Scott Radinsky 557 52 557 Paul Quantrill 552 19 616 Eric Plunk 549 27 557 Eddie Guardado 548 75 573 Gregg Olson 548 190 548 Heathcliff Slocumb 548 98 548 Mike Myers 545 14 545 Mark Wohlers 533 119 533 Randy Myers 531 291 543 Jeff Brantley 531 171 547 Dennis Eckersley 530 293 530 Mel Rojas 525 126 525 Graeme Lloyd 516 17 516 Bob Patterson 512 27 518 Tony Fossas 511 6 511 Darren Holmes 503 59 509 Name RA SV G Trevor Hoffman 632 352 632 John Wetteland 582 329 587 Roberto Hernandez 693 320 696 Robb Nen 639 314 643 Rick Aguilera 588 311 607 Dennis Eckersley 530 293 530 Randy Myers 531 291 543 Jeff Montgomery 578 285 578 John Franco 605 274 605 Rod Beck 642 266 642 Troy Percival 475 250 475 Lee Smith 436 244 436 Mariano Rivera 438 243 448 Doug Jones 668 225 672 Jose Mesa 605 225 695 Jeff Shaw 614 203 633 Gregg Olson 548 190 548 Tom Henke 322 189 322 Todd Jones 607 184 607 Billy Wagner 386 181 386 Armando Benitez 495 176 495 Ugueth Urbina 355 174 376 Jeff Brantley 531 171 547 Mike Henneman 381 156 381 Bob Wickman 599 156 627 Billy Koch 277 144 277 Jeff Russell 339 143 339 Bryan Harvey 218 135 218 Todd Worrell 336 130 336 Mike Jackson 769 130 769 Danny Graves 363 129 367 Mel Rojas 525 126 525 Mitch Williams 309 124 311 Antonio Alfonseca 340 121 340 Mark Wohlers 533 119 533 Kazuhiro Sasaki 193 119 193 Mike Williams 345 116 400 Ricky Bottalico 460 114 460 Mike Timlin 660 114 664 Bobby Thigpen 248 110 248 Jason Isringhausen 219 108 271 Jeff Reardon 233 101 233 Keith Foulke 349 100 357 Billy Taylor 317 100 317
Here are the totals per role for the decade:
Year GP GS SV CG CG% RA P/G #P SP SP% RP RP% SP/RP Swing% 1990 12694 4210 1113 429 10.19% 8484 3.015 483 100 20.70% 209 43.27% 174 36.02% 1991 13171 4208 1132 366 8.70% 8963 3.130 475 102 21.47% 212 44.63% 161 33.89% 1992 13251 4212 1109 419 9.95% 9039 3.146 441 101 22.90% 177 40.14% 163 36.96% 1993 14839 4538 1192 371 8.18% 10301 3.270 507 101 19.92% 238 46.94% 168 33.14% 1994 10642 3200 777 255 7.97% 7442 3.326 469 129 27.51% 223 47.55% 117 24.95% 1995 13865 4034 1000 275 6.82% 9831 3.437 551 108 19.60% 279 50.64% 164 29.76% 1996 15596 4534 1116 290 6.40% 11062 3.440 539 104 19.29% 260 48.24% 175 32.47% 1997 15859 4532 1139 266 5.87% 11327 3.499 534 114 21.35% 253 47.38% 167 31.27% 1998 16827 4864 1265 302 6.21% 11963 3.459 557 126 22.62% 274 49.19% 157 28.19% 1999 17277 4856 1217 236 4.86% 12421 3.558 586 111 18.94% 301 51.37% 174 29.69% 2000 17220 4858 1178 234 4.82% 12362 3.545 606 124 20.46% 307 50.66% 175 28.88% 2001 17624 4858 1210 199 4.10% 12766 3.628 591 138 23.35% 299 50.59% 154 26.06% 2002 17611 4852 1224 214 4.41% 12759 3.630 609 129 21.18% 301 49.43% 179 29.39%
Year
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